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With the final phase of the European Monetary Union under way concern 
has been raised over the regional implications of the European Central 
Bank's (ECB) Monetary Policy. Departing from the standard approach 
utilized by the ECB, this book provides a comprehensive theoretical 
framework to explore the ways through which money and monetary policy 
may affect regions. 
Regional Monetary Policy examines the role that the banking system and 
the liquidity preference of economic agents play in the transmission of 
central banks' monetary policy decisions to regions within a country or 
countries within a currency union. This book utilizes a unique framework 
built upon the basic principles of the Post Keynesian monetary theory which 
enables the identification of a new way for money and monetary policy to 
have a regional impact: the behavioural effect. 
This book will prove essential reading for all students of economics 
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Foreword 
We are delighted to be invited to write the Foreword to this volume. It 
brings together and extends Carlos Rodriguez-Fuentes's important and 
innovative work on regional finance and the differential regional impacts 
of monetary policy. 
The contribution this book makes to our understanding extends beyond 
the specifically regional field. Carlos makes a much more general 
contribution by developing fully a Post Keynesian account of money and 
banking and the mechanism by which monetary policy is transmitted 
through the banking system. The contrast between the Post Keynesian 
approach and the more conventional money-macro approach is drawn out 
in the discussion of monetary policy. The conventional approach assumes 
that money is under the control of the monetary authorities, while the Post 
Keynesian approach stresses the active role of the banking system in the 
creation of money. This challenges the whole idea of thinking of monetary 
policy in terms of exogenous shocks. 
The realism of the analysis is grounded in its application to regional 
economies, both within and among nations. Until recently, regional 
economics had been treated as of minor importance within the discipline. 
But, since the introduction of the euro, regional economics has enjoyed 
much broader application and has drawn more extensively on monetary 
and macroeconomic theory. 
In the application to the impact of monetary policy on different regions, 
the role of the banking system becomes even more clear. Banks exercise their 
power over credit creation differentially, depending on their perceptions of 
region-specific risk and growth potential. But this power also depends on 
the stage of development of the banks concerned. Within nations, small 
firms in particular regions may be dependent on borrowing from local banks 
with less credit-creating capacity than national banks. Even more clearly, 
national banking systems may be at different stages of development, as well 
as having differing conventional behaviours, something which is very 
apparent within the euro-zone. This translates into a variable regional 
impact of monetary policy. Until recently, the subject of regional finance 
has been comparatively underdeveloped. But now the political importance 
xvi Foreword 
of the euro has prompted a significant research agenda, which has almost 
exclusively drawn on conventional money-macro theory and competition 
theory. This book provides an important counterweight to this body of 
research, opening up another perspective, and one which we feel is both 
closer to the real operations of the banking system and accordingly more 
fruitful. 
Regional analysis is normally dogged by data availability problems, 
which impede effective empirical analysis. Carlos's work provides some rare 
examples of econometric analysis of the regional impact of monetary policy 
for the euro-zone, Spain and the US, where regional data are less scarce. 
Again the analysis is all the more effective for being accompanied by a 
critical analysis of the extensive body of empirical work based on the 
conventional money-macro approach. 
We feel personal pleasure in being involved in Carlos's book in this way, 
for he is someone we admire as a creative and careful thinker, and value 
greatly as a colleague and friend. 
Sheila Dow and Victoria Chick 
Dunblane, 27 November 2004 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Delimiting the aims and scope of the book 
This book is about the regional effects of monetary policy and was partially 
motivated by the increasing attention that this topic is attracting in Europe 
over the last decade or so. I have always found it very interesting that the 
same national central banks that never paid much attention to this issue in 
the past for regions within national economies are now supporting joint-
research programmes to study the cross-country differences in the responses 
to monetary policy shocks within the euro area. 1 
This increasing interest in Europe could probably be explained by the 
fact that, in January 1999, with the establishment of the third and final 
stage of the European Monetary Union (EMU), some European Union 
(EU) countries became regions within the euro area. This fact has raised 
some concerns over the regional implications of the European Central 
Bank (ECB) monetary policy and there is accordingly an increasing number 
of contributions addressing this issue. 
This book aims to contribute to this debate by presenting a theoretical 
framework that explores the ways through which money and monetary 
policy may affect regions. Our analysis emphasizes the role that the banking 
system and the liquidity preference of economic agents (including banks) 
play in the transmission of central banks' monetary policy decisions to 
regions within a country, or countries within a currency union. 
One peculiarity of this framework, which is built on the basic principles of 
the Post Keynesian monetary theory, is that it broadens the scope of the 
analysis of the regional effects of monetary policy by taking into account the 
underlying factors determining regional credit availability: the stage of 
banking development and the liquidity preference of financial agents 
(including the banking system). The consideration of these two variables 
allows us to identify a new way for money and monetary policy to have a 
regional impact: the behavioural effect. 
Our analysis specifically suggests that monetary policy affects regional 
credit availability through its influence on banks' and borrowers' liquidity 
preference and that regional differences in terms of banking development 
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and liquidity preference may produce higher instability in credit availability 
in less developed regions. This argument clearly contrasts the orthodox one, 
which assumes that regional credit shares mirror regional GDP shares, since 
money is considered to be a means of payment and, consequently, its 
demand is only determined by the transaction motive. This argument is 
sometimes extended by pointing out that peripheral regions may face a long 
run decrease in their credit shares because banks tend to lend in these 
markets less than they borrow, whereas the contrary applies to more 
developed regions. However, this interregional distribution of financial 
funds is usually seen as efficient and neutral since it assures that funds are 
driven toward the best alternative investment projects (which are usually 
located in central markets, where investment is less risky and also offers 
better prospects in the long run). This argument implies that, from an 
empirical point of view, there should be a close correspondence between 
both regional GDP and the credit shares, and regional GDP per capita and 
credit shares. However, there is some empirical evidence that shows that 
the relationship between regional GDP per capita and some banking 
variables is highly variable across some European countries (Mackay and 
Molyneux 1996: 758). Our empirical results also point out to the existence of 
a more unstable pattern of credit availability in the less developed regions in 
Spain.2 We interpret the variability of such nexus as an indication that a 
stable relationship between monetary and real variables does not exist, as 
orthodox monetary theory suggests, since this relationship depends very 
much on behavioural responses which are difficult to predict. 
Contrary to the orthodox view, we will suggest that credit instability is 
explained by changes in banks' liquidity preference alongside business 
cycles, and not only for regional differences in terms of GDP rates of 
growth. This constitutes the way through which monetary policy and the 
banking system may influence regional development: by producing unstable 
patterns of credit availability for some particular regions, and not a long run 
decrease in their credit shares. 
The theoretical framework presented in this book is based on the assump-
tion that, as the financial system develops (stage of banking development), 
central banks lose their ability to directly influence the money stock, so 
the money supply becomes increasingly endogenous to the economic pro-
cess. However, and contrary to orthodox monetary theory, an endogenous 
money supply does not mean that regions face a horizontal money supply 
thanks to interregional arbitrage. An endogenous money supply means that 
any increase in liquidity depends more on the demand for credit (and thus 
borrowers' liquidity preference) and on the willingness of banks to supply 
credit (and thus the banks' liquidity preference) than on the central bank's 
direct interventions. Consequently, even at the regional level the money 
supply is the outcome of the willingness of the banks to create credit in 
response to demand, although subject to indirect influence (but 
not determinism!) from the central bank. 
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One of the consequences of the framework presented in this book is 
that the proper analysis of the regional impact of monetary policy should 
explicitly take into account the spatial differences in terms of banking 
development and liquidity preference, as well as the influence that monetary 
policy may have on such variables (the behavioural effect), and not only the 
structural differences that might produce regional asymmetric responses to 
exogenous monetary policy shocks (the structural effect). 
1.2 Money is regionally neutral ... unless there are 
market failures 
Orthodox economic theory has usually assumed that monetary policy has 
no role to play in economic development. Money is considered as a separate 
variable whose only role is to ease the exchange of goods already produced. 
Consequently, all that money can do is to affect the general level of prices 
(when it is supplied in excess for exchange purposes) but not the real output 
(at least in the long run). According to this view, financial factors play 
no role in regional development since monetary policy has no real effects 
and the banking system simply allocates scarce financial resources among 
regions. The argument runs as follows: the central bank sets the money 
supply in accordance with the real needs (the transaction motive in the 
demand for money) and then the money multiplier determines the total 
available supply of bank credit. Finally, the banking system passively 
distributes total amount of available credit among regions according to 
demand pressures. 
This perspective offers very few exceptions where money, banks and 
monetary policy could influence regional development. One of these pos-
sibilities arises when the existence of segmentation in credit markets 
interferes in the equilibrating interregional financial flows that other-
wise would exist (Roberts and Fishkind 1979, Moore and Hill 1982). 
However, as long as financial markets work properly, that is financial 
markets are fully integrated, regions would never experience financial 
problems since they potentially face a perfectly elastic supply of credit 
(see Barts 1968, Moore and Nagurney 1989). Under these conditions, 
there will always be equilibrating interregional financial flows which, in 
turn, would mean that money is of no significance at the regional level. 
Another possibility why monetary policy matters for regions is when 
national monetary policy shocks produce different responses in regions 
(Beare 1976). 
The predominance of the above argument might have led regional 
scientists to generally omit the inclusion of money and monetary policy in 
their analysis or to belittle the power of money in explaining regional 
income differences. Therefore, there is a tendency to interpret money and 
monetary flows as mirroring regional economic differences rather than a 
key factor which might have played a role in their explanation. 
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This lack of interest in financial variables within regional economics 
could be explained by the following three factors. 3 First, regional 
economists have usually used the orthodox assumption that money and 
monetary policy are neutral in the determination of real income, at least in 
the long run. Consequently, if money does not matter at the national level, 
as orthodox monetary theory suggests, it does not matter at the regional 
level either. The second factor is that regions do not have monetary tools. 
If a region does not really have the chance to implement its own monetary 
policy, what is the point in studying these matters? Third, even if regions 
were to use monetary tools, their extreme openness and perfect capital 
mobility would leave them no possible control over their monetary condi-
tions (the money supply would be horizontal at some interest rate level 
and, therefore, endogenous). 
These reasons might have led regional scientists to rule out money and 
monetary variables in their analysis, or when they have decided to include 
them, to consider them endogenous, that is, determined at the national 
level (such as the money supply or the interest rate) and mirroring real 
economic differences. This explains why regional monetary analysis has 
usually corresponded with global monetarism theory, since regions, like 
small open economies in the international context, are supposed to face a 
horizontal supply of money at some interest which is fixed, in national or 
international markets.4 Providing that financial capital flows freely from 
one region to another, interregional monetary flows mirror real ones unless 
some market failure inhibits such accommodating behaviour. All of these 
reasons explain why traditional models of regional income determination, 
such as Neo-Classical models, cumulative causation models, I-0 models 
and multi-sector models, have excluded monetary variables. Of these 
traditional models, only export base and econometric models have included 
some kind of monetary variable in their specification. 5 Regional econo-
metric models in tum have usually included some monetary variables in 
their specification, either in simple equations where regional income is 
linked to some national variables (such as GDP, interest rates or money 
supply), or in simultaneous models, where interest rates are very often 
included as an exogenous variable (see, for example, Czamanski 1969, 
Glickman 1977, 1980a, 1980b). The consequence of all of these is that, 
as Richardson (1973: 12-13) pointed out, traditional regional economics 
has not been able to make any significant contribution to discussions of 
national monetary policy. 
The macroeconomic perspective is covered in a large empirical liter-
ature studying the regional impact of monetary policy; particularly for the 
United States (see, among others, Scott 1955, Lawrence 1963, Beare 1976, 
Fishkind 1977, Miller 1978, Garrison and Chang 1979, Mathur and Stein 
1980, Chase Econometric 1981). However, most of these contributions 
seem to be a regional extension of the national discussion about whether 
or not money matters6 (Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes 1997: 903). 
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Consequently, the 'old regional macro literature' has implicitly taken for 
granted the neutrality of monetary policy so it has attributed the regional 
effects of monetary policy to either the existence of a market failure (lack 
of information, segmentation, money illusion, etc.) or structural differences 
which make the transmission mechanism differ from one region to another. 
Consequently, most empirical work has focused on identifying the factors 
which may lead to some segmentation in regional credit markets or the 
regional structural differences in terms of IS and LM slopes, respectively. 
In fact, these two approaches, along with the other contributions which 
have considered money as being the cause of regional business cycles, have 
attracted most empirical effort. Nevertheless, most of these pioneering 
contributions paid no attention to either the differences in regional financial 
structure or to the changing nature of the financial structure and the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This latter aspect is at the 
centre of attention of the 'newer' contributions which have flourished 
because of the third stage of EMU, so the 'old literature' on the regional 
impact of monetary policy has been complemented with some 'newer' 
contributions, which are mainly concerned with the consequences which 
might stem from the existence of significant differences in the transmis-
sion mechanism of the European Central Bank monetary policy to the 
member economies of the euro area (see Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes 1997, 
Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow 2003). 
1.3 When countries become regions, monetary policy suddenly 
matters again 
When the EU entered the third stage of EMU, in January 1999, the euro-
area member economies became regions from the monetary policy 
perspective. It was when 11 national economies of the EU lost their 
monetary policy identity (in favour of the ECB) that the concerns over 
the regional implications of the single monetary policy came to the forefront 
of the economic debate in Europe and elsewhere. 
Since then there has been an increasing concern for studying the 
transmission mechanism of the ECB monetary policy within the EMU 
area. These concerns are grounded on the fact that empirical evidence 
reveals substantial differences in financial structure across countries in the 
euro area (De Bandt and Davis 1999, Danthine et al. 1999, Schmidt 1999, 
Bondt 2000, Maclennan et al. 2000, Padoa-Schioppa 2000, Kleimeier and 
Sander 2001, Cabral et al. 2002) and on the expectation that these 
differences will persist for long in the retail credit markets (Danthine et al. 
1999, Padoa-Schioppa 2000, Cabral et al. 2002). 
This evidence has led some authors to suggest that differences in financial 
structure among the European Monetary Union countries may produce a 
differential impact of the ECB's monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein 1997b, 
Cecchetti 1999, Bondt 2000). However, other authors have pointed out that 
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these regional asymmetries in the monetary policy transmission mech-
anism are only temporary, since cross-country differences in financial 
structures will be removed in the future as the process of economic inte-
gration continues and economic policy coordination among euro countries 
increases (see Dornbusch et al. 1998: 52, Ehrmann 1998: 28, Arnold 1999: 
22, Arnold and Vries 2000: 213, Clausen 2001: 172, Suardi 2001). 
The current orthodox empirical literature on the regional effects of 
monetary policy approaches the issue from two different perspectives. 
On the one hand there is the literature studying the consequences of a 
common monetary policy when the currency union member economies 
show a low degree of business cycle synchronization (Carlino and Defina 
1996, 1999, Angeloni and Dedola 1999, Ramos et al. 1999a). The aim of this 
literature is to suggest that a common monetary policy might not 
fit to all members of a currency union, particularly when the regions 
(national economies) of the currency union differ in terms of inflation and 
growth rates. 
On the other hand there is the larger group of contributions focusing 
on studying the cross-country differences in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy within a currency union. Sometimes this literature is 
simply focused on studying whether (or not) the euro countries differ in 
their responses to monetary policy shocks. In other cases it also tries to 
provide an explanation for the cross-country differences in responses to 
monetary shocks. In this case, the asymmetric impact of monetary policy is 
usually explained by differences in economic and/or financial structure 
that increase the sensitivity of some regions to exogenous changes in 
national interest rates or business cycles (which are considered to be caused 
by monetary policy). 
One of the constant conclusions from surveys of the empirical literature 
on asymmetries in the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy 
in Europe is that the empirical evidence is not conclusive at all. These 
surveys usually mention that there is a high variability in the results, both 
across countries and across studies. They agree that no robust conclu-
sions can normally be extracted from the available empirical literature 
(Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998: 12, Guiso et al. 1999: 61). Some authors 
have even gone further and suggested that, given the complexity of the 
task, the econometric analysis 'will never be able to resolve this issue' 
(Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998: 32). 
Why has current empirical work failed to deliver a robust and definitive 
conclusion about the regional effects of monetary policy, in Europe or 
elsewhere? 
Honestly, it is hard to say. Everyone has his own opinion in this 
regard. Some authors could suggest that it is the variety of econometric 
techniques which are used that produces so much noise in the results. 
Others could say that the imperfection of data sets does not allow us to 
fully test theories. It could also be argued that institutional differences 
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across countries may also be important to interpret the variability of the 
results. For sure all these arguments are relevant. 
However, we believe there could be other explanations to this question 
and that the theoretical framework presented in this book can help us 
understand these other possibilities. In our opinion, the current orthodox 
empirical literature normally ignores the fact that monetary policy influence 
on economic activity depends on the 'behavioural responses' of economic 
agents, and these responses cannot always be fully anticipated by policy-
makers nor completely modelled by econometricians. Economic agents are 
of course rational but we all know that human beings do not always 
follow deterministic rules. Fortunately the possibility for change is always 
present and the economics profession is aware of that and calls it 'structural 
change' (econometricians call it 'structural break'). 
Monetary theory therefore has to take into account that monetary 
policy might work differently, depending on the 'behavioural responses' by 
economic agents, which is reflected in their liquidity preference. However, a 
quick look at the current research on regional monetary policy would 
show that the usual explanation for the differences in responses to monetary 
shocks relies on macroeconomic structural differences ( economic and 
financial structure), and very little attention is paid to the determinants of 
economic agent responses, 7 which certainly influences the macroeconomic 
structure (outcome) but are always open to change in a non-deterministic 
way. Thus, it is difficult to say which part of the asymmetric effect is 
due to structural differences and which part is due to the behaviour of the 
economic agents (Mazzola et al. 2002). This is an important issue, since the 
current structural differences in Europe might disappear in the future, but 
this would not necessarily mean that asymmetries in the transmission of 
monetary policy would automatically vanish: there would still be scope 
for asymmetries arising from differences in the behavioural responses of 
economic agents to monetary policy. The theoretical framework presented 
in this book is aimed towards emphasizing the relevance of those 
behavioural responses in the analysis of monetary policy. 
1.4 Structure of the book 
The book has seven chapters, including the Introduction (Chapter 1) and 
Conclusions (Chapter 7). Chapters 2 and 5 are reviews of literature which 
are necessary to build up Chapters 3 and 4, where our own arguments are 
developed. 
Chapter 2 offers a review of the literature on the transmission mech-
anism of monetary policy. The aim of this chapter is to review the 
differences between different schools of economic thought with regard to 
the specification of the transmission mechanism. Our analysis will show 
that most of these differences are more of degree than of kind, as the idea of 
a mechanism that links real and monetary forces is commonly shared by all 
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the participants in the debate. Actually, to a great extent the debate on the 
transmission mechanisms of monetary policy has been developed within 
the IS-LM model and, in particular, it has been focused on the slopes of the 
IS and LM curves. 
Chapter 3 explores the meaning and role of monetary policy in a context 
of endogenous money, where endogenous money means a situation where, 
thanks to the development of the banking system, the increase in liquidity 
depends more on banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference than on the 
central bank's direct interventions. The theoretical perspective put forward 
in this chapter aims to challenge the view that central banks do unilaterally 
determine the money supply through monetary policy. This view is present 
in most economic textbooks, where the money supply curve is represented as 
vertical and any change in money stock is thus represented as a horizontal 
displacement of this line. This displacement is due to exogenous monetary 
management by the central bank. Money supply is therefore considered to 
be exogenous in the sense that it is unilaterally determined by the monetary 
authorities. Our analysis in Chapter 3 will instead suggest that, as financial 
systems develop, central banks lose their ability to control the money stock, 
since the money supply becomes endogenous to the economic process. 
However, our analysis will also challenge the belief that, in a context of 
endogenous money, monetary policy is ineffective to influence the liquidity 
of the economic system. On the contrary, we will assume that central banks 
can always influence the liquidity of the system, but it is only influence, since 
monetary policy is only one of many factors which are involved in the 
process of liquidity creation. Consequently, our conception of endogenous 
money in Chapter 3 will not mean that money is not important, as some 
orthodox economists could argue. Instead, the endogenous money approach 
only removes the causal role attributed to money by orthodox economists, 
but not necessarily its power to affect real variables nor affect the whole 
process of credit creation (Dow 1993a: 26). 
Chapter 4 applies the notion of endogenous money developed in 
Chapter 3 to build up a theoretical framework that allows us to explore 
the way through which money and monetary policy may affect regions. The 
peculiarity of this framework is that it broadens the scope of the analysis by 
taking into account the underlying factors determining regional credit 
availability, specifically the stage of banking development and the liquidity 
preference of financial agents (including banks). Contrary to other 
theoretical approaches employed to study the regional effects of national 
monetary policies, our framework particularly pays attention to the 
influence of monetary policy on banks and borrowers liquidity preference, 
that is, 'the behavioural effect' and not just the effects of monetary policy on 
economies with divergent economic structures ('the structural effect'). 
Chapter 5 offers an analytical review of the existing literature on the 
regional effects of monetary policy. The chapter not only reviews the 
'old literature' on the regional impact of monetary policy, that is, those early 
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empirical contributions explicitly concerned with the regional effects of 
national monetary policies, but also the 'newer contributions' studying 
differences in the transmission mechanism of the European Central Bank 
monetary policy to the member economies of the euro area. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents some empirical evidence which we think might 
be useful to illustrate some of the issues mentioned in the book about the 
regional dimension of national monetary policies. 
2 A dichotomized view of 
the economic process 
The transmission channels of monetary 
policy 
2.1 Introduction 
There is a large amount of literature which deals with the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy, i.e. the way monetary policy exerts its effect 
on economic activity .1 The basic assumption which underlies this 
'transmission mechanism view' is that a real and monetary side of the 
economy can be clearly distinguished, where the monetary transmission is 
the way through which both sides interact with each other. Furthermore, 
real forces of the economy are seen as determining not only the value of real 
variables such as the level of income and employment but also real interest 
rates. Interest rates are hence considered to be a 'real phenomenon' since 
they are determined by, on the one hand, the real forces of productivity 
(investment decision), and thrift (savings decision) on the other. Interest 
rates are thus determined in the goods market by the interaction between 
savings and investment schedules, being its role to equalize both decisions. 
Within this framework financial variables are seen as factors which may or 
may not help the economic system to reach its 'real equilibrium' by means of 
easing or speeding up the exchange of goods and services already produced. 
Nevertheless, monetary variables do not play any role in determining the 
real outcome itself, since the only role which is left for money to play is a 
'negative' one, in the sense that, at best, it is considered to be responsible 
for determining the general level of prices (inflation) in the long run or 
business cycles in the short run. Within this schedule money matters, but 
for its potential power to disrupt the real economy. 
The aim of this chapter is to review the discrepancies between different 
schools of economic thought with regard to the specification of the 
transmission mechanism. It will be shown that, for some economists, this 
mechanism takes on the form of a direct and simple effect which runs from 
changes in money supply to expenditure. On the contrary, other economists 
believe that the way through which monetary variables affect economy 
is not so clear, more complicated and indirect than monetarists sustain. 
This group is usually known as Keynesians. 
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Our analysis will show that most of these differences are more of degree 
than of kind, as the idea of a mechanism that links real and monetary forces 
is commonly shared by all the participants in the debate. Actually, to a great 
extent, the debate on the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy has 
been developed within the IS-LM model and, in particular, it has been 
focused on the slopes of the IS and LM curves. On the one hand, we have 
the monetarist view, which has tried to show that the LM curve was steep 
and, therefore, demonstrate the power of monetary policy to affect nominal 
income. On the other hand, there is the Keynesian view, which tries to 
demonstrate the opposite, i.e. the existence of a flat LM curve, which would 
mean that monetary policy was either partially or totally ineffective in 
affecting nominal income. In fact, the debate has mostly centred on the 
size and stability of the parameters of the model, not on the suitability of the 
IS-LM model itself, as many authors have pointed out: 
the neoclassical synthesis claims to have produced a macro model of 
complete generality in the sense that, given a certain set of assumptions, 
it can be used to prove the macroeconomic propositions of classical 
economists and, given a different certain set of assumptions, it can be 
used to validate Keynes' conclusions. 
(Morgan 1978: 4) 
Chick (1973) emphasized this point when analyzing the theoretical 
differences, or, to be more precise, the absence of theoretical differences 
between the two schools of economic thought. Indeed, she has suggested 
that both schools 'are consistent with several specifications of the struc-
tural equations of IS-LM' and, therefore, differences between them only 
arise when some parameters of the model are constrained to be zero 
(Chick 1973: 19, Chick 1985: 79-98). Figure 2.1 illustrates this point. 
This suggestion in tum, would partially explain why the debate between 
both schools of thought has been mainly developed on an empirical basis, 
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Figure 2.1 Monetarists and Keynesians on monetary policy effectiveness. 
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data' could a definitive answer to this debate on the value of the parameters 
be found. In fact, Friedman has many times suggested that 'the basic 
differences among economists are empirical, not theoretical' (Friedman 
1970: 234), and that the only way to know which 'pudding' is best is by 'eating 
them' (Friedman 1956: 17). However, he has also pointed out that differen-
ces among theories ('puddings') can not always be disentangled by 'eating 
them' (empirical testing) since only 'imperfect figures' (data), unable to 
'disentangle what is systematic and what is random and erratic', are 
available to researchers. This explains why both Fried.man's work and that 
of many of his followers has focused on trying to obtain perfect figures 
rather than on the elaboration of the theory (Friedman 1970: 235). 
The chapter is organized into five sections, apart from the introduction 
and the conclusion section. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 start with the monetarist 
and Keynesian views on monetary policy transmission, where by Keynesian 
is meant the neoclassical synthesis represented in the IS-LM model. 
Sections 2.4 and 2.5 present the New Classical and New Keynesian reac-
tions, whereas Section 2.6 offers a brief review of recent macroeconomic 
developments that, in some authors' opinions, are producing a new 
synthesis which, 'like in the synthesis of the 1960s, melts classical with 
Keynesian ideas' (Goodfriend and King 1998). 
2.2 The monetarist view 
The monetarists' view is based on the assumption that the economy is 
naturally stable and, as long as markets work properly, should work at its 
equilibrium level. This equilibrium level is assumed to be achieved by the 
interaction between the production function and the supply of labour. 
Equilibrium therefore has nothing to do with money or monetary variables 
as it is assumed to be dependent on real factors endowments (capital and 
labour). 
Within the monetarist model money is as a factor which comes into play 
to ease the exchange of goods and services already produced and, in so 
doing, it might fuel production as it speeds up the exchange. Money would 
therefore be, according to John Stuart Mill, just 'a machine for doing quickly 
and commodiously, what would be done, though less quickly and commo-
diously, without it.' (John Stuart Mill, as quoted in Friedman 1969: 105). 
The reason why money demand is mainly considered as being determined 
by the transactions motive is due to its function as a means of exchange. 
Monetarists thus consider money, as Dow (1985: 182) has pointed out, as 
if it were 'a technical input' and, as such, its quantity should be supplied 
according to the real needs given by real production (transaction motive). 
As money is (i) an asset which does not earn any interest and (ii) is only 
demanded for transaction purposes, any quantity of money supplied over 
this transaction level, which in tum is determined by the availability of 
capital and labour, will produce a portfolio disequilibrium. Agents will try 
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to restore the imbalance by changing money for any other assets in order 
to restore their former desired portfolio (because money does not earn 
any interest). It is precisely this switch from money to any other asset, 
both financial and real, that fuels spending and, as a result, money income. 
The monetarist transmission mechanism is therefore a direct effect which 
runs from money supply shocks to money income (equation 2.1). 
!:!,.. Money supply ~ portfolio changes~ !:!,.. Expenditure (2.1) 
The relationship shown in equation 2.1 has been empirically assessed by 
means of some reduced-form models, such as the so-called St. Louis 
Equation or V AR models. Its aim is to find empirical support for the 
monetarist view on the monetary transmission mechanism. 2 However, 
Keynesian authors have criticized this direct mechanism as a 'black box' 
because it only shows the correlation between money and income but is 
unable to provide an explanation of how money affects economy. 
Further, monetarists consider that real income is relatively fixed within 
the short run because physical capital is fixed within this period of time. 
However, they also acknowledge that, within the very short run, income 
may overshoot its long run equilibrium level when 'money illusion' exists. 
Money illusion may then lead both supply of and demand for labour to 
grow when real wage changes. However, this possibility for income to 
overshoot is removed in the long run since economic agents cannot be 
constantly fooled by nominal shocks in the long run.3 To monetarists then, 
inflation 'is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon' and, what is 
more important, could be eliminated by implementing a close control of the 
quantity of money. Monetarism has not only given an explanation of the 
inflation process but also offered its definitive solution, and those two points 
should be considered, as Johnson has pointed out, when analyzing the 
political success of monetarist thought.4 
The monetarist model may be formally summarized as follows 
(Morgan 1978: 19): 
D(:) = s(:) (labour market) 
Y = y(N, K} (production function) 
I(r) = S(r) (goods market) 





where equations 2.2 and 2.4 represent the equilibrium conditions in the 
labour and goods market, respectively. Equation 2.3 is the production 
function and equation 2.5 represents the money demand. W is the nominal 
wage, P is the price level, D and S are the demand for and supply oflabour, 
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which depend on real wages (W/P), Y and N are the level of output and 
employment, I and S are the investment and savings functions, which 
depend on the interest rate (r). 
The assumptions underlying the model can be summarized as follows. 
First, income is fixed within the short term because both capital (K) and 
labour (N) are relatively fixed within the short term. Secondly, as money 
(M) is only held for transactions motive its demand must be specified in 
real rather than in nominal terms. Thirdly, money demand is stable and 
depends on a very small number of variables, mainly permanent income and 
interest rate, and its interest elasticity is low. Friedman's first specification of 
money demand took a form similar to equation 2.5, which did not include 
any interest rate, but he later considered interest rates among the param-
eters upon which money demand depended. He specifically put forward the 
money demand function5 shown in equation 2.6: 
M I ( ldP ) p = y, w,rm,rb,re, P dt'µ (2.6) 
where M, Pandy are the stock of money, the price level and the nominal 
income, respectively, w is the fraction of wealth in non-human form, 
rm is the expected nominal rate of return on money, rb is the expected 
nominal rate of return on fixed-value securities, re is the expected 
nominal rate of return on equities, (1/p)(dP/dt) is the expected rate of 
change of prices of goods and hence the expected nominal rate of return 
on real assets, and µ is a symbol standing for whatever variables other 
than income may affect the utility attached to the services of money 
(Friedman 1970: 204). 
If the above monetarist assumptions were right, then monetary policy 
would be the most important tool to affect expenditure and money income. 
Further, if output were relatively fixed within the short term then monetary 
policy would be responsible for business cycles when it is used for doing 
'what monetary policy cannot do', that is, to maintain interest and 
unemployment rates below their 'natural' levels (Friedman 1969: 99). The 
monetarist advice for avoiding business cycles and economic instability 
would therefore be to use monetary policy considering 'what monetary 
policy can do', that is, in Friedman's own words: 'prevent money itself 
being a major source of economic disturbance . . . and provide a stable 
background for the economy (price stability)'. (Friedman 1969: 105-106). 
Additionally, price stability would be best achieved, following Friedman's 
advice, by setting a steady and low rate of monetary growth, although 
the latter has not been acknowledged as a necessary condition. 6 
It is worth noting that this argument is based on the assumptions 
that money demand is stable, depends on a few variables (permanent income 
and interest rates) and that its interest rate elasticity is low or insignificant. 
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2.3 The Keynesian view 
Keynesian economists, contrary to the monetarist ones, do not think that 
the economy automatically works at its full employment capacity but that 
some economic management is usually required in order to achieve such 
a situation. This belief has led them to focus their attention on the role 
of fiscal and monetary policy for restoring market equilibrium when an 
insufficient level of aggregate demand exists. The Keynesian model, which is 
shown below, is similar to the monetarist. Differences between the two only 
arise when specifying the demand for money and the consumption function 
in order to let a speculative motive (interest rate) and wealth (Pigou's effect) 
play a role in money demand and consumption functions, respectively 
(Morgan 1978: 62). 
I(r) = S(r, Y, W) (goods market) 
M 
p = L(r, Y) (money market) 
(2.7) 
(2.8) 
where I and Sare the investment and savings functions, respectively, r is 
the interest rate, Y is the level of output, W is the nominal wage, M is the 
money supply, P is the price level and L represents the money demand 
function, which depends on both r and Y. 
Within the Keynesian model the debate over the relative effectiveness 
of monetary policy for affecting income and employment has focused on 
the size and stability of the monetary multiplier (equation 2.10) with respect 
to the fiscal one (equation 2.9).7 What is worth noting for our analysis here 
is that the monetary multiplier depends on both the interest elasticity of 
income and interest rate elasticity of money demand. These two factors are 
the variables which would determine the relative effectiveness of monetary 
policy to affect output. 
I 
dy = I - c'(l - t') + (i'k' /1'/g (fiscal) (2.9) 
i' /1' 
dy = 1 _ c'(l _ t') + (i'k' /l') dm (monetary) (2.10) 
where dy, dg and dm represent the change in the level of output, public 
expenditure and stock of money, respectively, c' is the propensity to con-
sume, i' is the interest rate elasticity of investment, k! is the income elasticity 
of money demand, l' is the interest rate elasticity of money demand, and 
t' is the tax rate. 
Hence, the standard Keynesian monetary mechanism (equation 2.11) is 
not a direct one, which runs from money to income, but rather an indirect 
one whose first step is the change in interest rates due to the monetary 
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change, while the second one would be made up of the effect that 
interest rates would have on expenditure (investment).8 
ll.M ➔ Vr ➔ ll.investment ➔ ll.real output + prices (2.11) 
However, the Keynesian view also asserts that monetary policy becomes 
ineffective when either money demand is highly interest elastic or the income 
function is highly interest inelastic. In the former case (money demand is 
interest elastic) the first step within the Keynesian chain is broken since 
monetary authorities are unable to affect interest rates because of the perfect 
elasticity of money demand. This is the so-called 'liquidity trap' (LM curve 
being flat). On the other hand, when the spending function is interest 
inelastic, changes in interest rates will have no effect on spending, nor 
income, because investment is not sensitive to changes in interest rates. 
In this case it is the second step of the transmission chain that breaks down 
(IS curve being a step function). Further, the effectiveness of monetary 
policy to affect the 
... real economy will depend not so much on the absolute ... but on 
the relative values of these two elasticities (LM and IS curves) ... The 
higher the interest elasticity of demand for money relative to the 
interest elasticity of demand for goods, the less the impact of open-
market operations on the demand for goods. 
(Goodhart 1989a: 271) 
Tobin (1947) already made this point as early as 1947. A summary is 
given in Table 2.1. The former explains why the debate on the effectiveness 
of monetary policy focused on empirical grounds until the mid 1970s and 
was concerned with the estimates of the interest rate of money demand and 
income function as those would determine the ability of monetary policy to 
affect economic activity.9 
An extended version of the IS-LM Keynesian model is the open one, 
i.e. the one which lets the external sector come into play. As far as the 
monetary effect on income is concerned, the open version of the IS-LM 
model differs from the closed one in that at least one new variable has to be 
added to the standard 'interest rate monetary channel'. In fact, most large 
macroeconomic Keynesian models10 have included in their monetary 
transmission mechanisms the exchange rate and other variables such as 
wealth or price assets, the former being considered of great importance due 
to the current greater links among different economies. 
The inclusion of both the exchange rate and the external sector in the 
model partially modifies the standard analysis of the effectiveness of 
monetary policy and requires additional information regarding exchange 
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Table 2.1 Fiscal vs monetary policy effectiveness within the standard IS-LM model 
Interest rate-elasticity 
(a) 'L' function perfectly 
inelastic, implying either 'I' 
function not perfectly 
inelastic, or 'S' function 
of positive elasticity, or both. 
(b) 'L' function elasticity 
between zero and infinity, 
and either 'I' function not 
perfectly inelastic or 'S' 
function of positive 
elasticity, or both. 
(c) (i) 'L' function perfectly 
elastic, regardless 
of other elasticities, or 
(ii) 'I' and 'S' functions 
perfectly inelastic, 
regardless of 'L' function 













rate regime, degree of international capital mobility, degree of substitu-
bility among national and foreign financial assets, etc. On the one hand, 
it is sustained that the greater the international capital mobility and the 
degree of substitubility among national and foreign financial assets, the 
lower the ability of national monetary policy to affect local interest rates. 
In fact, some argue that no differences between national and international 
interest rates could exist since arbitrage would remove any significant dif-
ference.11 On the other hand, it has also been pointed out that the exchange 
rates regime may also modify the mechanism, in the sense that a fixed 
regime would not allow for differences in interest rates between national and 
foreign rates, whereas some influence on national interest rates is acknow-
ledged when a flexible or 'dirty floating' system exists. 
The monetary chain of causation when a fixed exchange rate regime 
exists is shown in equation 2.12. 
l::!..M---+- Vr---+- capital out.flows---+- V M---+- l::!..r (2.12) 
In this case, the existence of a fixed exchange rate regime, along with 
perfect international capital mobility, removes the potential effect that 
national monetary policy could have on expenditure, as interest rates are not 
allowed to change because of the perfect arbitrage among national and 
international markets.12 Hence, any reduction in interest rates ( due to an 
exogenous increase in money supply) can only be temporary, since it would 
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immediately lead to an infinite outflow of financial capital searching for 
higher interest rates anywhere else. This capital outflow would reduce the 
national money supply, returning interest rates to their former level. Both 
perfect arbitrage and fixed exchange rates guarantee that national interest 
rates keep in line with international ones. 13 
Equation 2.13 in turn shows the adjustment mechanism when a 'dirty 
float' system exists. In this case, interest changes are allowed for some 
variation although this will be lower than the one experienced in the closed 
version of the model. 
!iM--. Vr--. exchange rate depreciation 
--. capital outflows--. V M--. !ir (2.13) 
The final effect on interest rates in this case will depend on whether 
financial outflows due to interest rate arbitrage account for as much as the 
inflows due to balance of trade surplus because of the exchange rate 
depreciation. The open version of the IS-LM model is specified in equations 
2.14 and 2.15. The two terms on the right-hand side in equation 2.14 
represent the internal and external sectors, respectively. Y is the level of 
output, P is the price level, r is the rate of interest, and e is the exchange rate. 
The external variables are denoted by *. Finally, equation 2.15 shows the 
interest rate equilibrium between national and international interest rates 
which must hold when a fixed exchange rate and perfect capital mobility 
exist. 
Y= A(r, Y)+ r( Y, r, e;) 
r= r* 
2.4 The New Oassical monetary theory 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
New Classical monetary economics points out that only unanticipated 
changes in money can affect real output although the neutrality of money 
is sustained in the long run {Lucas 1972: 103). The new classical argu-
ment rests upon these assumptions. First, there exists a 'natural rate' of real 
output and, secondly, economic agents behave optimally in light of their 
objectives and expectations and form their expectation in a forward-
looking way, rather than on either an adaptive or backward-looking way. 
New classical authors additionally acknowledge that agents sometimes 
may not be able to differentiate between a rise in the general level of prices 
and a change in relative prices, 14 especially when they face unexpected or 
unanticipated changes in money supply. Consequently, New Classical 
monetary theory accepts the existence of a direct effect between monetary 
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changes and income but only when the former is not fully anticipated 
by economic agents. Otherwise, the monetary effect will be on nominal 
variables (prices, interest rates, etc.) because economic agents would 
fully anticipate the effect of such a monetary increase. Economic agents 
behave in a 'rational way' and as such are free from money illusion. 
The conclusion then is that only unanticipated monetary changes will affect 
(destabilize) the economy, although in the long run money is still considered 
to be neutral. 
A consequence of the above argument is that any stochastic (unantic-
ipated) change in the quantity of money which leads to changes in price level 
may increase temporarily production and employment, because producers 
interpret the current increase in prices as a change in their relative prices and 
not as an increase of the whole set of prices of the system (Lucas 1972, 1973, 
Sargent and Wallace 1975, Barro 1976, 1977b). 
Business cycles are hence seen as a monetary phenomenon because the 
economy, by assumption, grows at a 'natural rate'. Business cycles are 
viewed as simple producers' responses to the difference between expected 
and current price, the latter being explained by unexpected monetary 
shocks. Lucas' (1972, 1973) aggregate supply, which is specified in equation 
2.16, shows this relationship. 
(2.16) 
where Y denotes real gross national product (GNP) or employment, P is 
the implicit GNP deflator, and e is a sequence of independent, identically 
distributed random variables with zero mean (Lucas 1972: 117-118). 
The sort of model that new classical economists use to test their theory 
could be seen as just an 'ad hoe modification' of the monetarist reduced 
form models which try to analyze the effect of both monetary and fiscal 
variables on the economy. As we have pointed out above, monetarist 
economists have tried to assess the greater power of money to affect income 
with respect to fiscal variables by means of reduced-form models which 
relate monetary income to fiscal and monetary variables. One of these 
models is the so-called St. Louis Equation (equation 2.17) 
(2.17) 
where Y, M, E and R stand for income, money, public expenditure and 
public revenues, respectively, a is a constant, and µ, is the error term. 
Neoclassical economists have also tested their hypothesis by way of 
reduced-form models which are similar to the St. Louis form. One difference 
between the monetarist and neoclassical models is that the latter include 
an 'ad hoe hypothesis' whose aim is to distinguish between anticipated 
and unanticipated monetary shocks. Barro (1977b), for example, used this 
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assumption when testing for the effects of monetary policy ( equations 2.18 
and 2.19). 
log(i:: U) = aa + P1DMR,-1 + P2DMR,-2 
+ p3MIL, + P4MINW, + µ, 




where U stands for annual average unemployment rate, DMR is the 
unanticipated monetary change (residuals from equation 2.19), MIL is a 
measure of military conscription (military personnel), MINW is minimum 
wage rate, µ is error term, DM is the annual average money growth 
rate, FED V is real expenditure of federal government, and UN is the 
dependent variable in equation 2.18 (Barro 1977b: 104-107). 
Equation 2.19 could be interpreted as the 'ad hoe hypothesis' to 
discriminate between expected and unexpected monetary changes. The 
unanticipated change in money supply is simply identified with the 
random term DMR, which stands for the difference between the expected 
and current money supply. 
The implication for monetary policy that is drawn from this model is 
that only unanticipated money matters, although some have also found 
that anticipated monetary changes also matter. 15 
2.5 The New Keynesian monetary theory 
New Keynesian monetary theory focuses on the role that monetary 
policy plays when 'imperfect competition' is present in the economic 
system. It is the existence of imperfect competition in the goods, labour or 
financial markets which leads to some kind of price rigidity or market 
segmentation, making monetary policy powerful for having 'real' effects, 
at least in the short run under some assumptions. Unions, the existence of 
long run contracts and implicit contracts, and wage efficiency theory, 
are among the factors which would explain, for example, wage rigid-
ity within labour markets. As Fischer points out: 'the effectiveness of 
monetary policy (to affect output) depends ... on the existence of nominal 
long-term contracts' (Fischer 1977: 194) and explains this through the 
following expression. 
(2.20) 
where a is a constant and p is a parameter, Y is the level of output, P is 
the logarithm of the price level, and t-1P1 is the expectation taken at the 
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end of period t - 1 of P,, and µ, is a stochastic disturbance term 
(Fischer 1977: 193). 
Further, Fischer develops his argument from an 'expectational Phillips 
curve' of the Lucas form (equation 2.20), his conclusions will not differ 
significantly from those of the New Classical models, i.e. that only 
unanticipated monetary changes matter (unless there exists wage indexa-
tion). He put it as follows: 
monetary policy can affect output ... by creating a difference between 
the actual price and the expected price level. However, if the money 
supply is known to economic agents . . . then the predictable effects 
of the money supply on prices are embodied in r-1Pr. and monetary 
policy can affect output only by doing the unexpected. 
(Fischer 1977: 193--194) 
Therefore, according to the New Keynesian theory, it is not only 
imperfect competition (sticky prices, both in goods and labour markets), 
but also the monetary 'surprise', that makes monetary policy have real 
effects in the short term. Consequently, in this point new Keynesians 
agree with the new classical position: only unanticipated monetary policy 
can affect output. 16 
The new Keynesians have also paid attention to the role of credit in the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy. This literature is usually 
known as the lending or credit view and, contrary to the traditional 'money 
view' that sees monetary policy operating exclusively only through changes 
in interest rates, it maintains that monetary policy might make access to 
credit more difficult or expensive for some borrowers when there exist credit 
market imperfections.17 According to this view, monetary policy ' ... will 
affect the level of investment, not through the interest-rate mechanism, 
but rather through the availability of credit' (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981: 409). 
Consequently, the transmission mechanism implicit in the textbook 
IS-LM model is rejected, since it does not take into account such capital 
market imperfections. 18 
The assumption that capital markets are imperfect leads to the inclusion 
of two additional channels in the transmission of the monetary policy, 
namely the balance sheet channel and the lending channel (Bemanke and 
Gertler 1995). A large amount of empirical evidence exists which supports 
the relevance of these two original channels, 19 and could be complemented 
with the much more recent 'capital channel' (Van den Heuvel 2002a, 2002b). 
This literature is concerned with the existence of credit rationing 
when capital markets fail to work properly. It is therefore when capital 
markets are incomplete that the banking system becomes important for 
the transmission of the monetary policy, due to several factors. From the 
bank lending channel perspective, monetary policy may affect credit 
availability to some kinds of borrowers (those most dependent on banks) 
22 A dichotomized view of the economic process 
when banks do not have close substitutes for bank loans in the asset side 
of the bank's balance sheet. On the other hand, the 'balance sheet channel' 
(also known as the financial accelerator) might reinforce monetary policy 
through their effects on the financial structure of economic agents. Finally, 
the 'bank capital channel' suggests that monetary policy might also 
influence lending through its impact on bank equity capital (Van den 
Heuvel 2002a, 2002b ). Overall, what this literature suggests is that banks 
are important for the 'transmission mechanism' of the monetary policy 
because they provide credit and monetary policy affects credit availability 
when capital markets are imperfect. 
2.6 The New Neo-Classical synthesis 
There is a growing argument that macroeconomics is currently moving 
towards a new synthesis (Goodfriend and King 1998, Clarida et al. 1999, 
Blanchard 2000, Hoover 2003), as in the 1960s. This new synthesis, which 
has been labelled as the New Neo-Classical Synthesis, seems to have put an 
end to the intellectual battles in macroeconomics which have been going 
on over the last decades, particularly between the flexible price model 
(neoclassical macroeconomics and real business cycles) and the sticky one 
(new Keynesian). The debate seems to be over, since the model which 
has emerged from this new synthesis incorporates both Keynesian and 
Neoclassical ideas. This point has been made by Goodfriend and King 
(1998), who state that the New Neo-Classical Synthesis: 
involves the systematic application of intertemporal optimization 
and rational expectations, which are applied to both the pricing and 
output decisions (Keynesian model) as well as to the consumption, 
investment and factor supply decisions (Classical and real business 
cycles) . . . It also embodies the insights of monetarists20 regarding the 
theory and practice of monetary policy. 
(Goodfriend and King 1998: 2) 
The new synthesis seems to be the result of a move into a middle ground 
in between the two ruling orthodox paradigms in macroeconomics from the 
1980s. This theoretical convergence has been possible because 'the 
neoclassical insistence on microfoundations has been adopted by almost 
all mainstream economists, and most have accepted microfoundations in 
the form of the representative-agent model'. Another reason is that 'Neo-
Classicals have been forced to concede that without sticky prices or wages 
their model cannot reproduce the empirical fluctuations in the economy' 
(Hoover 2003: 425). Some economists argue that it is because of this 
convergence that some argue that 'today the ideological divide is gone. 
At the frontier of macroeconomic research, the field is surprisingly 
a-ideological' (Blanchard 2000: 39). 
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According to Goodfriend and King (1998: 25), the New Neo-Classical 
Synthesis is characterized by two central elements: (a) the introduction of 
intertemporal optimization and rational expectations into dynamic macro-
economic models (Neo-Classical and real business cycles) and (b) the 
assumptions of imperfect competition and costly price adjustment (new 
Keynesians). The second element implies that monetary policy is not neutral 
in the short run since it exerts a powerful influence on aggregate demand 
through the changes in real interest rates. However, the influence of rational 
expectations and real business cycles (the first element) ensures monetary 
policy is neutral in the long run, so the output is supply-determined. 
The macroeconomic model of the new synthesis could be represented 
by equations 2.21, 2.22 and 2.23 (Clarida et al. 1999: 1664-1668), although 
some other representations have also been proposed (Meyer 2001: 2-4).21 
Xt = -0(i, - Et:ll't+d + g, 




where x is the output gap, ,r is inflation, i is the nominal interest rate, 
g and µ are disturbances terms, a is a constant that can be interpreted as 
the steady-state nominal interest rate, and p is a parameter that reflects the 
interest rate smoothing behaviour (0 < p < 1 ). All the variables are expressed 
as a deviation from their long run levels. 
Equation 2.21 is an aggregate demand (IS curve) whereas equation 2.22 is 
a Phillips curve. Contrary to the traditional IS-LM framework, the new 
model replaces the LM curve for an interest rate monetary rule (equation 
2.23). The replacement of the LM curve could be seen as an improve-
ment of the traditional IS-LM model, since it is widely accepted that 'most 
central banks now pay little attention to monetary policy in conducting 
monetary policy' (Romer 2000: 149). This explains the increasing concern 
for the need to produce a 'Keynesian Macroeconomics model without an 
LM curve'. 22 
Aside from replacing the LM for a concrete23 monetary policy rule, 
there are some other aspects which differentiate this model from the tradi-
tional textbook IS-LM model.24 First, in the new IS current output depends 
both on expected future output and the interest rate (Clarida et al. 1999: 
1665). Secondly, in the new Phillips curve 'the expected future inflation 
enters additionally, as opposed to expected current inflation. The implication 
of this is that inflation depends entirely on current and expected future 
economic conditions' (Clarida et al. 1999: 1667). 
It is worth pointing out that within this model the influence of monetary 
policy on economic activity depends entirely on the existence of 'distortions' 
(namely price rigidities) which give rise to 'small variations in the average 
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markup25 over time' due to monetary policy shocks (changes in the 
short-term interest rates) (Goodfriend and King 1998: 31-32). It is also 
acknowledged that monetary policy cannot affect the steady-state level of 
the markup. Some authors have also mentioned that in the new synthesis 
monetary policy works not only through changes in the short-term interest 
rates (as in the traditional IS-LM model) but also through 'beliefs about 
how the central bank will set the interest rate in the future, since households 
and firms are forward looking' (Clarida et al. 1999: 1668). The objective of 
monetary policy within this model is to adjust interest rates to the current 
state of the economy with the aim of maximizing welfare. The maximization 
of welfare is achieved when central banks succeed in minimizing the squared 
deviations of both output and inflation from their target levels (Clarida et 
al. 1999: 1668-1669). Consequently, monetary policy is designed to remove 
any signs or expectations of inflationary pressures in the short to medium 
term and so contribute to the normal or natural development of the 
economy (Goodfriend 2004: 36-38), which is independent of any monetary 
factors in the long run (monetary neutrality). 
2. 7 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a brief review of how monetary policy affects 
the economy according to some monetary theories. In particular, the 
chapter has paid attention to the monetarist, Keynesian, New Classical and 
New Keynesian perspectives. The chapter has also considered the more 
recent contributions by the so-called New Neo-Classical Synthesis. 
Our analysis suggested that according to both monetarists and new 
classical economists, monetary policy is neutral since for those two schools 
money is just a veil which has nothing to do with the real economy. 
Monetarist and new classical economists believe that money can only 
cause inflation in the long run or economic instability (business cycles) 
in the short run. 
On the contrary, Keynesians and new Keynesians have insisted on the 
idea that money may affect economic activity, at least in the short run and 
under some assumptions. This idea is also central in the New Neo-Classical 
Synthesis, since their followers maintain that even though there is little trade 
off between inflation and real activity in the long run, monetary policy can 
have important real effects in the short run due to temporary nominal 
rigidities in the economy (Goodfriend and King 1998: 2). 
Despite the theoretical differences between these different schools in terms 
of how monetary policy works, they seem to share a common assumption: 
monetary policy only matters when there are distortions in the economy. 
These distortions take the form of imperfect competition, information, 
nominal rigidities, etc. Without such an assumption monetary policy should 
be neutral, since money would only act as a medium of exchange, as the 
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oil which lubricates the machine. However, the oil is not considered to be 
an integral part of the machine itself. 
In the next two chapters we will elaborate a theoretical framework where 
the monetary policy is seen as an integral part of the economic system. 
From this perspective the monetary policy will not be limited to a passive 
response to economic developments, since it might well play a crucial role 
in determining the long-run equilibrium values of real variables. The 
theoretical framework developed in Chapters 2 and 3 will be primarily based 
on the Post Keynesian monetary theory. 
3 Beyond transmission 
mechanisms 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the meaning and role of monetary policy in a context 
of endogenous money, where endogenous money means a situation where, 
thanks to the development of the banking system, the increase in liquidity 
depends more on banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference than on the 
central bank's direct interventions. 
The theoretical perspective put forward in this chapter aims to challenge 
the view that central banks do unilaterally determine the money supply 
through monetary policy. This view is present in most economic textbooks, 
where the money supply curve is represented as vertical and any change in 
money stock is thus seen as a horizontal displacement of this line. This 
displacement is due to exogenous monetary management by the central 
bank. Money supply is therefore considered to be exogenous in the sense 
that it is unilaterally determined by the monetary authorities. 
The chapter will instead suggest that, as financial systems develop, central 
banks lose their ability to control money stock, since the money supply 
becomes endogenous to the economic process. However, our analysis will 
also challenge the belief that, in an endogenous money context, monetary 
policy is ineffective to influence the liquidity of the economic system and 
its only role consists of setting the level of interest rates over which banks 
mark-up their loan applications. On the contrary, we will assume that 
central banks can always influence the liquidity of the system, but it is only 
influence, since monetary policy is only one of many factors which are 
involved in the process of liquidity creation. Our analysis shares the view 
expressed by Chick and Dow (2002), who see monetary authorities as 
having certain influence on both interest rates and bank behaviour, but 
without absolute power to determine both. 
Consequently, an endogenous money approach will not mean that money 
is not important, as some orthodox economists could argue. Instead, the 
endogenous money approach only removes the causal role attributed to 
money by orthodox economists, but not necessarily its power to 
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affect real variables nor to affect the whole process of credit creation (Dow 
1993a: 26). 
The chapter has six sections. Since our analysis is built on the principles of 
the Post Keynesian monetary theory, Section 3.2 offers a brief review of 
their view on money and monetary policy. Section 3.3 goes on to explore the 
meaning of and possibilities for monetary policy in a context of endogenous 
money. Section 3.4 addresses the influence of monetary policy on liquidity 
while Section 3.5 concentrates on monetary policy non-neutrality. Finally, 
Section 3.6 offers some conclusions. 
3.2 The Post Keynesian view on money and monetary policy 
One of the relevant characteristics of Post Keynesian monetary theory 
is that 'money is integral to the capitalist process' (Dow 1993a: 1). This 
particular characteristic means that, contrary to other schools of economic 
thought (see Chapter 2), no clear distinction between real and monetary 
forces is made. This feature points out the difference between general 
equilibrium models and Post Keynesians with regard to the way money 
enters the economic system. Within walrasian general economic models 
money only plays a single role: to lubricate exchange. Money does not play 
any real role in the determination of real variables; money only matters in 
the determination of the level of prices. Real forces determine real variables 
and monetary ones determine nominal ones. It is because of this dichotomy 
that money is usually introduced, exogenously, into the analysis only once 
the output has been already specified. 1 This explanation is sometimes 
reinforced by suggesting that early societies were barter economies and 
money appeared in society to solve problems associated with barter (barter 
is both costly and time-consuming). However, some authors have suggested 
that 'early societies were not barter economies, that markets did not spring 
forth from barter, and that money was not invented to facilitate exchange' 
(Wray 1990: 4). 
It is because money is introduced (exogenously) 'at the end of the 
real process' that a 'transmission mechanism' must be found in order to 
explain what role money will play within these models. The discussion 
then turns into whether this mechanism is either direct or indirect, as 
we have seen in Chapter 2, but not on the very distinction between real 
and monetary sides of the economy. That is the reason why some 
authors have argued that 'the difference between Keynesians and 
monetarists lies in their policy recommendations, not in their theories' 
(Chick 1973: 1). 
On the contrary, Post Keynesians do not need to specify a 'transmission 
mechanism' to link the real and monetary sides of the economy because 
'money and monetary institutions are an inseparable part of the real sector 
of the real world' (Davidson 1978a: 213-214). That link is not needed, since, 
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as some authors have pointed out, money 
does not enter the system like manna from heaven, nor is it dropped 
from a helicopter, nor does it come from the application of additional 
resources to the production of the money commodity 
(Davidson 1978a: 226) 
According to Davidson, money enters into the system through two 
different ways. These ways are 'the income-generating process (the finance 
motive)' and the 'portfolio-change process' (Davidson 1978a: 226-227, 
Davidson 1988: 163-166). In the 'income-generating process' money 
appears at the beginning of the production process because 'production 
takes time and purchase of inputs has to be financed prior to the sale of the 
output' (Arestis 1992: 180). Since money, and particularly credit, bridges 
the financial gap which arises in the production process, then investment is 
no longer constrained by a shortage of saving.2 But, in this case, money 
also plays another important role: to reduce the uncertainty attached to 
the investment process itself. Davidson put it as follows, 
In the absence of money contracts, it is unlikely that entrepreneurs, 
facing a statistically unpredictable and unknowable future, would 
undertake large and long-lived complex production processes 
(Davidson 1988: 154). 
In the 'portfolio-change process' money comes through 'fiscal and open-
market operations initiated by the monetary authorities' (Arestis 1992: 180). 
Money, in this case, is seen as exogenous to the extent that monetary change 
comes from the central bank. However, monetary change in the 'income-
generating process' is endogenous because it is the private sector which 
commands this increase in the money supply (providing that both borrowers 
and lenders 'agree' in their expectations). On the one hand, we have the 
borrowers (credit demand) who are willing to run into debt because they 
'expect' an increase in their demand. On the other hand, there is the bank-
ing system (the supply side) which, depending on whether it shares this 
optimism, may be willing to meet all the increase in the demand for credit. 
The issue regarding whether the banking system meets all the increase 
in the demand for credit remains as a point of disagreement within the 
Post Keynesian school. The source of disagreement does not lie in the 
'impossibility' of the banking system to expand lending because of a lack of 
reserves but in its willingness to do it because of its liquidity preference. 3 
Post Keynesians also differ from orthodox economists in their methodol-
ogical roots. To post Keynesians, 'it is impossible to establish any one set of 
axioms which is broad enough to support an adequate theoretical structure', 
and this explains why it has been suggested that 'any problem requires to 
be analyzed from a variety of angles (historical, political, sociological, 
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and psychological)' (Dow 1993a: 12-14). In other words, economic analysis 
must be context-specific because only this kind of analysis is able to take 
into account all these specific aspects. Further, only in a context-specific 
analysis can the role played by institutions in the economic process be 
introduced, and 'institutions, economic and political, are of paramount 
importance in shaping economic events' for post Keynesians (Arestis 
1992: 88-89). 
Post Keynesians consider the IS-LM model as a misleading representation 
of the economic process because it assumes that monetary and real sectors 
are independent (IS and LM curves are independent). However, Davidson 
(1978b: 52-57, 1978a: Chapter 7) has noted that once we consider the 
finance motive within the demand for money, the IS and LM curves are 
not independent anymore and, therefore, the debate about their relative 
slopes becomes misleading. Secondly, post Keynesians consider money to 
be endogenous and not exogenous, as is assumed within the IS-LM model. 
Finally, the IS-LM model is not context-specific, like other general models. 
This final observation is worth noting because, as suggested in the former 
chapter, most of the debate on the effectiveness of monetary policy has been 
reduced to the simple estimates of the IS and LM slopes. However, Chick 
(1986, 1988) has suggested that the effectiveness of monetary policy may 
depend very much on the stage of development of the banking system itself. 
Therefore, the relevant question for post Keynesians is not 'whether' mone-
tary policy is effective or not, but 'when' and under which 'institutional 
setting' it becomes effective. This issue has been particularly addressed by 
Chick in her stages of banking development (Table 3.1 ). 
During the first stage banks are merely intermediaries in the sense that 
lending is limited by their deposits. The cash drain from lending is high in 
this stage. Deposits are used as a means of saving rather than a means of 
payment. It is when deposits begin to be used as a means of payment that we 
move on to the second stage. In this stage reserves rather than deposits 
constrain lending and the banking multiplier begins to apply. 
Stage three is characterized by the extended use of interbank lending. 
This in tum allows some banks to lend more than what their reserve 
position allows. At this stage the bank multiplier works faster than it did in 
stage two. 
Stage four appears when monetary authorities begin to act as a 'lender of 
last resort' in order to preserve financial stability of the banking system. It 
is at this stage when the causation between reserves and lending reverses. 
Hence, whereas for lower stages bank lending may be constrained by scarce 
bank reserves, here the causation between those variables works the other 
way round since central banks will always supply reserves to demand from 
banks. If central banks are to fulfil this lender of last resort function they 
have to supply reserves, at a penalty price if they want, but they have to. 
This is why it is said that rather than a 'lender of last resort function', 
what central banks offer is a 'lender of first resort function' (Chick 1988: 6). 
Table 3.1 Chick's stages of banking development: implications for monetary policy effectiveness 








Banking system characteristics 
Banks are intermediaries between savers 
and investors. Investment is limited by 
saving; lending is limited by deposits 
Claims on deposits are widely used as means 
of payment. Deposit multiplier applies 
(bank reserves determine lending) 
Interbank lending arises but, as a whole, 
deposit multiplier still applies 
Central Monetary Authorities act as 'lender 
of last resort'. Banks are less constrained by 
their reserve positions. It is banks' liquidity 
preference and not reserves which determines 
lending. The former causality between 
reserves and lending is thus reversed 
Liability management and increased competition 
among banks characterize this stage. Banks 
seek lending opportunities rather than wait 
for them to come 
Securitization and other banking practices 
(off-balance-sheet operations) make banks 
less vulnerable 
Source: Adapted from Chick (1986, 1988). 
Degree of monetary policy effectiveness 
Traditional monetary policy is more effective to 
control lending as this depends very much on banking 
reserves. Banking multiplier is less than 1 
Banking multiplier greater than 1, and determined 
by banks 
Banking multiplier works faster 
From here on, it is banks' willingness and not banks' 
reserves that determines how much credit is given. 
However, monetary policy may still exert some effect 
on lending as it may affect banks' behaviour 
(Same as Stage 4) 
Monetary policy is ineffective because lending and, 
therefore, monetary expansion, relies on banks' and 
borrowers' liquidity preference. Monetary policy may, 
however, affect these behavioural parameters 
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From this point bank lending will start to depend more on banks' 
willingness to supply credit than on banks' reserves position. 
Finally, in stages five and six the former tendency for bank lending to 
depend more on banks' behaviour rather than on banks' reserves is rein-
forced, due to factors such as: liability management, increased financial 
competition, securitization, etc. All these factors free bank lending from the 
reserve constraint, which in turn makes it difficult for monetary authorities 
to have strict control on bank lending and the supply of liquidity to the 
system. The supply of liquidity has become endogenous in the sense that it 
does not depend on exogenous injections of money on behalf of the central 
bank but it mainly depends on banks' and borrowers' willingness to lend 
and borrow, respectively. 
Time, uncertainty and money are three other key variables which very 
much define Post Keynesian monetary theory. These three variables have 
also been explicitly considered in other theoretical approaches, but their 
meaning in Post Keynesian theory is quite different. It is precisely here 
where major differences between the Post Keynesian and other theoretical 
approaches to money are to be found. 
As regards the variable time, post Keynesians usually consider time to be 
'historical' rather than 'logical'. Time is therefore irreversible and implies 
that 'economic decisions taken in the present will require actions which 
cannot be completed until some future day (or days)' (Davidson 1992: 15). 
On the other hand, uncertainty is clearly distinguished from predictable 
risk to the extent that to post Keynesians risk can be measured by recurring 
to the calculus of probabilities but uncertainty can not.4 The assumption 
here is that decisions taken today can affect, in an unpredictable way, the 
economic environment (the parameters of the model) and, therefore, no 
probability can be applied. It is recognized that 
errors, surprises and disappointments are part of the human condition 
... (therefore) economic agents in a Keynes world will take actions that 
would be considered irrational in a neoclassical world, e.g. the holding 
of money over periods of calendar time for liquidity motives. 
(Davidson 1992: 17) 
On the contrary, in neoclassical models it is assumed that, providing 
economic agents are rational, future events can be fully anticipated, at 
least within a probability distribution. However, many authors have 
insisted on the idea that uncertainty and risk are not the same thing. 
Keynes for example pointed out the differences between these two concepts 
as follows: 
By 'uncertain' knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean to distinguish 
what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of 
roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty . . . The sense in 
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which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European 
war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest rate 
twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the 
position of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About 
these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know. 
(Keynes 1973a: 113-114) 
With regard to money, post Keynesians have stressed, above all, its 
function as a store of value, because it is this fact that explains why a 
monetary economy works in a very different way to a barter one, i.e. an 
economy where Say's Law does not apply any more. In a barter economy, 
such as 
monasteries, nunneries, prisons, or even an Israeli Kibbutz ... a central 
authority directs and plans both the production and payments in terms 
of real goods distributed to the inputs according to some predetermined 
rules accepted by the members of the community. There is never any 
involuntary unemployment of monks, nuns, prisoners, ... Say's Law 
prevails. This is the world of neoclassical analysis. 
(Davidson 1992: 37) 
However, the existence of money permits that not all the money paid out 
to inputs in the production process will be spent on the products of industry 
because part of these earnings can be transferred to the future (savings 
in liquid assets, e.g. money). In this case, when money enters as a store of 
wealth, Say's Law does not apply any more and possibly involuntary 
unemployment in the economy arises. 
Even more important than the recognition of the relevance of time, 
uncertainty and money is the close relation which exists among them (Dow 
1993a: Chapter 2, Davidson 1978a). To be short, we could state that money 
exists because production takes time and the future is uncertain and 
unknowable. Historical time causes any investment decision to be made 
under uncertainty. The problem that investors have to face is the calculation 
of the profitability of the 'position' that they want to take (Davidson 
1982-1983, Davidson 1992: 48-50). This calculation entails the estimation 
of, among many other things, that we, the economists, include in the ceteris 
paribus condition, the stream of cash flows (wages, raw materials, interest 
payments, etc.) till the investment process begins to deliver its products, the 
expected price of our product, the level of demand, etc. The investor then 
faces an uncertain decision because all these expected variables, and many 
others not considered in the initial moment, can change in the future. The 
decision can be considered as a 'crucial experiment' (Shackle 1955) in the 
sense that no past experience is relevant to the future5 and decisions taken 
now can change the future in a totally unexpected way. Once uncertainty is 
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introduced in the analysis money follows naturally because money is a 
way to cope with uncertainty. On the one hand, because it helps put a 
limit on production costs when forward contracts are used in the pro-
duction process for the hiring of inputs (Davidson 1992: 42). On the other 
hand, because money is also a way to transfer purchasing power to the 
future (saving). This is so because people are confident that money will 
be always 'universally accepted in the discharge of contracts' (Davidson 
1992: 43). Therefore, money can be seen as a way to cope with uncertainty. 
As Keynes pointed out, if it is not because of uncertainty, 'why should 
anyone outside a lunatic asylum wish to use money as a store of wealth?' 
when there are many other financial assets which earn interest (Keynes 
1973a: 115-116). 
As we suggested earlier, the endogeneity of money supply is another 
characteristic which defines the post Keynesian monetary theory.6 Although 
the roots of the concept can be found in Keynes' writings, especially in 
his Treatise of Money, the concept itself has further been developed by 
post Keynesians. 7 
Post Keynesians see money supply as being determined endogenously 
to the system. However, mainstream economics considers money to be 
exogenous to the economic system, i.e. money supply is under the control of 
central banks through, mainly, their open market operations and mecha-
nism of reserve requirement.8 As real variables are considered to be deter-
mined by only real factors and money is only seen as a medium of exchange, 
the only role which is left for money is to determine the general level of 
prices (inflation). At most money can influence real variables when there is 
a 'failure' in the market process. For example, in the New Classical model, 
money plays a real role when agents cannot anticipate changes in money 
supply ('imperfect information' is present). Within the New Keynesian 
model, money affects output when either there is 'imperfect competition', 
which leads to price rigidity9, or 'imperfect information', which leads to 
credit rationing. However, if these imperfections would not exist, money 
would be neutral. It is this assumed neutrality of money, along with the 
assumption that money supply is under the control of monetary authorities, 
which explains why, within these models, the discussion on monetary policy 
is reduced to three main points: first, the determination of the channels 
through which monetary changes affect nominal income; second, which is 
the 'right quantity' of money to be supplied according to the needs of the 
'real economy'; and finally, which are the best instruments to control the 
liquidity of the system? 
Nonetheless, post Keynesians do not share this view because a clear dis-
tinction between real and monetary sides of the economy is not acknowl-
edged by them. On the contrary, as we have already noted, money is 
considered to be integral to the economic process. Money does not enter at 
the end but at the very beginning of the production process (Lavoie 1984: 
773). Credit is what finances or bridges the time-financial gap which arises 
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in each new investment, e.g. between the very moment we invest (and make 
outpayments in advance of the expected profitability of our investment) and 
the time where our investment begins to deliver products to be sold in the 
market. The monetary authorities and the banking system play a central 
role in this process because they can provide these credit needs in advance. 
This argument leads to another post Keynesian assumption: that it is not 
a shortage of savings what can constraint investment but a shortage of 
liquidity and finance (Davidson 1992: 51). 
Post Keynesians consider that money supply is 'credit-driven' and 
'demand-determined'. Money is credit-driven because money is seen as the 
outcome of the production process (Lavoie 1984: 775, Arestis 1992: 182). 
Money then cannot be the cause of changes in any economic magnitude 
because it is an outcome (Arestis 1992: 203). The causation chain then is 
reversed10 in comparison to the standard view. Causation does not run from 
money to nominal income but from income to money, since money-growth 
occurs prior to income-growth simply because money is credit-driven and 
the demand for credit depends both on current income and expected 
income. However, Wray (1992c) points out that 'the reverse causation 
argument does not mean that spending must increase before the money 
supply expands' because in the real world 'it may be difficult to establish 
empirically the relations between money and spending' for two main 
reasons: first, there is a wide variety ofliabilities that function as money and, 
secondly, money is created not only to finance spending, but also to finance 
purchases of financial assets and other things that do not show up in GNP 
(Wray 1992c: 299). 
On the other hand, money supply is considered demand-determined11 
because 'commercial banks are rarely constrained in terms of their reserves' 
(Arestis 1992: 201). The lender of last resort function of the central banks, 
access to the discount window, financial innovation, asset and liability 
management, access to international financial markets, etc., are some of the 
factors mentioned to explain why 'banks do not passively await deposits 
so they can issue loans' (Wray 1990: 73), but instead first make loans and, 
afterwards, worry about their reserves. 12 
Even though post Keynesian economists share the belief that money 
supply is endogenous, i.e. 'that the rate of money supply growth and, more 
important, credit availability are fundamentally determined by demand 
side pressures within financial markets' (Pollio 1991: 367), the degree of its 
endogeneity remains a controversial point. Two different views have been 
identified regarding this point, namely the 'accommodative endogeneity' 
and the 'structural endogeneity' (Pollio 1991: 367). 
The 'accommodative endogeneity' view is identified with authors 
like Kaldor (1986) and Moore (1988a). Moore maintains that it is not 
true that central banks can choose whether to control interest rates or 
monetary aggregates directly. They cannot do so because an 'elastic supply 
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of credit money in the short run is a necessary precondition of the 
perpetuation of system liquidity' (Moore 1988a: xi), and system liquidity 
must be guaranteed in order to avoid financial distortions. Therefore, he 
goes on: 
The supply of credit money responds endogenously to changes in the 
demand for bank credit. The supply of credit money is governed by 
the amount of credit granted (financial asset purchased) by banking 
institutions. Modern commercial banks are price setters and quantity 
takers in both their retail deposit and loan markets. As a result at every 
moment of time the money supply function should be viewed as 
horizontal. 13 It follows that the total quantity of money is both credit-
driven and demand-determined. 
(Moore 1988a: xii) 
One of the implications which can be drawn from this 'horizontality' of 
the money supply is that central banks do not exogenously determine the 
quantity of credit money in existence, and therefore, 
the entire literature of monetary control and monetary policy, IS-LM 
analysis, the Keynesian and the money multiplier, liquidity preference, 
interest rate determination, the influence of public sector deficits on the 
level of domestic interest rates, growth theory, and even the theory 
of inflation must be comprehensively reconsidered and rewritten. 
All models that treat money as exogenous ... are either mispecified or 
incomplete. 
(Moore 1988a: xiv) 
However, and contrary to Moore's horizontalist view, 'structuralist' 
post Keynesians argue that banks do not fully meet all credit demands 
(Lavoie 1984, Wray 1990, Dow 1993a and 1996b, Davidson 1994, Rousseas 
1986, Chick and Dow 2002). These authors do not agree with Moore's 
argument because 'in his model, there is no room for liquidity preference in 
the determination of interest rates' (Wray 1989b). Additionally, as Dow has 
suggested, for borrowers such as small firms and developing countries, 'it is 
not the general case that the banks are price setters and quantity takers' 
(Dow 1996b). What all these authors come to say it is that, perhaps, Moore 
has become too horizontal, 14 because money supply is more likely to be 
horizontal during expansions and (more) vertical during recessions (Wray 
1990, Dow 1993a, particularly Chapter 3). 
Another implication that follows from the above is that the analysis of 
the effects of the monetary policy on economy is no longer reduced to the 
calculus of monetary multipliers, nor is it possible to be evaluated in a pure 
theoretical ground because the issue will depend itself on factors which can 
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only be made explicit in a specific context. Chick summarizes the point 
in the following way: 
In monetary theory ... the main theme is the effects on the economy of 
variations in the quantity of money. The literature is extensive but 
inconclusive, ... Perhaps it is inconclusive because the effect of a change 
in the quantity of money is contingent upon the state of the economy at 
the time of the change and upon who issues the money and in exchange 
for what. 
(Chick 1992: 159-160) 
And she expands on the argument by pointing out that: 
A change in the quantity of money, however, never occurs in isolation: 
it always comes into the system in exchange, as half of some transaction, 
and its effects depend partly on what the other half is. An expansion of 
government-issued money may result from an increase in the govern-
ment's purchases of new goods and services, a direct stimulus to 
demand, or from an exchange for interest-bearing debt outstanding, in 
which case the effects are more roundabout. Bank money is expanded 
through increases in bank lending, so the effect of the change depends 
partly on what the borrower does with the proceeds of his loan. 
(Chick 1992: 160) 
The above argument means that when analyzing the effectiveness of 
monetary policy the point is not then to determine whether monetary policy 
is effective or not but when and why it has been effective. We believe that 
the 'whether matter' only fits in a world where money is considered to be 
fully exogenous. That is to say, a world where, due to the low stage of 
development of the financial system, the monetary authorities have a tighter 
control over the level of liquidity of the economy. Under these particular 
circumstances, some exogenous monetary management could be imple-
mented by central banks if they wanted to. This possibly explains why the 
impact of monetary policy on economy has been mainly addressed either by 
means of correlating money growth with output, or by looking at the effects 
that monetary changes have on some financial variables (interest rates, 
credit, exchange rate, etc.). If, for instance, these estimates showed money to 
have a strong effect on real variables, we should then conclude that money 
does affect output. The answer to the 'whether matter' would be: yes, money 
does affect output. 
However, one wonders whether this would still be the relevant question to 
address if, as we suggested earlier in this section, money were not exogenous 
to the economic system. What would happen then if the supply of liquidity 
depended more on banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference rather than 
on exogenous monetary authority interventions? Further, if money were 
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endogenous to the economic system, how should we understand the 
correlation between money and output? Would monetary growth be 
explained by exogenous central bank interventions alone? Would monetary 
authorities really be open to exogenously modify such a relationship? 
Furthermore, if money is credit-driven, how could we determine the real 
effect of any monetary increase without having additional information 
regarding the final use of credit, for example. Perhaps all these points would 
explain why empirical literature fails to offer a definitive answer to the 
debate of whether money affects output. Perhaps the issue, as we suggested 
above, is not to determine whether or not, but why and when monetary 
policy has been able to affect economic activity. 
Another implication that follows from the above argument is that a 
redefinition of the precise meaning of monetary policy is required. Although 
for lower stages of banking development the textbook monetary policy 
concept may apply, as we move on to further stages this concept does not 
apply any more. Additionally, central banks lose their ability to strictly 
control the liquidity of the system by means of open market operations 
at further stages of banking development, but instead rely more on the 
'expectational effect' that their policies may have on banks' and borrowers' 
liquidity preference. Monetary policy should be understood as a wider 
concept rather than a narrow one which only considers open market 
operations and reserve requirement instruments. Hence, variables such as 
financial regulation should also be included within this wider concept of 
monetary policy. We address this issue in the following section. 
3.3 A reconsideration of the meaning and role of 
monetary policy 
The New Pa/grave: A Dictionary of Economics defines monetary policy as 
follows: 
The term monetary policy refers to actions taken by central banks to 
affect monetary and other financial conditions in pursuit of the broader 
objectives of sustainable growth of real output, high employment, and 
price stability. 
(Lindsey and Wallich 1998: 508) 
It would be difficult to argue with this very general definition of monetary 
policy. Differences do, however, arise among economists when trying to 
expand on this definition. Orthodox monetary theory sees monetary policy 
as a simple combination of day-to-day interventions within financial 
markets. Hence, monetary policy is usually understood as injections ( or 
withdrawals) of cash (outside money) in primary money markets, either 
through open market operations or changes in the reserve requirement 
ratio. In its simplest form, monetary policy is then understood as shifts or 
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displacements of the LM curve within the IS-LM model, due to exogenous 
changes in the money supply which, in tum, are due to central bank 
interventions. 
Discussions of the practicalities of monetary policy soon become heavily 
conditioned by the type of banking system under discussion. Chick (1986) 
has extensively studied the different stages through which most banking 
systems proceed during their development. She demonstrates that the form 
of monetary policy which is appropriate and feasible depends on the stage 
of development of the banking system. In particular, she points out that the 
capacity for monetary authorities to exert direct control over monetary 
aggregates declines dramatically once a lender-of-last-resort facility is 
introduced. Then the central bank cannot determine the volume of reserves, 
nor credit and deposits. 
If money is supplied by commercial banks which have a considerable 
degree of latitude in determining credit levels, how much of the LM curve 
shift can be attributed exclusively to the actions of the monetary authorities? 
Would such a thing as a monetary policy exist if the money supply were 
endogenous? The argument we wish to develop here is that monetary policy 
cannot, in modem banking systems, be understood as the effecting of 
discrete changes in the money supply (either directly, or indirectly, through 
interest rate control). Nevertheless, this does not remove the possibility of 
effective monetary policy. But monetary policy needs to be understood as 
a much more complex intervention in a process within which money is 
endogenously generated. Further, the possibilities for monetary policy 
extend beyond manipulation of the traditional instruments ( open market 
operations, etc.) to encompass such elements as bank regulation and 
supervision. 
What we are suggesting here is that, as financial and banking systems 
develop and money supply becomes endogenous, the very concept of 
monetary policy should also change in order to take into account such 
major changes. Even though it is difficult for monetary authorities to 
control liquidity, central banks still intervene in markets through open 
market operations. We believe this kind of intervention is neither their 
only tool nor the most effective way to affect liquidity. As banking 
systems develop, monetary policies rely much more on indirect mechanisms 
than on direct ones; central bankers themselves are perfectly aware of 
their own limitations in affecting liquidity without risking financial 
instability. In other words, at higher stages of banking development, central 
banks are perfectly aware of the limits of the traditional textbook monetary 
policy rules, so that in practice they choose to affect liquidity through a 
variety of means, including influencing the mood of the market and bank 
supervision. 
This view of monetary policy is to be distinguished from the more 
standard one, which considers that monetary policy always works in the 
same way regardless of institutional factors, such as the degree of financial 
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development. In fact, traditional monetary analysis has usually drawn a line 
between monetary and financial or regulation policy.15 Monetary policy is 
concerned with monetary control whereas financial regulation deals with 
financial stability. Furthermore, orthodox economists consider financial 
regulation as a 'negative' factor that makes financial intermediation more 
expensive or less efficient. It is sometimes argued that bank regulation ( or 
over-regulation) has been responsible for periods characterized by 'missing 
money' or 'credit crunch' which, in tum, has made monetary control more 
difficult to achieve.16 Some others have claimed that central bank regulation 
may be seen as a 'tax on transactions intermediated through banks' (Wills 
1982: 249). Prudential financial regulation is thus never seen as being either 
an integral part of the monetary policy itself or as a 'positive' factor which 
may encourage lending by providing confidence into the workings of the 
financial system. 
But the existence of a regulatory burden on banks' capital level, banks' 
portfolios, shares, etc. may give confidence to the consumers of financial 
services as they perceive that such a system is being backed by monetary 
authorities (Dow 1993a: 20-21). Indeed the development of banking can be 
seen in terms of the creation of confidence in the banking system, which 
in tum allowed banks to grow while maintaining increasingly small reserve 
ratios. In other words, prudential regulation has made a positive 
contribution to the growth of banking, without which it is not clear that 
banks could now function effectively. Modem banking systems generate 
a money stock which is primarily inside money, i.e. money which is the 
liability of the banking system, with only fractional backing by outside 
money. The confidence in inside money reflects a confidence not only in the 
outside money (bank reserves) but also in the panoply of regulation and 
supervision which facilitates a backing by only fractional reserves. 
It is also useful to consider the balance between regulation for monetary 
control purposes and prudential regulation. The first form of regulation is 
likely to exert a larger effect when the banking system is less developed. The 
latter however will become more important for the more developed banking 
systems. This does not mean that central banks need to refuse the use of 
monetary control at higher stages of banking development but rather that 
they should use both kind of policies to control liquidity, since banks may 
bypass direct monetary controls. That is, as the financial system develops, 
monetary control relies more on the effects of central bank interventions on 
banks' and borrowers' behaviour than on simple monetary restraints. J.C.R. 
Dow and Saville (1990) point out the relationship between monetary policy 
and regulation policy: 
Though the two kinds of official involvements (monetary policy and 
prudential supervision) have different aims, these are not completely 
distinct. Prudential supervision does not aim to affect the course of 
the monetary aggregates, ... but it could do so [they are referring to 
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the British monetary experience since 1971], and perhaps at times 
has done so. 
(J.C.R. Dow and Saville 1990: 163) 
Further: 
To some extent, then, the purposes of monetary policy and banking 
supervision run together; and it is worth considering whether the 
procedures of banking supervision could properly assist monetary 
policy more actively. 
(J.C.R. Dow and Saville 1990: 168) 
By monetary policy then we would distinguish two different, but 
interrelated, ways through which central banks may affect the liquidity of 
the system (Figure 3.1). The first channel for monetary policy is a direct 
channel which would apply at lower stages of banking development and 
would fit well within the standard IS-LM view. The direct effects work 
through the banking multiplier model which assumes exogenous and 
complete control of money by central banks. This concept would match 
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Figure 3.1 Monetary policy influence on liquidity. 
Beyond transmission mechanisms 41 
with the most restrictive view of monetary policy and would only work in 
banking systems at low stages of development. However, as banking systems 
develop, this concept of monetary policy becomes less operative as central 
banks experience a reduced capacity to control liquidity .17 
It is when central banks lose their power to exert a perfect control on 
liquidity that they try to exert their influence through alternative means. We 
have labelled this action as the indirect channel and it would mainly apply to 
a highly developed banking system. At this stage, central banks affect 
liquidity through their influence on agents' (borrowers and lenders) 
financial behaviour rather than through the standard banking multiplier 
model. From this perspective, then, monetary policy would affect the 
liquidity of the system by means of changes in behavioural parameters that 
have always been considered as fixed. In fact, some have acknowledged this 
point. For example, Kaldor (1986) pointed out that: 
the major effect of changes in interest rates is to be found 'in their 
repercussions on the behaviour of financial institutions' rather than that 
of private individuals. 
(Kaldor 1986: 13) 
Chick (1985: 90-91) has also acknowledged that monetary authorities 
have relied, to some extent, on the 'expectational effect' that an exogenous 
monetary intervention may have on agents' expectations and that a change 
in interest rates is not essential to the transmission of monetary policy. 
There is in any case an issue in terms of the capacity of the central bank 
to affect market interest rates. J.C.R. Dow and Saville (1990: Chapter 4) 
point out that when reserve requirements are low changes in the cost of 
borrowed reserves have such a minor effect on bank costs that its influence 
on market rates is necessarily diffuse. Changes in bank rate are taken by the 
market primarily as a signal. But, depending on the current mood of the 
market, and the market's perception of the behaviour of the central banks, 
the signal may or may not be taken seriously. Successful efforts to influence 
market rates must thus be endogenous to current behaviour and 
expectations in the market. 
Monetary policy influence on liquidity cannot be seen as being 
deterministic because the 'same monetary policy' may produce different 
expectational responses on behalf of economic agents. 18 This argument 
gathers force the more developed the banking system and the more the 
reliance on indirect channels of influence. Direct interventions would mainly 
work through changes in interest rates and bank reserves. However, the 
effectiveness of these two factors to slow down the demand for and supply 
of credit would depend both on the nature of borrowers and on the ability of 
the banking system to extend credit beyond their deposit base. 
The effect of interest rates on the demand for credit will depend on how 
interest elastic the demand is: the more interest elastic, the stronger the 
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effect. However, what is worth considering are the differences in terms of 
interest elasticity between, on the one hand, the demand for credit for 
productive purposes and, on the other hand, the demand for credit to 
finance speculation. In this regard we would argue that, as both speculative 
and personal demand for credit are less interest elastic than corporate 
demand, it would be this latter which is most likely to be squeezed from 
credit markets when a rise in interest rates is being pursued.20 This squeeze 
however is more likely to apply to small firms since these may be more 
dependent on bank finance.21 
Regarding the quantitative effect, i.e. the change in credit availability, 
it is worth noting that the issue regarding whether tight monetary policies 
are able to reduce credit demand will depend on the stage of banking 
development. The lower the stage, the more central banks are able to 
constrain credit expansion by pursuing tight monetary policies. As long as 
banks may have ways either to avoid monetary control by innovating or 
alternative sources of liquidity, and thus their credit no longer depends on 
bank reserves, then the credit constraint is not likely to work unless it affects 
banks' expectations and thus banks' lending policy. However, the final 
effect will be mediated by the banks' behavioural response. It is on these 
variables that indirect monetary instruments, such as prudential regulation, 
exert their effects. 
The issue of whether monetary policy so considered is able to affect the 
liquidity of the system will thus depend on variables such as: 
• the interest rate elasticity of demand for credit, since this will 
determine whether higher interest rates may reduce credit demand 
or not; 
• the stage of banking development, as this will determine whether 
monetary constraints may directly constrain bank lending expansion; 
• banks' and borrowers' response to such monetary changes, since these 
will determine whether banks decide to meet all credit demand increases 
or not. These responses will finally depend on how monetary policy 
affects banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference (willingness to assume 
risks) and agents' expectations. 
Monetary policy could then be considered as an exogenous variable which 
is incorporated into the decision-making process of the private sector. It is 
exogenous in the sense that its changes are related to decisions taken by 
central banks. But, at the same time, monetary policy may be considered as 
an endogenous variable because once its future lines are known these are 
incorporated into the decision-making process of private agents. Hence, the 
announcement of future monetary policy intentions may affect current 
financial behaviour (the 'announcement effect') and so exert its effect on 
the economy through behavioural rather than structural parameters. Future 
monetary restraints may slow down current demand for credit because 
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of a general increase in liquidity preference. It is this interrelationship, 
which has been labelled as the 'identification problem' of money demand, 
which makes it difficult (if not useless) to draw the distinction between 
exogenous and endogenous variables which is usually made in economic 
analysis. 
3.4 Monetary policy and credit availability 
We suggested earlier that, for orthodox economists, money supply is exog-
enous to the system and so determined by central banks. Post Keynesians, 
on the contrary, consider the money supply to be credit-driven and demand-
determined, i.e. endogenous to the system. Some economists have therefore 
argued that, as long as money supply is credit-driven and demand-
determined, monetary policy becomes ineffective in terms of controlling the 
money stock. This argument is reinforced by the fact that the most extreme 
endogenous position, the horizontalist one,22 considers banks as simple 
price setters and quantity takers in retail credit markets, i.e., banks set prices 
and demand establishes the quantity to supply. This horizontalist position 
argues that the money supply is demand-determined and therefore all that 
monetary authorities can do is to set the general level of interest rates at 
which banks would supply, at a marked-up interest rate, as much credit as 
creditors demand. 
This perfect endogeneity has sometimes been understood by orthodox 
economists that money does not matter. For orthodox theorists, any 
exogenous variable is automatically significant as a cause of disturbance 
from equilibrium; once a variable is endogenous it loses causal force. 
However, this extreme horizontalist position is not widely shared by all post 
Keynesians economists, 23 since for some it is not enough to say that 
'demand creates its own supply, but it must be explained how the private 
sector commands the money supply it wants?' (Chick 1973: 88). 
While we share the endogenous money approach we will argue that some 
factors put limits on the endogeneity of the money supply and, furthermore, 
that some of these limits will come both from the activities of a monetary 
authority, which tries to control the liquidity of the system, as well as from 
the banks themselves, which may also put limits on their credit extension. 
Our argument will be that monetary policy does matter even if money is 
endogenous. As Wray (1992a: 1163-1164) put it24: 
banks do not fully accommodate the demand for flows of credit even 
if their expectations move in the same direction as those of borrowers. 
. . . This does not mean that we must accept the textbook 'deposit 
multiplier' or the orthodox position that the central bank controls the 
quantity of money. However, the central bank can make it very difficult 
for banks to extend their balance sheets if it so chooses. 
(Wray 1992a: 1163-1164) 
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In principle we will assume money supply to be horizontal at some level of 
interest rates. In so doing, it must be emphasized that the money supply 
schedule employed here is itself the outcome of a process over time, unlike 
the orthodox money supply schedule which represents a range of 
simultaneous possibilities. This distinction is central to the analysis of 
Arestis and Howells (1996) which unpacks the money supply curve into 
a shifting series of credit demand and supply curves. 
It has been argued by several authors that the horizontal cannot be 
extended indefinitely, but instead that there must be some point (Ml in 
Figure 3.2), beyond which 'banks might require higher interest rates to 
compensate for greater perceived risk as balance sheets expand' (Y,/ray 
1992a: 1160). 
This point would be where, following Minsky's analysis, 
the internal workings of the banking mechanism or central bank action 
to constrain inflation will result in the supply of finance becoming less 
than infinitely elastic - perhaps even approach to zero elasticity. 
(Minsky 1982: 107) 
The point where the money supply approaches zero elasticity is labelled 
M2 in Figure 3.2. 
But what are the factors that determine changes in money supply? We 
follow Minsky's work on financial instability25 in order to explain why the 
two turning points (Ml and M2) are likely to exist and why they are also 
likely to move (backward and forward) along with business cycles. Let's first 
start by analysing the factors determining these turning points in the money 
supply curve. Bank lending expansion is likely to arise during economic 
upturns, since it is then that economic optimism fuels both demand for and 
supply of credit as new business opportunities arise. It is during economic 
upturns that the number of people willing to run into debt grows and this 
in tum may make credit demand more interest inelastic. Hence, banks not 
only face a growing demand for credit but also a less elastic one. Banks can 
Bank lending 
Figure 3.2 Lending expansion. 
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thus charge higher interest rates without any fear of loss of market share. 
It could be argued that growing competition both between banks and 
between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries would drive prices 
(interest rates) down. Even though competitive pressures that may put 
bounds to interest rates rising, it is likely that, sooner or later, interest rates 
will rise and that this policy will be followed by all institutions 
simultaneously.26 
As bank lending increases, banks become less liquid and borrowers 
become less credit worthy than before (personal indebtedness has already 
increased and this might affect personal creditworthiness). On the other 
hand, as demand for bank lending increases it is likely that riskier and 
more speculative projects come into banks' portfolios. Furthermore, lending 
expansion may also drive banks to accept new customers whose risk is 
difficult and costly to assess. This factor would in tum explain why banks 
may begin to ration credit, not only by raising interest rates but also by 
asking for higher collateral requirements from their new customers. 
The effect of higher interest may well displace some projects (investments) 
which cannot sustain higher rates within the very short term; for example, 
long term projects which demand low interest rates until they begin to 
produce cash flow to pay off debts. Only those projects with higher profit 
expectations within the very short term will be able to afford these higher 
financial costs. Since some of these projects are likely to be speculative, these 
activities then displace productive activity from financial markets. 
One important by-product of these displacements is that the demand for 
credit will become more interest-inelastic, so that higher interest rates will 
have a weaker effect on the demand for credit. At this point banks may 
decide to ration credit themselves despite the fact that the demand is still 
going up. In addition, as banks' lending portfolios increase, banks' fears 
about their own financial stability may arise, driving banks into more 
prudent and conservative behaviour as regards their lending policies. 
Another factor which may halt the lending-expansion process is the 
running of both tight monetary and banking-supervision policies. These 
factors may affect lending expansion since it would make it more expen-
sive and difficult for banks to extend lending further and, what is more 
important, may affect banks' attitude towards lending (banks' liquidity 
preference). We are not arguing that central banks can control liquidity 
by means of quantitative ratios which make the provision of credit 
by commercial banks more difficult. Instead, we agree with J.C.R. Dow 
and Saville (1990), who clearly stated that central banks' power is more a 
qualitative than a quantitative matter. They put the argument in the 
following way: 
Banks are older than central banks, and if central banks were abolished, 
banks would undoubtedly survive .... One or more large banks could 
indeed in principle provide the services now provided by the central 
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bank, so that the extreme position in which the banking system became 
completely independent in this respect is not inconceivable. . . . That 
situation is not, in practice, likely to arise. For the game is essentially a 
political one: the central bank could always control the banks in other 
ways, as all parties are aware. 
(J.C.R. Dow and Saville: 1990: 148-149) 
It is the combination of all these factors, both quantitative and 
qualitative, that explains the increasing slope of the money supply as 
bank lending expands. The extension of lending may finally stop when both 
central and commercial banks begin to implement restrictive policies to slow 
down credit expansion at any cost. 
So far we have concentrated our analysis in studying how a bank lending 
expansion may entail an upward-sloping money supply function, even 
when money is endogenous. However, there is another feature of the 
process that we would like to stress here: the different path that this process 
may take along economic business cycles. Both Ml and M2 cannot be 
considered as fixed points but are likely to move, either forward or 
backward, along with economic upturns and downturns. We explicitly 
suggest that money supply is likely to be more elastic in upturns than in 
downturns and that this differential behaviour is explained by changes in 
the overall liquidity preference of the economy (Figure 3.3). It is worth 
noting that these changes are mainly due to changes in financial behaviour 
which have the capacity to change the functioning of the whole financial 
system: 
individual actions which are rational in themselves generate outcomes 
which act against the collective interest .... In an expansion, the supply 
of money may increase to such an extent that ... fuels the speculative 









Figure 3.3 Lending expansion: recession and expansion. 
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irrevocably destroy the confidence in the outside money ... which had 
allowed the financial system to function as it did. In the aftermath of the 
bursting of the speculative bubble, the supply of credit is inelastic 
relative to demand ... (and this) inelasticity of supply with respect to 
demand is so great as to force bankruptcies and impede investment 
plans, thus contributing to the contraction of output and employment. 
(Dow 1993a: 39--40) 
In terms of Figures 3.2 and 3.3, point M1 moves because of the higher 
(lower) banks' liquidity preference during downturns (upturns). The more 
confident banks are (the lower its liquidity preference is), the later they will 
begin to charge higher interest rates on new loans. Point M2 in turn is also 
able to move because of central banks' interventions. The tighter the 
monetary conditions the central bank establishes, the more likely it is that 
commercial banks will begin to cut back on their lending expansion. 
Overall this argument suggests that money supply is 'sometimes 
horizontal' and, depending on some factors, 'sometimes vertical' (Wray 
1990: 91-93). Table 3.2 summarizes the relationship between the 
endogenous/exogenous character of money and the elasticity/inelasticity 
of money supply, as well as the effect that monetary policy, banking 
development and liquidity preference may have on such variables. Table 3.2 
shows that, at lower stages of banking development there can only exist 
an elastic supply of liquidity when central banks are implementing a loose 
monetary policy and both banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference 
is low. In all other cases, an inelastic supply of liquidity is likely to exist, 
either because central banks are pursuing tight monetary policies which 
makes banks' reserves scarce, or because banks or borrowers are unwilling 
to lend and borrow, respectively. However, a high stage of bank 
development does not necessarily mean that an elastic supply of liquidity 
exists, but it rather reinforces the fact that liquidity expansion relies much 
more on banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference than for lower stages 
of banking development. 
3.5 Monetary policy non-neutrality 
We have suggested that monetary theory has traditionally drawn a sharp 
distinction between real and monetary variables. This distinction has led 
most economists to study how these two relate to each other, in the form of 
the monetary transmission mechanism. Real economic variables are 
usually assumed to depend only on real factors such as physical capital 
and labour, whereas money is seen as just a device to ease the exchange of 
goods and services already produced. Therefore, the only role which is 
left for money to play is to determine the general level of prices. Providing 
the system is working properly, monetary flows should thus mirror 
real flows. From this point of view money (and by implication monetary 
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Table 3.2 Endogeneity of money and liquidity expansion 
Degree of Monetary Stage of bank Liquidity preference Liquidity 
endogeneity policy development Bank Borrower expansion 
Exogenous Tight Low Regardless Regardless Inelastic 
Exogenous Loose Low Low Low Elastic 
Exogenous Loose Low High Low Inelastic(a) 
Exogenous Loose Low Low High Inelastic(b > 
Exogenous Loose Low High High Inelastic(c) 
Endogenous RegardlessCd) High Low Low Elastic 
Endogenous RegardlessCd) High High Low Inelastic Ca) 
Endogenous RegardlessCd) High Low High Inelastic(b > 
Endogenous RegardlessCd) High High High Inelastic(c) 
(al Banks may decide not to lend despite having funds available because of their high liquidity 
preference. Instead they would prefer less-risky investments such as public bonds, large 
companies rather than small ones, etc. Some credit rationing may exist. 
(b) Even though banks are willing to lend, borrowers may decide not to borrow because of 
their unwillingness to invest. High economic instability, low profitability, higher risks, etc., 
may explain this kind of conservative behaviour. 
(c) In this case both borrowers and lenders are unwilling to run into debt and to lend, 
respectively. Banks decide not to lend nor borrowers to borrow. This situation would be 
what Dow (1992d) labelled as 'defensive financial behaviour'; a situation where the low 
availability of credit is explained by both a weak supply and demand for credit. 
(d) Once the banking system reaches some level of development, monetary authorities lose their 
power to control liquidity perfectly. However, monetary authorities may still exert some 
effect on liquidity of the system by affecting banks' and borrowers' financial behaviours. 
Hence, monetary and financial policy may play this role at this stage and these influences 
should be considered. 
Source: Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998: 12). 
policy) is considered to be neutral because a change in its quantity only 
changes 'the level of prices in an economy, and not the level of its real 
outputs' (Patinkin 1998: 639). Furthermore, 'money is said to be super-
neutral - or long run neutral - if changes in the steady-rate of growth of 
the money supply do not affect the growth path of real economic 
variables' (Patinkin 1998: 641). The neutrality of money simply means 
that economic agents are free of 'money illusion' or, more formally, that 
demand functions 'are homogeneous of degree zero in the money prices 
and in the initial quantity of financial assets, including money' (Patinkin 
1998: 639). 
However, some economists have recognized that money need not be 
neutral, at least within the very short term. For example, some have pointed 
out that an increase in the price level, which is always seen as a monetary 
phenomenon, may have a stimulating effect on production since this 'keeps 
alive a spirit of industry in the nation' (Hume 1752: 39-40, as quoted in 
Patinkin 1998: 640). Others have relied on the redistributive effects that 
such a monetary change could produce, for example, the redistributive 
effects that inflation may cause between lenders and borrowers, and the 
Beyond transmission mechanisms 49 
redistributive effects that high interest rates may have on profits, wages and 
personal indebtedness.27 
Monetarists, in turn, have recognized that money may not be neutral in 
the short run although they claim its neutrality in the very long run. But 
rational expectation theorists have pointed out that this effect of money on 
output and employment within the short run only happens when the 
monetary change is unforeseen by economic agents. Otherwise, only prices 
will be affected. That is, only a non-systematic (unanticipated) monetary 
policy is able to affect output within the short run. However, in the long run 
money is neutral. 
Price stickiness, either in nominal interest rates or wages, is often noted as 
another source of monetary non-neutrality. Indeed, much of the standard 
Keynesian view on monetary effects has relied on such price stickiness. This 
approach underpins New Keynesian theories of non-neutrality, which have 
explored the role of asymmetric, or otherwise imperfect, information in 
generating market failure. In particular, asymmetric information is seen as 
causing credit rationing, where capital markets are not sufficiently perfect 
to provide substitutes for bank credit. However, if information were full, 
costless, complete and available to all agents, money would be neutral. 
The implications of these arguments are that, as long as there are market 
imperfections, money is non-neutral and monetary policy is important 
(Laidler 1990: 21). This is why most of the empirical literature dealing with 
the issue of whether money is neutral has looked at one or more of the 
following issues: 
• how different economic sectors respond to exogenous monetary shocks; 
• the degree to which anticipations of monetary changes matters; 
• whether credit markets are rationed. 
Unfortunately, this approach is rather misleading because it only fits in a 
theoretical framework which splits economic activity into real and monetary 
variables. The starting point is a world of exogenous money where real 
variables are determined only by real factors and money determines prices. 
The question then is, under what conditions would an exogenous change 
in the money supply have real effects? Money would be neutral within 
this model if it were unable to affect real variables. 28 It is only from 
this particular perspective that the issue regarding monetary neutrality 
(non-neutrality) makes some sense. 
If money were not exogenously introduced into the system but 
endogenously created by the banking system to finance economic activity, 
how could we address the issue of whether money is neutral? In particular, 
how could we discuss the effects of a money supply increase without first 
discussing the expenditure plans which generated the demand for credit, and 
the bank behaviour which led to the demand being met? If these factors are 
introdu.ced,29 then the issue is no longer restricted to whether money is 
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neutral or not but when and why it has been so. The issue is not then to 
determine whether the banknotes dropped from the helicopter affect output 
and employment. 'It matters who receives the money' (Dow and Earl 1982: 
255). Only by assuming that what is going on in the real economy is 
strictly independent on what is going on in the helicopter could we safely 
analyze the matter of whether money is neutral or not. Otherwise the 
relevant question to be addressed would be a more specific one: why the 
money dropped in this place has not produced the same effect as the one 
dropped a little further away. 
What we are suggesting here is that the issue of the money neutrality is 
related to the issue of how money enters into the economy. If we assume 
that money is endogenous to the system, then the issue of its neutrality does 
not make sense any more since the question regarding whether money helps 
to increase production or employment will depend on factors such as 
(i) what money is used for and (ii) the response of investors, banks, savers, 
etc. to monetary changes. Hence, the pure analysis of the neutrality of 
money which ignores these considerations can only make sense in a 
theoretical framework which assumes the banking system to play a passive 
(neutral) role in the economic process. It cannot make sense in a framework 
which assumes money to be endogenously supplied by the system: 
There always has been a conflict between those who see banks as the 
operators of a safe and secure payments mechanism and those who see 
banks as an essential institution for the capital development of the 
economy. The first group views banking and financial intermediation 
as essentially passive processes by which a predetermined amount 
of savings is allocated among alternative uses. The second group 
views banking and financial intermediation as active agents in the 
economy that, by financing investment, force resources to be used to 
put investment in place, thereby fostering the development of the 
economy. 
(Minsky 1993: 82) 
There are two different dimensions within the neutrality/non-neutrality 
debate: a quantitative and a qualitative one. The quantitative dimension, 
which we shall call the structural effect, would mainly apply to an economy 
where money is exogenously determined and would be concerned with the 
effect that exogenous monetary changes may have on different sectors, 
level of employment, output, etc. We have named this the quantitative 
effect because it can be quantified through the calculus of simple elastici-
ties. This, in tum, helps to explain why most research has paid so much 
attention to this dimension. Nevertheless, a focus on this dimension can 
only explain at best one half of the process. The other half, we suggest, 
would be explained by what we have labelled as the qualitative dimension 
of the process. 
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The qualitative dimension highlights what we call the behavioural effect 
and would instead fit in a world of endogenous money. Here, the question 
to be addressed is how economic and current monetary conditions30 may 
affect agents' financial behaviour and how those, in turn, may affect 
economic activity (employment and output). In other words, the question is 
how financial behaviour affects the real economy, bearing in mind that this 
behaviour is determined both by financial variables (monetary policy and 
financial regulation) and real variables (economic expectations, etc.) and 
neither a clear-cut nor a one-way causal relationship between the two can be 
established. It is clear that the behavioural effect can not be completely 
deterministically quantified. 
3.6 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to clarify the meaning of the concept 
of monetary policy when money is endogenous to the economic process. 
It has been argued that, as the financial system develops and therefore 
money creation becomes endogenous, the concept of monetary policy 
has to be widened in order to include the factors which may affect banks' 
and borrowers' behaviour, since these will determine credit expansion/ 
destruction. Accordingly it is not possible to draw a clear distinction 
between monetary policy and financial regulation, since the latter is 
probably the most important determinant of credit expansion in financially 
developed economies. 
Regarding the endogenous character of money, we suggested that an 
endogenous money supply does not necessarily mean that the demand for 
money is passively accommodated, nor that money loses its causal power. 
But, by the same token, if money is generated endogenously, its causal role 
is suffused within the overall economic process. 
We have argued here that, under certain conditions, money supply may 
become inelastic even though money is endogenous: for example, when there 
exists high liquidity preference among borrowers and lenders. Furthermore, 
it was suggested that the money supply is likely to be more elastic during 
expansions rather than during downturns. That is, the pattern of credit 
expansion follows a cyclical pattern, as do changes in liquidity preference. 
As far as the analysis of the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity is concerned, we pointed out that the debate over whether money 
matters vs doesn't matter only makes sense if (i) there is a sharp distinction 
between the real and monetary sides of the economy and (ii) money is 
perfectly exogenous to the system. Only this distinction would allow us to 
analyze what happens to the real side when we introduce an exogenous 
change in the money supply. Only by assuming that economic activity 
depends on real factors such as labour, physical capital, etc., and monetary 
flows simply mirror real ones, can it be assured that money and monetary 
policy are neutral with respect to output and employment. Otherwise, 
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the issue regarding whether money is neutral would not make any sense, just 
as it would not make sense to consider whether labour or physical capital, 
for example, were neutral. 
If such a clear distinction between real and monetary sides of the economy 
are not drawn, then efforts should be put into studying when and how rather 
than whether monetary policy is neutral or not. Whether monetary policy is 
neutral or not could only be addressed from a theoretical standpoint which, 
by assuming money to be exogenous to the economic process, tries to 
determine the long run effect of an exogenous increase in the money supply. 
However, if money were not exogenous then this matter would not be 
relevant. Then the issue to analyze would rather be how exogenous 
monetary interventions in financial markets affect the liquidity of the system 
and thereby economic activity. 
We also argued that two dimensions have to be distinguished when 
analyzing the effects of monetary policy on economic activity: a structural 
dimension and a behavioural dimension. The first is concerned with the 
effects of exogenous monetary changes on different economic variables. The 
second dimension is related to the effect that such changes may have on 
agents' behaviour. The more developed the financial system is, the more 
relevant this second factor will be. 
Bearing this in mind, it is clear that the issue to study is no longer whether 
exogenous monetary changes affect output or not but when and how they 
do, especially in financially developed economies. This is so because the final 
effect of any monetary change will depend on the final use given to the new 
money which is supplied. This is what Chick (1973: 132) has labelled as the 
second half of the monetary transaction. In this sense, an endogenous 
money supply perspective would mean that the place in which, and time at 
which, the 'helicopter' throws the money is of crucial importance when 
analyzing its effects. 
The view that monetary policy enters into an endogenous process, where 
its effects are context-dependent, therefore clears the way for analysis of 
what that monetary policy should consist of in particular contexts. This in 
tum requires understanding, not only of the structure of the banking system 
and of the economy as a whole, but also of the determinants of behaviour. 
In particular, this approach draws attention to the fact that behaviour is 
conditional on an institutional structure which emerged as a result of past 
behaviour. In other words, modem banking systems function on the 
foundation of confidence, which is the product of institutional arrange-
ments, and experience of central bank behaviour, built up over many years. 
Minsky's work highlights the interdependence between financial 
behaviour, the state of confidence, and output and employment. What we 
have argued here is that this interdependence should be borne in mind when 
designing monetary policy. Specifically, this requires attention to bank 
regulation and supervision, with a view to maintaining financial stability, 
as a central plank of monetary policy. 
4 The regional effects of 
monetary policy 
A theoretical framework 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a theoretical framework, built on the principles of 
the Post Keynesian theory of regional finance (Chick and Dow 1988, Dow 
1990, 1993a, Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes 1997), which allows us to explore 
the way through which money and monetary policy may affect regions. 
One peculiarity of this framework is that it broadens the scope of the 
analysis by taking into account the underlying factors determining regional 
credit availability, specifically the stage of banking development and the 
liquidity preference of financial agents (including banks). 
The framework presented in this chapter explicitly acknowledges that 
central banks lose their ability to directly influence the money stock as 
financial systems develop, thus money supply becomes increasingly 
endogenous to the economic process. An endogenous money supply 
means that any increase in liquidity depends more on the demand for 
credit (and thus borrowers' liquidity preference) and on the willingness of 
banks to supply credit (and thus the banks' liquidity preference) than on 
the central bank's direct interventions. 
Contrary to other theoretical approaches employed to study the regional 
effects of national monetary policies, our framework pays particular 
attention to the influence of monetary policy on banks' and borrowers' 
liquidity preference, that is, 'the behavioural effect' and not just the effects 
of monetary policy on economies with divergent economic structures ('the 
structural effect'). Nevertheless, behaviour not only reflects economic 
structure but also influences its evolution. Consequently our theoretical 
framework considers the interdependencies between economic structure, 
financial structure, economic conditions and financial behaviour. In our 
opinion this framework offers a more satisfactory basis for analyzing the 
regional impact of monetary policy than the orthodox approach, which relies 
on exogenous factors for explanation. 
The chapter has been structured in two sections. Section 4.2 studies the 
effects that exogenous monetary shocks may have on economies with 
different economic structures. As will be seen, this section only focuses 
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on what we have labelled as the structural effect of monetary policy. 
Section 4.3 extends the analysis and includes not only the effects due to 
differences in economic structure, but also those due to differences in 
economic responses to monetary policy decisions: the behavioural effect. 
The chapter ends with the conclusion section. 
4.2 The regional impact of monetary policy with exogenous 
money: the structural effect 
Most of the literature dealing with the regional impact of monetary policy 
could be considered as a 'regional extension' of the more general discussion 
on the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. In practical terms, the 
regional literature has mainly focused on studying those regional differences 
where national monetary policy may have a different impact across regions 
within a country. In particular, the literature has concentrated on studying 
the relevant factors of the transmission mechanism, particularly those 
pointed out by both Keynesian and monetarist authors. 
Monetarists identify the regional impact of monetary policy with different 
regional responses to business cycles since they take for granted that 
business cycles are due to monetary shocks. The monetarist argument relies 
on two assumptions. The first one is that monetary policy is responsible 
for fluctuations (business cycles) in the short run. The second one is that 
some regions might be more affected than others by these business cycles, 
which is usually explained by regional differences in terms of income or 
wealth elasticity of the demand for regional products (see, for example, 
Beare 1976). However, if the fluctuations created by exogenous monetary 
shocks were evenly distributed across regions, then such regional effects 
of the monetary policy would not exist. Monetary policy would therefore 
be neutral at the regional level, since no region would improve its relative 
position with respect to the rest. Everyone benefits or no one does, 
depending on whether the monetary policy causes a temporary upturn 
(expansion) or downturn (recession). However, the monetarists also suggest 
that these gains (or losses) would be only temporary, since in the long run 
real growth depends only on real factors, i.e. money is neutral. The 
monetarists have tried to test their assumptions by means of estimating 
some kind of reduced-form model where the regional income depends on 
monetary policy. The purpose here has been to prove that money and 
income are highly correlated also at the regional level, and that changes in 
regional nominal income are explained by changes in the national money 
supply. This reasoning is presented in the papers by Beare (1976), Cohen 
and Maeshiro (1977), Toal (1977) and Kozlowski (1991), among others. 
However, it is not free from criticisms.1 
Traditional Keynesians in contrast have denied the existence of a direct 
relationship between money and income. They argue that such a relation-
ship between money and income, either at the national or regional level, 
The regional effects of monetary policy 55 
is rather indirect and mainly works through the effect that changes in 
interest rates have on the different components of the aggregate demand. 
Here the regional effect of monetary policy depends on the existence of 
regional differences in the responses of the aggregate demand components 
(consumption, investment, exports and imports) to changes in interest 
rates.2 These authors suggest that the regional impact of monetary policy 
is reduced to the study of the regional differences in terms of consumption 
(durable and non-durable) and investment (fixed, construction, etc.) 
responses to changes in national interest rates. The potential regional 
effect that changes in exchange rate could have on regional exports and 
imports is sometimes included. 3 Other authors have pointed out that some 
regional differential impact of monetary policy may exist when regional 
credit markets are segmented, either because of imperfect or asymmetric 
information, and this in tum impedes a proper allocation of financial 
resources.4 
The fact is that for monetarists and Keynesians the regional impact of 
monetary policy is reduced to either the existence of structural differences, 
which cause a higher response to national monetary policy shocks 
(monetarists) or a higher response of some of the regional aggregate 
demand components to changes in interest rates (Keynesians). Independent 
of the reason why, the fact is that regions that are structurally more different 
with respect to the national average would be the ones most likely to suffer 
from differential effects of national monetary policy.5 It is clear then that 
the main difference between monetarists and Keynesians (Neo-Classical 
synthesis) is rooted in their diverging views of the transmission channels of 
monetary policy, which were reviewed in Chapter 2. Even so, both schools 
share two important points. Firstly, they assume the money supply is 
exogenous, that is, unilaterally determined by the central bank's interven-
tions. Secondly, their explanations of the regional impact of monetary 
policy are primarily based on the existence of structural economic 
differences among regions of a national economy (structural differences 
in terms of regional sensitivity to business cycles, or structural diff eren-
ces in terms of regional sensitivity to changes in national interest 
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Figure 4.1 Structural effect of monetary policy. 
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since its applicability is strongly linked to the existence of regional structural 
differences. 
According to the structural effect, national monetary policies may have a 
regional differential effect only if regional differences in terms of economic 
structure exist. Otherwise all regions would be equally affected by national 
monetary policies, either positively (expansion) or negatively (recession). 
Two objections arise from this argument. First, there is nothing specific to 
monetary policy. If monetary policy affects regions differently because of 
their structural differences, the same could also be claimed for any other 
national economic policy. In fact, as many authors have pointed out,7 any 
policy, either strictly economic or not, has a regional dimension since it may 
affect economic activity, either directly or indirectly, intentionally or not, 
and economic activity, in tum, is not evenly distributed along the spatial 
surface. We are not neglecting the possibility that a single monetary policy 
may affect some economies differently, particularly those with strong 
structural differences.8 Instead, we are suggesting that the 'real cause' of 
the regional impact of monetary policy in this analysis is not money itself, 
but regional structural differences which have nothing to do with 
monetary policy. 
The second objection to this argument is that it only applies to a context 
where the national money supply is considered exogenous. However, if 
money is created endogenously, monetary policy may have an impact on 
banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference, and thus on credit creation. This 
is what we have called the behavioural effect, which is explored further in 
the next section. 
4.3 The regional impact of monetary policy with endogenous 
money: the structural and behavioural effects 
As we suggested earlier, most of the literature on the regional impact of 
monetary policy concludes that, while money is exogenous at the national 
level, it is endogenous at the regional one. That is, national monetary 
authorities control national money supply which, thanks to interregional 
arbitrage and perfect capital mobility (as a result of financial market 
integration), then flows freely among regions according to regional 
differences in demand pressures. 
This argument, which is illustrated in Figure 4.2, is embodied in the small 
open economy version of the IS-LM model, although this time the reasoning 
is applied to a regional setting (see, for example, Roberts and Fishkind 1979, 
Moore and Hill 1982, Harrigan and McGregor 1987). Regions having 
higher demands for credit will experience financial inflows, since they will be 
willing to pay higher interest rates for financial resources. Regions having 
lower demand relative to its supply will experience financial outflows, since 
they cannot compete with higher interest rates offered in faster-growing 
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Figure 4.2 Standard regional finance literature. 
financial flows will equalize regional interest rates. Regional differentials 
in interest rates may only persist in the long run if markets fail to work 
properly,9 or if regional differences exist in terms of perceived risk or 
transactions costs. In the latter, the market will allow for such differences 
and add some mark-up on the normal interest rate. Within the very short 
term there could also be some differentials as financial flows to (from) 
other regions may take time. In this case differentials in interest rates could 
last until financial funds are driven in (out) of the region. Both national 
demand and supply determine interest rates and total amount of credit 
available. The supply of credit is perfectly inelastic, since it is assumed that 
banks can only lend a fixed amount of credit, providing the central bank 
does not relax its monetary policy. The total amount of available credit is 
then divided among regions (regions A and Bin our figure) according to 
their demands for credit. Under these circumstances, and assuming that 
there exists perfect interregional capital mobility, if one region experiences 
an increase in its demand for credit relative to its supply, this would 
drive regional interest rates above the national average, leading financial 
institutions to drive fmancial resources (credits) into the region to make 
profits (a positive differential in interest rates). However, as total available 
credit is fixed, banks can only lend more in one region (region A) if they lend 
less somewhere else (region B). Regional supply in A will increase, driving 
interest rates down, whereas the reverse happens in B. Equilibrium is 
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therefore again achieved at higher interest rates, unless the central bank 
lets national supply increase, with A (B) having a higher (lower) amount 
of credit available than before. 
The former argument has led some authors to conclude that, providing 
there is perfect interregional capital mobility, no financial constraint can 
ever arise at a regional level since regions face a horizontal supply of 
funds at some level in interest rates. This statement has also led to the 
interpretation that money supply is endogenous at the regional level so small 
open regions have no monetary identity (see Dow 1993a, Chapter 8). 
However, in our work the term endogenous money does not necessarily 
mean that regions face a horizontal money supply, thanks to interregional 
arbitrage, but rather that the money supply at the national level, just as at 
the regional level, is the outcome of the willingness of the banks to create 
credit in response to demand, albeit subject to indirect influence from the 
central bank. Contrary to 'horizontalist' Post Keynesians (Moore 1988a), 
who consider that endogenous money means a perfectly elastic supply of 
credit, both at the national or regional level, our analysis makes a case for 
the 'structuralist' post Keynesian monetary theory. 'Structuralist' post 
Keynesians emphasize the significance of the particular financial structure 
(of banks and of firms) which has evolved in a particular economy, with 
reference to the stage of banking development. It also emphasizes how 
financial behaviour, given that structure, can vary over time as economic 
conditions change, and over space in line with the real characteristics of a 
particular economy.10 
Our argument is graphically shown in Figure 4.3, whereas Figure 4.4 
explains how both regional supply of and demand for credit are influenced 
by changes in the regional stage of bank development and liquidity 
preference. 
Contrary to the belief that small open regions face a horizontal money 
supply (see Figure 4.2), our analysis considers the possibility for regions to 
face an upward-sloping supply for credit, either because banks can not 
provide more credit due to reserve constraints (low stage of banking 
development) or because banks and borrowers are not willing to provide or 
demand credit (high liquidity preference).11 Consequently, the question to 
address is not how to divide a given amount of credit among different 
regions but instead to determine why banks lend within some regions more 
than in others, that is, why some regions face a nearly inelastic supply of 
credit whereas others face a more elastic one. 
Another important aspect which distinguishes our analysis from the 
standard regional finance literature (Figure 4.2) is that more credit for one 
particular region does not necessarily mean less credit available for the rest. 
According to Chick's theory of stages of banking development (Chick 1986, 
1988), as the banking system develops, the supply of credit becomes less 
constrained by reserves. 12 This point is worth considering since it completely 
changes the focus of the discussion on regional finance. If the relevant issue 
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Figure 4.4 Regional supply and demand for credit and changes in stage of banking 
development and liquidity preference. 
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were how to divide a given amount of credit regionally, the increasing of 
credit availability in one region might be achieved by expanding the national 
money supply, so the given amount of credit would automatically rise. This 
could explain why some authors have called for regional monetary policies 
to be implemented, as this would allow regional monetary authorities to let 
regional monetary supply grow according to their interests. However, if the 
issue were not how to divide a fixed amount of credit among regions but 
how to increase banks' willingness to lend in some regions, the managing of 
a regional monetary policy could not work since the decision regarding 
credit availability depends on the interaction between local banks' and 
borrowers' liquidity preference. 
The following considerations are necessary when studying the determi-
nants of credit availability. From a theoretical perspective, the relevant 
question is to study the determinants of credit availability: a) banks' ability 
and willingness to extend credit, b) borrowers' liquidity preference, and 
c) the influence that monetary policy and the central bank may have on the 
two aforementioned points. Borrowers' liquidity preference would deter-
mine the increase in demand for credit. Both banks' ability and willingness 
to provide credit and monetary policy would determine how much credit 
demand can be met by banks. From a regional perspective, the relevant 
question is to study the spatial differences in terms of banking development 
and liquidity preference, as well as the influence that monetary policy may 
have on such variables. 
The stage of banking development influences the money supply through 
its influence on banks' ability to lend. More developed banking systems are 
able to extend more credit than less-developed systems, regardless of their 
deposit base. The earlier stage of bank development, the more applicable the 
money multiplier model is. This fact would imply that regions having 
banking systems in earlier stages of development and regional borrowers 
more dependent on these banks for credit, would be more constrained 
by, say, low saving or deposit ratios than others. Thus, local banks charac-
terized by an earlier stage of development, compared to national or inter-
national banks, will find themselves at a competitive disadvantage, including 
a lesser capacity to create credit. 
Liquidity preference affects not only banks' willingness to lend within the 
region, but also savers' and borrowers' behaviour. Thus, higher liquidity 
preference may reduce the supply of credit in some regions by encouraging 
savers to adopt more liquid portfolios, which may produce an outflow of 
financial resources from peripheral to central regions. However, higher 
liquidity preference may also reduce the regional demand for funds to 
the extent that investors are less willing to accept additional debt due to 
uncertain expectations. Liquidity preference is normally discussed in 
temporal terms, and indeed the greater volatility over time in peripheral 
regional economies, and the lesser protection, in the form of wealth, from 
fluctuations, will also cause greater volatility in liquidity preference over 
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time for these regions. But there may also be secular regional differences in 
liquidity preference. Peripheral regions on average over time will display 
higher liquidity preference than central regions because of their greater 
vulnerability to instability.13 Therefore, regional differences in terms of 
stages of banking development and liquidity preference may produce higher 
instability in the credit availability in some regions14 (see Dow and 
Rodriguez-Fuentes 1997). 
The introduction of these two variables, the stage of banking development 
and liquidity preference, means that the analysis of the regional impact of 
monetary policy cannot be restricted to the so-called 'asymmetric shocks', 
but should also pay close attention to the influence of monetary policy on 
financial behaviour. This result is shown in Figure 4.5, which clearly 
contrasts with Figure 4.1, where only the structural differences were 
included. 
4.3.J Banking development and liquidity preference 
We have mentioned that banking development and liquidity preference are 
two important determinants in the supply of credit. This section explores 
further the influence of these two variables on regional credit availability. 
When the banking system is at a low stage of development, national 
money supply can be considered to be exogenous, since central banks 
perfectly control the liquidity of the system and, consequently, bank credit 
is limited by reserves. Under these circumstances, the financial problem 
becomes one of how the resulting fixed amount of credit (given by the 
banking multiplier) is distributed among different regions. Regional credit 
is therefore limited by regional deposits or bank reserves, the variations 
in the quantity of outside money which is supplied by the central bank, 
the interregional monetary flows and the changes in financial regulation 
(such as reserve requirements, capital ratio, etc.). This situation coincides 
with the regional monetary multiplier model.15 Within this framework, the 
monetary policy affects some particular regions through its influence on 
the total amount of bank credit (and its cost) which is available (through 
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the banking multiplier). The differential regional effect of monetary policy 
would arise if the reduction in total credit were not evenly distributed among 
regions, for example when peripheral markets experienced higher cuts in 
lending when monetary policy tightens, or when higher interest rates had 
stronger effects on particular regions (due to the higher interest rate 
elasticity of their sectors). With regard to the reduction in credit, it is likely 
to expect some regional differences, since cuts in lending policy by banks are 
likely to affect some regions more than others. For example, those markets 
considered as 'peripheral' by financial institutions will first experience a 
reduction in credit availability. The problem here is to define a 'peripheral 
market' for a financial institution, although it would not be too risky to say 
that they are likely to be located in regional peripheral economies. This 
question could be empirically addressed by studying the regional pattern for 
credit distribution over the business cycle and, particularly, by studying 
whether empirical evidence suggests a more unstable pattern for credit 
availability between central and peripheral regions alongside business cycles. 
A second question which requires studying is the different impact of 
changes in interest rates across regions. In this case, regional differences 
arise not only because sectors' sensitivity to changes in interest rate may 
vary across regions, but also because of a higher concentration of small 
businesses in some regions. 16 
This scenario would be quite different under a more developed banking 
system. Credit supply would depend more on banks' and borrowers' 
liquidity preferences instead of on bank reserves exclusively. Consequently, 
if a bank decided to lend more in one region this would not necessarily mean 
less available credit for the remaining regions (this would only apply in a 
situation where banks can only provide as much credit as the banking 
multiplier allows them to do). A bank could provide more credit in one 
region if it succeeds in getting more resources to lend from external sources, 
such as national or international financial markets or from their central 
offices outside the region, or by means of managing its assets and liabilities 
(securitization and off-balance-sheet operations). 
The analysis would also vary depending on the institutional structure 
of the banking system. We will consider two different scenarios in this 
regard. The first one considers the existence of institutional segmentation in 
the banking system (regional branch banking system), so some regions 
might differ from others in terms of their respective financial structures. The 
second one considers the existence of a national branch banking system 
which operates nationwide (national branch banking system). 
The supply of credit in a regional branch banking system is less elastic 
in those regions with both a lower deposit base and lower stage of banking 
development. That is, when monetary authorities try to slow down the 
growth of credit, these regions are likely to experience higher cuts in their 
credit availability. Consequently, in these regions the traditional monetary 
multiplier is likely to apply. 
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However, when a national branch banking system exists, local branches in 
one region could also borrow from their central offices to obtain funds at no 
cost and then lend them in the regional market at a mark-up. Consequently, 
a low regional deposit ratio does not necessarily mean low availability of 
credit. In addition, a perfectly elastic regional supply of funds can be 
assumed, as in both the open version of the IS-LM model and the 
'horizontalist' post Keynesian view. Even though local banks can get extra 
funds to lend in the region, they still may decide not to lend if they are 
unsure of the investment prospects. In this case, it is the banks' liquidity 
preference that determines the credit creation process. From a regional point 
of view the relevant question is to study whether banks' lending policies 
(liquidity preference) vary across regions and whether monetary policy 
effects on banks' liquidity preference can reinforce such regional differences. 
What we are suggesting here is that the more conservative practices in terms 
of lending that certain banks show in some regions, particularly during 
downturns, might also be a response to tighter monetary conditions pursued 
by the central bank, and not only to the worsening of the regional economic 
prospects. Let us suppose that the central bank considers current credit 
growth to be too high for the long term stability of the financial system. 
It would then try to slow down credit growth through a wide set of 
measures. Such measures may include higher interest rates applied at the 
discount window, quantity limits for outstanding credit, changes in reserve 
requirements, financial regulation17 or even the use of moral persuasion. 
Under these 'tighter circumstances', banks may find it to be more difficult to 
extend credit endlessly and borrowers would face increased borrowing costs. 
We are not arguing that banks' lending is limited by their reserves position, 
since this would only apply in an exogenous money approach. Banks' 
reserves cannot constrain lending because banks can overcome such 
restraints on lending by recurring to either their innovative power (asset 
and liability management, off-balance sheet operations, etc.), to the discount 
window (since central banks would always supply whatever quantity is 
needed to maintain financial confidence18), or look for liquidity in external 
markets (international financial markets), etc. In this sense we could con-
sider that modem banking systems would never be constrained as long as 
their lending policy is concerned. However, as Rousseas (1986) has pointed 
out, all these operations take time and hence it is likely that, within the very 
short term, some banks may find it more difficult or even impossible to 
carry on with their lending policy.19 
In addition, it seems unlikely that these restrictive practices which are 
being put in to practice by central banks do not affect banks' behaviour. 
Banks know that central banks' actions exert an important psychological 
effect on the market.20 Secondly, if commercial banks also share central 
banks' fears of the negative effect that extension of lending could have on 
financial stability of the financial system, they would be the first ones 
interested in following the central banks' advice, since their business relies 
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on the confidence which promotes such stability. Hence, the overall effect 
could lower banks' willingness to lend, i.e. a higher liquidity preference on 
behalf of the banking system under these circumstances. The more conser-
vative lending policy would be a response to monetary changes introduced 
by the central bank, rather than a low deposit or reserve position. 
The relevant issue from a regional perspective is to determine whether a 
higher bank's liquidity preference leads to an even cut in lending policies 
across regions, or whether the credit contraction concentrates in particular 
regions. If such differences exist, then it is also necessary to determine why 
banks seem to be more conservative in some regions. 
The problem we face here is how to empirically measure banks' liquidity 
preference. Some economists sort out the issue by comparing bank lending 
and deposits by regions, the difference between the two being understood as 
a rough measure of such concept. Hence, higher deposits relative to credit 
would mean that banks were driving financial resources out of that region 
because of the lack of confidence attached to it, or because of the lack of 
profitable investment alternatives in comparison to other regions. This 
interpretation would fit in an 'exogenous money view', which sees banks as 
'passive agents' which can only lend what has already been deposited before. 
However, the previous argument can only be applied in specific 
situations, namely where bank lending is limited by bank reserves (monetary 
multiplier). It cannot be used in a scenario where commercial banks 
normally lend first and afterwards look for their reserves.21 In this latter 
context (where the monetary multiplier does not apply), high deposits 
relative to credit could be seen either as a high banks' liquidity preference 
(which leads banks to not meet some regional credit demands) or as a 
situation, where regional demand for credit is weak (banks can not provide 
credit because borrowers are not willing to run into debt). As a consequence 
of the interdependence between the supply of and demand for credit, it is 
difficult to interpret the information given by ratios such as deposit/credit at 
the regional level or to put forward economic policy solutions for the 
situation, since the nature of the problem has not been clearly identified.22 
Thus, if the problem were due to the existence of a weak demand for credit, 
this situation could be reversed by encouraging borrowers to borrow and 
invest in profitable projects.23 However, if the problem were due to the 
existence of a high bank liquidity preference, policy makers should act by 
helping banks to provide more credit to regional investors (by providing 
incentives to lend regionally, by establishing some regional differentials in 
terms of financial regulation, by monitoring regional investment projects 
and in doing so help banks in their credit-risk assessments, etc.). 
What happens in reality is that these two effects, the existence of both a 
weak demand and supply of credit, are interdependent because both banks' 
and borrowers' liquidity preference tend to move in the same direction as 
they are affected by the same underlying factors. Therefore, it is likely that 
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for some regions both supply and demand for credit tend to decrease in 
downturns because of the lower economic expectations and, therefore, this 
complicates the identification of the existence (or absence) of credit 
rationing. This also may result in incorrect interpretations of ratios such 
as credit/deposit, since they show what the result of this interdependence has 
been but reveal nothing about the underlying factors which led demand or 
supply to increase (decrease). This situation might well apply to peripheral 
regions, which, due to their intrinsic economic instability (because of their 
low economic diversification or higher dependence on business cycles, lower 
economic development, etc.) may experience a more unstable pattern of 
credit availability than the one for the more developed ones. This economic 
instability might consequently reinforce the growth of credit during 
expansions as well as its destruction during recessions. Therefore, the ques-
tion is not that the less developed regions face a long run decline in their 
credit shares, but a more unstable pattern of credit availability alongside 
business cycles, whereby unstable pattern means greater fluctuations in 
regional credit both in expansion and recession. This more unstable pattern 
reflects changes in regional liquidity preference (both from banks and 
borrowers) and may have important consequences for regional economic 
activity. The credit expansion during upturns may foster speculative 
activities and hence squeeze non-speculative activities from credit markets. 
The credit contraction during downturns may drive some regional investors 
not to go ahead with their plans, and banks to not meet some regional 
demands for credit. 
Some economists argue that this 'discriminatory effect' is the proof that 
the financial system works properly, i.e. driving scarce financial resources 
away from risk, allocating them to the 'best' investment alternative, thus 
improving the overall efficiency of the system as a whole because, at the end 
of the day, this is what matters. However, this argument does not answer 
the question of whether this 'efficient argument' is a suitable policy for 
promoting economic growth and, in the case that it was, how the gains of 
such a process should be distributed between losers and winners. This is 
worth noting, since our argument states that one of the factors which may 
cause instability in credit extension to peripheral economies is 'monetary 
policy', which, in tum, is often implemented to achieve inflation goals 
claimed by central and more developed regions. 
But, apart from banks' liquidity preference, the availability of credit also 
depends on borrowers' willingness to run into debt (liquidity preference) 
since banks can only provide credit when someone is. asking for it. Banks 
could not lend if nobody was interested in borrowing under any conditions. 
Therefore, the availability of credit is the result of the interaction between 
the demand and supply of credit. The next section concentrates on study-
ing the implications of changes in both borrowers' and savers' liquidity 
preference for regional credit availability. 
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4.3.1 Borrowers' and savers' liquidity preference 
With regard to the influence of borrowers' liquidity preference on regional 
credit availability, it is important to consider the effect that monetary 
policy may have on borrowers' investment plans, who are highly sensitive 
to changes in interest rates (high interest rates elasticity demands). 
The investment decisions with a low short term profitability ( or higher 
maturity) might not survive in a context of higher interest rates when other 
riskier short term projects that compete for funds are expected to yield 
higher retums.24 This 'price effect' is likely to slow down the growth of 
credit demand but may also have varying consequences across sectors 
and regions. For example, the 'adverse selection' effect is likely to affect 
small businesses differently to large ones. For larger firms higher interest 
rates could have a weaker effect on their financial costs since they have 
access to other financial sources than bank credit (such as bond markets, 
international financial markets, etc.). Large firms also have stronger 
bargaining power in the credit market, can offer higher collateral and 
provide standard information which reduces the cost of the credit scoring 
process. These arguments are usually employed to support the hypothesis 
that, if a credit rationing is to exist, it is more likely that small-sized firms 
will be affected. 
Business size is not the only characteristic which influences credit 
availability. Business specialization might also matter. For instance, for 
firms operating in markets where any increase in cost could be easily 
translated to the selling price, higher interest rates (higher financial costs) 
would have a weaker effect on their 'balance sheets' in comparison with 
those firms which are facing more price-elastic demands for their products. 
The foregoing implies that changes in interest rates ( caused by monetary 
policy) may have different effects on regions, depending on factors such as 
the spatial distribution of investment projects returns (low vs high returns), 
maturities (short or long term project), business size (small vs large firms) 
and specialization, populations' attitudes towards risk (personal liquidity 
preference), personal wealth,25 etc. 
Another important and neglected issue in the literature is the effect that 
monetary policy could have on savers' behaviour and, particularly, on their 
portfolio preferences. If raising interest rates would lead regional savers to 
change their portfolios into safer and more liquid positions, and if risk-free 
and more liquid assets were not available within the region, then monetary 
policy might cause financial outflows, since regional savers would try to 
look for safer and more liquid financial assets elsewhere. 
4.3.3 Beyond the structural effect of monetary policy 
The introduction of the stages of banking development and (banks', 
borrowers' and savers') liquidity preference means that the analysis of the 
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Table 4.1 Relevant variables for analyzing the regional impact of monetary policy: 














• Sectors' sensitivity to business cycles: interest 
rate elasticity 
• Consumption (durable and non-durable) and 
investment (fixed capital, construction, etc.) 
responses to changes in: interest rates, 
national income and credit restrictions 
• Export and import responses to: exchange 
rates, interest rates, credit restrictions. 
Regional differences in degree of 
openness to trade, marginal and average 
propensity to export and import, export 
specialization and import composition 
• Firms' size: differences in terms of sources 
of finance, costs and availability of bank 
credit, collateral, etc. 
• Internal competition: degree of 
segmentation in regional financial markets 
(information costs gathering, administrative 
and risk evaluation costs, regional financial 
assets and intermediaries, isolation and 
distance from 'financial centres', etc.) 
• Banks' ability to expand credit (banking 
development) and liquidity preference 
• Central banks' financial regulation 
and monetary policy influences 
• Savers' portfolio preferences 
• Borrowers' willingness to borrow (invest), 
liquidity preference, firms' size 
(dependence on bank lending, 
bargaining power, etc.) 
Source: Rodriguez-Fuentes (1997b: 174) and Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow (2003: 976). 
regional impact of monetary policy cannot be restricted to the structural 
effect, but should also pay close attention to the influence of monetary 
policy on financial behaviour. The two sets of effects shown in Table 4.1, 
structural and behavioural, provide a framework for studying the factors 
determining regional differences in credit availability. A second aim of this 
framework is to ease the identification of the processes underlying the real 
and financial structural effects of the orthodox approach, as well as to 
extend the analysis to incorporate associated behavioural differences. 
Table 4.1 provides guidance as to the kind of regional data that would be 
useful in order to conduct a full regional analysis of the effects of monetary 
policy; a significant barrier to (sub-national) regional analysis is that much 
of this information is not readily available; although when regions are 
68 The regional effects of monetary policy 
understood as nations, as in the EMU debate, this problem is greatly 
diminished. 
The structural effect applies to the orthodox view that sees monetary 
policy as an exogenous force applied to an existing (arbitrarily disparate) 
economic or financial structure. The structural effect suggests that monetary 
policy would affect regions differently because these are structurally 
different to the economy for which the monetary policy is actually being 
designed. For example, it is sometimes argued that national monetary policy 
does not suit those regions whose business cycles are not fully synchronized 
with the national economy, or that the central bank has set the official 
interest rate too low for the more inflationary regions. However, this argu-
ment only applies to a world of exogenous money where the central bank's 
role is to determine the quantity of exogenous money that fits to real needs 
of exchange. Nevertheless, this view ignores the influence that central banks' 
monetary policy decisions may have on banks' and borrowers' liquidity 
preference, which, as suggested earlier, have important consequences for 
regional credit availability in more financially developed economies. In this 
particular setting monetary policy could help by facilitating lending but 
could never assure that banks automatically expand regional credit when 
more outside money is supplied, nor borrowers to go ahead with their 
investment plans even though banks are ready to provide funds. 
A further question is to determine how useful a regional monetary policy 
would be to achieve such goals. On this issue most researchers agree that a 
true regional monetary policy would be of little help, since regions would 
not succeed in effectively controlling their money supply because they are 
very small open economies (this is the 'global monetarism' proposition 
applied to a regional setting).26 
However, the aim of the more general framework considered here is to go 
beyond the common duality between structure and behaviour. Our 
framework is therefore aimed to consider the interdependencies between 
behaviour and structure, particularly in the credit market, where the 
structure of the banking market influences financial behaviour. Thus, it 
acknowledges that behaviour reflects economic structure but also influences 
its evolution. Once we accept that the supply of money at a national as well 
as regional level is endogenous, then the volume of credit is understood 
to depend primarily on private banks' behaviour with respect to borrowers 
in different regions rather than on central banks' interventions. In this con-
text central banks could still exert some effect on private banks' behaviour 
but the question then would be how deterministic this influence is. 
In this scenario monetary policy could not be too loose in the sense that 
the central bank is causing banks to create 'too much' credit. The causality 
has then been reversed: borrowers decide to borrow, and banks may 
decide to fund them. The central bank sets a price for reserves borrowed 
at the margin, which undoubtedly influences banks' portfolio decisions. 
But it is only influence; other important factors are banks' and borrowers' 
The regional effects of monetary policy 69 
expectations about returns on different assets located in different regions, 
and the default risk attached to each. These all take on a regional dimension 
because expectations formed under uncertainty rely on conventional 
judgement, e.g. about the relative health of the regional economy, and 
because both the real economic structure and the financial structure of 
the banking system and of firms generally differ from region to region. 
4.3.4 Some implications for empirical research 
The foregoing argument has important consequences for the empirical 
analysis of the regional effects of national monetary policies. 
One implication is that the empirical analysis can not be restricted to 
the economic or financial structural differences which might make one 
particular monetary policy unsuitable for some regions (the structural 
effect), but also the behavioural responses of economic agents to changes in 
monetary policy (the behavioural effect), as well as their consequences for 
the economic and financial structure in the long run. 
It is not enough then to restrict the empirical analysis to the measurement 
of the differential effect that national monetary variables, such as interest 
rates, money and credit, exchange rates, etc., could exert on regional 
economies which strongly differ from the 'national average' in structural 
terms (economic sectors, investment, consumption, exports, imports, etc.). 
The analysis must also take into account the influence of monetary policy on 
banks' and borrower's willingness to lend and borrow since these are the 
final determinants of the variation in regional lending. 
Another implication is about the universal validity of the results. Many 
empirical approaches to the regional impact of monetary policy look at the 
ceteris paribus effects that either changes in national money supply or 
interest rates have on regional income or employment. Most of them 
address this issue by studying correlations among these variables along 
periods of tight and loose monetary policy in order to determine whether 
tight monetary policies produced higher contractions in some regions. Apart 
from the tricky issue of how to identify periods of tight or easy monetary 
policy when money is endogenous, 27 the problem with these empirical 
approaches is how to isolate the effect of the monetary policy from the other 
policies' influences implemented at the same time (fiscal, labour, industrial, 
etc.) and, furthermore, how to isolate the effect of the monetary policy 
under 'some particular given institutional conditions' (expectations, legal 
framework, etc.) or, alternatively, the effect of 'another kind of monetary 
policy' under these same institutional conditions. Actually, an increase in 
the money supply could come from very different sources, for example, from 
a government purchase, from an open market operation initiated by the 
central bank, from an expansionary bank's lending policy, etc. Therefore, 
the empirical analysis should also address the following issue: does a 'certain 
monetary policy' (labelled as Ml in Figure 4.6) always produce the El effect, 
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regardless of the institutional setting (labelled as I in Figure 4.6)? 
Alternatively, does a monetary change always have the same effect 
regardless of the way this change comes about (see Figure 4.6). 
The former argument implies that empirical work on the effects of 
monetary policy should not be restricted to the analysis of correlations 
between national monetary variables and some regional indicators, because 
these correlations tell us what the relationship between them has been in 
the past under particular circumstances but say nothing about the causal 
relationships involved in the process. For instance, a strong correlation 
could exist between, on the one hand, credit (or money) and, on the other, 
regional income in one particular economy over one particular period of 
time. This relationship could say that, for example, when the national 
money supply went up by 20 percent regional income rose by 7 percent while 
prices grew by 13 percent. However, if, as we have suggested, the increase in 
credit (or money), rather than being the result of a deliberate and exogenous 
increase of outside money by the central bank, were the result of an increase 
in the regional demand for credit which was partially ( or totally28) met by 
banks, then how should that relationship be understood? Should we 
understand it as a fixed relationship which always applies or, on the con-
trary, the breakdown of the monetary increase between real and nominal 
effects depends on other factors which are not included in such a deter-
ministic relationship? A second issue is whether a 'truthful and fixed 
relationship' between money and income exists, or whether this relationship 
depends very much on 'the way money comes into economy', as Chick has 
pointed out. That is, does it matter whether the monetary expansion comes 
from either an increase in the government's purchases of goods and ser-
vices ( direct effect on demand), or in exchange for outstanding interest-
bearing debt (open market operation), or an expansion on bank lending 
(Chick 1992: 160)? We believe that this is a critical point for the analysis, 
because if the way money comes into existence matters, then the relevant 
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question to answer is not whether the monetary policy affects regional 
output or not, but to explain when and why the monetary increase affected 
regional income in the past. 
The foregoing clearly complicates the development of any empirical test 
since theory suggests the inclusion of variables that are complex to measure 
in a very deterministic way, such as banks' and borrowers' liquidity 
preference. The traditional view assumes the following: (i) economic growth 
only depends on real factors, (ii) money being exogenously and perfectly 
controlled by central banks, with financial intermediaries playing a total 
passive role in the process, and therefore, (iii) money causing inflation in 
the long run when it is supplied in excess of real needs, or business cycles 
when central banks surprise economic agents in the short run. Perhaps it 
is easier to translate this view onto empirical grounds under these assump-
tions, but it does not provide a comprehensive understanding of how 
monetary policy works in a world where it is credit that determines money 
supply and credit depends on borrowers' and lenders' expectations, rather 
than on central banks' unilateral decisions. 
4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has presented a theoretical framework to explore the ways 
through which monetary policy can affect regions. 
One peculiarity of the analysis presented in this chapter is that it explicitly 
takes into account the potential regional differences in terms of banking 
development and liquidity preference of financial agents (including banks). 
As has been suggested, the inclusion of these two variables has relevant 
implications for our analysis. One implication is that, as financial systems 
develop, central banks lose their ability to directly influence the money stock 
since the increase in liquidity depends more on the demand for credit (and 
thus borrowers' liquidity preference) and on the willingness of banks to 
supply credit (and thus the banks' liquidity preference) than on the central 
bank's direct interventions. However, even at this stage central banks can 
still influence both banks' and borrowers' decisions; so there is still scope for 
monetary policy to affect regions differently. 
Another important implication we would like to mention here is of an 
empirical nature. Whereas most empirical works concentrate on studying 
the differences in economic or financial structure which might cause 
national monetary policy to affect regions differently, our theoretical 
framework suggests emphasizing the factors which determine regional credit 
availability. Consequently, the relevant issue is not to study regional dif-
ferences in response to exogenous monetary shocks, nor how a given 
amount of credit is distributed among regions by the banking system. 
These might be the right issues to address where the banking multiplier 
applies 0ow level of banking development), but not when the supply of 
credit increasingly depends on banks' and borrowers' financial decisions 
72 The regional effects of monetary policy 
(high level of banking development). Under this scenario, we suggested 
that the relevant issue is to study the influence of monetary policy on banks' 
and borrowers' liquidity preferences, that is, the behavioural effect, and 
not only its effects on economies with divergent economic structures (the 
structural effect). 
5 Monetary policy, financial 
flows and credit markets 
A survey of the regional literature 
S.1 Introduction 
This chapter surveys the existing literature concerning the regional effects 
of monetary policy. The chapter is structured into three main sections. 
Section 5.2 deals with the 'old' literature on the regional impact of monetary 
policy, that is, those early empirical contributions explicitly concerned with 
the regional effects of national monetary policies. Section 5.3 focuses on 
a more heterogeneous group of contributions, ranging from regional 
monetary multipliers to the regional credit markets literature. Finally, 
Section 5.4 includes more recent contributions which study the differences in 
the transmission mechanism of the European Central Bank monetary policy 
to the member economies of the euro area. The chapter ends with the 
conclusion section. 
S.2 The 'old' literature on the regional impact of 
monetary policy 
This section reviews the traditional literature that has explicitly dealt with 
the issue of the regional effects of national monetary policies. The papers 
included in this survey have been grouped into three different blocks 
(Table 5.1). As will be seen, most literature reviewed in this section could 
be considered as a regional extension of that dealing with how national 
monetary changes affect real economy. Therefore, the same two ruling 
views, monetarists and Neo-Classical Keynesian, on how monetary policy 
affects economy will also be distinguished at the regional level. 
The monetarists look for evidence of the power of money and monetary 
policy to cause business cycles at the regional level. On the contrary, Neo-
Classical Keynesians instead try to demonstrate that this direct monetarist 
effect of money on income does not seem to be reliable at the regional level 
either, because they believe that monetary policy affects the economy in a 
rather indirect way. This belief explains why they have also chosen to 
develop large regional structural models, mostly regional base models of 
growth, in order to test such an indirect effect. The monetarist models are 
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operations 
Beare (1976), Cohen and Maeshiro (1977), 
Toal (1977), Mathur and Stein (1980, 1982, 1983), 
Garrison and Kort (1983), Kozlowski (1991) 
Fishkind (1977), Deiss (1978), Miller (1978), 
Garrison and Chang (1979), Chase Econometric 
(1981), Goodhart (1989a) 
Scott (1955), Lawrence (1963), Bryan (1967), 
Ruffin (1968), Barth et al. (1975), Thurston (1976), 
McPheters (1976) 
Source: Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes (1997: 904). 
reviewed in Section 2.1, whereas Section 2.2 deals with the Keynesian ones. 
The third group of papers are those that focus on how open market 
operations may have different regional impacts. This literature is reviewed 
in Section 2.3. 
5.2.1 Reduced-form models 
Beare (1976) was one of the first works which empirically addressed the 
issue of the regional impact of monetary policy. Although there were 
earlier contributions, such as Scott (1955), and Lawrence (1963), Beare's 
contribution received much more attention since it represented a 'further' 
step in the development of the monetarist view on business cycles. Hence, 
the underlying 'theoretical roots' of Beare's work are to be found in earlier 
papers by Friedman and Meiselman (1963) and Andersen and Jordan 
(1968). These papers not only set up the basis of the so-called 'St. Louis 
equation', but they also provided a 'theoretical frame' where most of the 
monetarist argument on the impact of monetary policy, either national or 
regional, has developed. 
The monetarist's argument has been that business cycles are mainly due 
to monetary shocks, and so empirical work was developed to support such a 
hypothesis. Beare's departing point also was aimed to test monetarist theory 
on business cycles. However, Beare decided to apply monetarist theory to 
a regional setting since he suggested that 
if money contributes at least to some extent to fluctuations in national 
activity levels, then it must also contribute to fluctuations in the activity 
levels of the different regions of a national economy 
(Beare 1976: 57) 
In order to test this hypothesis Beare estimates a monetarist reduced-form 
model, the St. Louis equation, to the Prairie Provinces of Canada 
(Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta). Beare's model was therefore a 
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simple extension of the St. Louis equation to a regional setting. The model, 
shown below, was tested with annual data from 1956 to 1971, and was 
specified both in nominal and real terms. 
(5.1) 
where E stands for expenditure on products of the i-th region, M for 
national money supply, and A for autonomous expenditure on products of 
the i-th region. The variables which were chosen to carry out the estimation 
were Personal Income Before Taxes, as a measure of E, and, 'after some 
experimentation', Total Net Income of Farm Operators from Farming 
Operations as a proxy for autonomous expenditure (A).1 
Beare concluded that his model confirmed the monetarist hypothesis, 
i.e. the importance of money in the determination of regional income. 
However, one might wonder whether his results really do support the 
monetarist hypothesis. Indeed, what Beare presents in his paper are the 
results of the model in real terms for the three individual regions (Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan and Alberta) and in nominal terms for the three together 
(Prairies). And, according to the individual significance of the parameters in 
the model, t-ratios, the variable M/p (real money holdings) seems to have a 
strong effect on E; /p in almost every case. That is, money seems to affect 
regional real income, at least for the regions and period of time chosen by 
Beare. However, the monetarist view, if we are right, states that money only 
causes business cycles within the short term, and inflation in the long run. 
Money is neutral in the long run. 
Beare justified the impact of money on regional income on the ground of 
the existence of regional differences in terms of income or wealth elasticity 
of demand for their products. However, to lead his conclusion towards a 
monetarist field, he states that, although 'the initial effects of a monetary 
change are principally on real output rates, ... the long run effects are 
principally (and perhaps totally) felt on price level' (Beare 1976: 58). 
Perhaps, what Beare means is that the 15 year period between 1956 and 1971 
is not long enough for monetarist 'money neutrality' to be tested. 
Cohen and Maeshiro's (1977) paper also aimed at testing the monetarist 
view of business cycles at the regional level. They did so by estimating the 
following two models for the US regions for the period 1948-1971. 
GSP, =f(MON,,MON,_1) 
MON, = f(GDP,, GDP,-1) 
(5.2) 
(5.3) 
where GSP is Gross State Product and MON stands for State Money 
Holdings. 
According to the authors' conclusions, their model supported the 
monetarist view, i.e. equation (5.1) was a better fit than equation (5.2). 
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Leaving aside any theoretical discussion regarding the 'theoretical content' 
of both equations, one might raise doubts about the reliability of the data 
used in the estimation. For example, the variable MON, which stands for 
State Monetary Holding, was obtained by adding the state currency 
holdings to the demand deposit holdings, being the former 'determined by 
applying the annual average national currency-demand deposits adjusted 
ratio to state demand deposits' (Cohen and Maeshiro 1977: 674). Although 
this procedure is frequently used when it comes to the estimation of regional 
variables, especially fmancial ones, we should bear in mind what the 
limits of these estimations are, and what implications for the analysis 
follow. For example, one implication of this approach could be that no 
regional differences in terms of liquidity preference are allowed to exist. 
Furthermore, if we do not allow regional differences in liquidity preference 
to exist, we are implicitly assuming that money only plays a transaction role. 
If money were then only demanded for a transaction motive, regional 
money holdings should be in line with regional shares in national Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP). And, finally, if regional money holdings are 
supposed to 'mirror' regional shares in GDP, aren't we implicitly assuming 
money neutrality? Furthermore, if we are assuming no influence of money 
on regional GDP because the former is worked out from the latter, how can 
we possibly demonstrate money being non-neutral? What we are suggesting 
here is that, sometimes, our conclusions are very much determined by our 
assumptions. If the former argument is right, then what does the 'empirical 
truth of the data' mean? 
The paper by Kozlowski (1991) takes a different approach to those used 
by Beare and Cohen and Maeshiro. Rather than prove the suitability of a 
reduced-form model to test the monetarist view of the regional business 
cycle, Kozlowski tried to show that when a national monetary variable is 
incorporated in regional models of leading indicators, their forecasting 
performance is highly improved. In so doing he compared the performance 
of four leading indicator models for Detroit, South Carolina, Toledo and 
Wisconsin, with and without a national monetary indicator (M2). The 
results showed that when M2 was included in the models the forecasting 
performance was improved. 
Although this paper does not address directly the issue of the role of 
money in the regional business cycle, we believe that the idea that national 
money supply should be considered in regional models, because it is one of 
the causes of regional business cycles, is implicit in it. 
Within the monetarist vs Keynesian debate over the explanation of the 
regional business cycles, there have been also some contributions which have 
pointed out the dangers and limits of following simple reduced-form 
approaches, such as those from the St. Louis equation. The three papers by 
Mathur and Stein (1980, 1982, 1983) belong to this category. 
As a response to the extended use of reduced-form models in economics 
in order to test theoretical hypothesis, Mathur and Stein (1980, 1982, 1983) 
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pointed out the limits surrounding this kind of empirical approximation. 
Mathur and Stein were mainly concerned with the bias problem which arises 
when using such reduced-form models. They support their hypothesis both 
theoretically and empirically. Empirically they tested a reduced-form model 
similar to that of Beare (1976). Their model (Mathur and Stein 1980) was 
as follows. 
(5.4) 
where Y is total personal income, G is high-employment government 
expenditure, T is high-employment receipts, Mis national demand deposits 
plus currency in circulation, and e is the random error term. The subscripts i 
and t indicate region and time-period, respectively. The model was estimated 
for eight US regions during two sample periods, 1952:1 to 1968:II and 1952:1 
to 1976:IV. 
The results obtained by Mathur and Stein were in a monetarist line, i.e. 
monetary multipliers were highly significant in comparison to the fiscal 
ones. However, and this is the point the authors wanted to make with their 
paper, both multipliers showed high instability. It is this instability that led 
the authors to be sceptical regarding the use of reduced-form models at the 
regional level. 
Garrison and Kort's (1983) paper, on the contrary, was a response to 
both Beare's monetarist explanation of the regional business cycle and the 
scepticism shown by Mathur and Stein concerning the use of reduced-form 
models. In order to demonstrate both the power of fiscal variables in the 
explanation of regional business cycles and the usefulness of the reduced-
form models, they estimated the following model by states in the US for the 
period 1960:1 to 1978:IV. 
(5.5) 
where N is the total non-agricultural employment, T is a time variable for 
trend influences and rising productivity, Eis the high-employment budget 
expenditure, R is the high-employment budget receipts, M is the national 
money supply (M 1 ), and e stands for a random error term. The subscripts 
i and t stand for region and time-period, respectively. 
The results confirmed that both money and fiscal variables influence real 
activity. They also argued that the instability found by Mathur and Stein 
(1980, 1982) was due to the misselection of both the independent variable 
and the temporal period. However, these criticisms were going to be rejected 
again by Mathur and Stein (1983). 
Apart from criticisms about the usefulness of the use of reduced-form 
models (Mathur and Stein 1980, 1982), most of the approximations 
reviewed so far include some 'black boxes' regarding the explanation of 
the relationship between money and output. The general standpoint in all 
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these monetarist models has been that, as economic growth depends on real 
factors, any monetary change, which is assumed to be exogenous to the 
system, is only able to distress economic activity, either creating instability 
in the short run (business cycle) or inflation in the long run. Others, on the 
contrary, have sustained that fiscal variables are also important in the 
explanation of the business cycle. 
The solution to this debate was supposed to be found by recurring to 
empirical evidence. But empirical evidence, as Beare's (1976) and Garrison 
and Kort's (1983) papers show, has left the debate open because it has given 
support to both explanations. It is our view that these controversial results 
could be explained by several factors, among which we would mention the 
following: 
a) As Mathur and Stein (1980, 1982, 1983) have pointed out, reduced-
form models are not able to discriminate between the two sides of the 
debate. 
b) There are differences in data and econometric tools used in each paper. 
c) There does not exist a theory of general applicability; the suitability of 
each theory depends very much on institutional factors which differ 
from case to case, and might swing the empirical pendulum from one 
extreme of the debate to the other. 
But a more fundamental issue arises if money is not exogenous to the 
economic system, as both monetarist and Neo-Classical Keynesians suggest, 
but is the result of a complex process of interaction between monetary 
authorities' interventions and private agents' responses to those interven-
tions. If that were the case, how should the correlation between money and 
income be understood? In fact, money and income would then show a 
strong correlation over the cycle because credit is what finances production 
and money is credit-driven. From this theoretical point of view, money, 
rather than being the cause, would be the effect of the cycle and the 
correlation between money and income, either at a national or regional 
level, would have a different interpretation to the one given by either 
monetarist or Neo-Classical Keynesian models. 
Furthermore, even if money were the single cause of economic instability, 
it would remain difficult to put into practice the monetarist proposal of 
controlling money supply in order to avoid business cycles if money were 
no longer under the control of the monetary authorities. 
5.2.2 Large regional macro models 
Although monetarists have mainly addressed the issue regarding the 
regional impact of monetary policy by means of some kind of reduced-
form model, Keynesians have instead chosen to develop some kind of large 
regional macro model. Among the latter we would distinguish two different 
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kinds. One type aimed to assess the 'side effect' that some national financial 
variables, mainly interest rates, have exerted on regional income. Although 
these papers have explicitly considered the issue of how national financial 
conditions have affected regional growth, they have not directly addressed 
the matter of the regional impact of monetary policy .2 The other type dealt 
directly with the issue of the regional impact of monetary policy, either from 
a monetarist or Keynesian point of view.3 Large regional macro models 
built on Keynesian assumptions have mainly recognized two different ways 
through which national monetary policies have affected regional economies. 
The first channel has been through the effect that money has on national 
income, as the latter is considered as one, if not the single, determinant of 
regional income. The second effect has been the one which national interest 
rates could have on regional expenditure. Some of these ways are explicitly 
considered in the papers by Fishkind (1977) and Garrison and Chang 
(1979), as will be shown below. 
Monetarist models have instead taken a different account of the process, 
being more concerned with how national monetary policy has affected the 
regional distribution of money and, therefore, how monetary policy may 
affect regional business cycles. This is the approach taken, for example, 
by R.J. Miller (1978). In what follows, some brief comments on both kinds 
of models will be offered. 
Fishkind (1977) developed a short run export-base model for a state 
economy (Indiana, US) which was estimated for the period 1958-1973. The 
model is not fully presented in the paper, although the author states that it 
is composed of 34 equations, 17 of which are stochastic ones. The first of 
these 17 stochastic equations is presented in the paper, the remainder being 
highly interdependent. 
QB, = f(GNPi, YCB1) (5.6) 
where QB is the state's basic output, GNP is the gross national product, 
and YCB is the yield on corporate bonds. 
According to Fishkind, the model contains the three channels of 
monetary policy: (i) the cost of capital, which is included in the housing 
investment equation; (ii) the availability of capital, also included in the 
housing investment function; and (iii) the wealth effect. 
In order to test the differential effect of the US national monetary policy 
on the Indiana economy, Fishkind compares the behaviour of some regional 
economic indicators (Gross Product, Personal Income, Total Employment, 
Unemployment Rate and Transfer Payments) with the national ones during 
periods of tight (1969-1970) and easy (1971-1972) monetary policy.4 The 
results showed that during 'tight monetary policy' periods, the Indiana 
economy experienced slower growth than the national one. However, during 
'easy money' times, Indiana grew at the same rate as the national one. This 
asymmetrical behaviour of Indiana was explained, according to Fishkind's 
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conclusions, by the differences in terms of the relative composition of the 
state economy. 
Garrison and Chang (1979) also estimated a regional Keynesian model 
which was built on the export-base theory. 5 The model was as follows: 
YMFGit = f(M,, ... M,-n, E,, ... E,-n, Ri, ... R1-n) 
YBit = YMFGit + YAGRit + YM/Nit 
YNit = g(YBit, ... , YBit-n) 





where YMFG, YAGR and YMIN are the regional manufacturing, agrarian 
and mining earnings, respectively. YN is the regional non-basic income, Y 
is the total regional income, M stands for the national money supply (Ml), 
E for high-employment federal expenditures and R for high-employment 
revenues. 
The model was applied to eight US regions with quarterly data for the 
period 1969:1 to 1976:1 and, in light of the empirical results, Garrison and 
Chang concluded that, in line with Keynesian theory, both monetary and 
fiscal variables influence economic activity. 
They also worked out the elasticities of manufacturing income with 
respect to M, E and R, and found that regions with higher concentrations in 
durable-good manufacturing experienced a larger response to changes in all 
variables. Therefore, they concluded, monetary and fiscal policy are likely to 
have different regional effects due to the regional differences in economic 
structure. Regions having a higher concentration of durable-goods manu-
facturing will be more affected than those where agriculture and mining are 
more important. 
Chase Econometric Associates (1981), by means of the estimation of a 
regional model for eight US regions, four rural and four urban, arrived at 
the same results as Garrison and Chang (1979). That is, that urban regions 
seem to be more affected by tight monetary policies than rural ones. This 
result is explained by the regional differences in elasticities between different 
economic sectors. Unfortunately, the model is not shown in the paper. The 
only thing we know about it from the paper is that it was composed of 164 
equations, 114 identities and 38 exogenous variables. Two exercises were 
carried out with the model. First, the effect of a tight monetary policy was 
simulated. Secondly, the effect of a redistribution of credit from urban to 
rural regions was carried out. Both exercises gave support to the results 
already mentioned, i.e. tight monetary policy affected urban regions more 
than rural ones. 
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R.J. Miller's (1978) book offers a monetarist view on the regional impact 
of monetary policy. He put forward a 'short-run two-region macroeconomic 
static multiplier model' which, combining the global monetarist approach 
to the balance of payments and a regional specification of the money 
supply, allowed him to test the channels through which monetary policy 
affects regional economies. His model, as he states, goes further than the 
global monetarism literature because of the inclusion of a regional money 
supply mechanism (R.J. Miller 1978: 32-34). The model was expressed 
as follows: 
Lhi = 1/P [ L(Bf(Yf ,P,r)- Bf0 )- L(Bf(Yf ,P,r)-B'/°) 
I:mi = 1/P[ Lki(Ti+anF1 +a12F2 -Fi)+ LMf] 
+ LMi(Yf ,P,r) = 0 






where equations 5.11 to 5.15 represent, respectively, the commodity, bond, 
money and labour markets and the regional balance of payments, where ei is 
the net interregional transactions in goods and services for region i, Yi is the 
real regional product of the region, Ei is total real expenditure by the private 
sector (consumption and investment), Gi is the real government expenditure, 
P is the price level in the national economy, r is national interest rate, tx is 
the tax function in the region, B 8 is the desired nominal bond supply in 
region, B 80 is the initial nominal bond supply position in region, Bd is the 
desired nominal bond demand in region, Bd0 is the initial nominal bond 
demand position in region, Zi is the exogenous nominal net flow demand 
for bond in region, Di is the nominal flow supply of inside money in region, 
b; is the net interregional transactions for bonds in region, m; is the net 
interregional transaction in real money balances, M; is the desired stock of 
real money in region, M° is the initial level of the real money stock in region, 
k; is the regional money multiplier, F 1 is the central bank's net open market 
purchases of bonds, F 2 is the float item, 5 F 3 is the flow of deposits from the 
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private sector ofregion-i to the government's deposit accounts at the central 
bank, N" is the demand for labour services in region, N9 is the supply of 
labour services, W is the wage, and T is the regional balance of payments 
for region. 
The data requirements of the model make it quite difficult to obtain an 
empirical estimation. In fact, what Miller did was some comparative static 
analysis in order to see what the regional effects of open market operations 
were. The conclusions were that open market operations were not neutral 
once the regional dimension was introduced, being the effects on each region 
depending on parameters such as: (i) price; (ii) interest rate elasticities of 
the expenditure; (iii) money demand functions in each region; (iv) their 
relative size in terms of their relative share in the total money stock; (v) value 
of regional multipliers, etc. However, what Miller means by monetary 
nonneutrality was not that money could affect regional output, because 
his model is a full-employment economy. What he really means by monetary 
policy non-neutrality is the possibility that monetary changes could 
affect either prices or interest rates, not regional output (R.J. Miller 1978: 
72-74, 136). 
R.J. Miller also developed another model in his book which was aimed to 
assess empirically the issue of the regional impact of the US monetary 
policy. The model is a two-region reduced-form monetarist model whose 
main structure is shown below. 
ASNE, = c1 +a11 DDNE1-1 +a12DDROC1-1 +bu AUSG1 
+ b12 MF,+ b13 AFGS1 + b14 AOA1 + bis AOL1 
ASROC, = c2 +a21 DDNE,_, +a22DDROC1-1 +b21 AUSG, 
+ b22 MF,+ b23 MGS, + b24 AOA1 + bis AOL1 
KNE, = c3 + du KNE1-1 + d12 KNE1-2 + d13 KNE,_3 
KROC, = c4 + d21 KROC,_,+ d22 KROC1-2 + d23 KROC,_3 
AYNE, = cs + e,o AMNE, + en AMNE,-1 + e12 AMNE,-2 
+e13AMNE,_3 
AYROC, = c6 + e20 AMROC1 + e21 AMROC1_, + e22 AMROC,-2 
+ e23 AMROC,_3 
DDNE, = c1+fu YNE,+gn Q2+g12 Q3+gl3 Q4 
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where SNE is the stock of net source base to the Northeast region, SROC 
the stock of net source base to the rest of the country, DDNE the level of 
demand deposits in Northeast region, DDROC the level of demand deposits 
in the rest of the country, KNE the money multiplier for the Northeast, 
KROC the money multiplier for the rest of the country, YNE is the personal 
income in the Northeast region, YROC is the personal income in the rest of 
the country, MNE is the money supply (Ml) in the Northeast region, 
MROC is the money supply (Ml) in the rest of the country, DDNE is the 
level of demand deposits in the Northeast region, DDROC is the level of 
demand deposits in the rest of the country, USG is the Federal Reserve's 
holdings of government securities, FF is the federal reserve float, FGS is the 
gold stock, OA are other assets at the FED, OL are other liabilities at the 
FED, and Q2, Q3 and Q4 stand for quarterly dummies. 
Miller's explanation of the workings of the model is as follows. The 
process begins with equations (5.16) and (5.17), with an exogenous monetary 
policy manipulation by the central monetary authority, the FED. This 
monetary manipulation changes the flow of net source to a region which is, 
in turn, amplified by the multiplier process (equations 5.18 and 5.19). This 
change in a region's money supply generates changes in a region's level 
of economic activity (equations 5.20 and 5.21). This change in a region's level 
of economic activity influences interregional economic relationships 
(interregional trade of goods and services) which, in tum, generate new inter-
regional monetary flows (equations 5.22 and 5.23). These monetary flows 
change the region's net source base and, therefore, the process starts again. 
The model was estimated for the period 1969-1975 using quarterly data 
for two regions: the Northeast region and the rest of the country. The 
Northeast region grouped the reserve districts of Boston, New York, 
Philadelphia and Cleveland. According to Miller's own conclusions: 
the regional pattern of monetary policy ... supported a rate of growth 
in nominal personal income in the rest of the country which was 
greater than the rate of growth in nominal personal income in the 
northeast region 
(R.J. Miller 1978: 142) 
However, just one page before this statement was made, he had also 
recognized that, 
the explanatory power of these reduced form equations [his empirical 
model] was inadequate, ... and [this low significance] suggested the 
need for additional explanatory variables, such as fiscal explanatory 
variables 
(R.J. Miller 1978: 141) 
So far we have reviewed some works which have tried to assess 
empirically the issue of the regional impact of monetary policy. We have 
84 Monetary policy, financial flows and credit markets 
mainly focused our attention on those points which, we consider, conform 
to the main contribution made by each author. Many differences could be 
distinguished among the papers under review. Some of them have adopted 
some kind of reduced-form model, whereas others have chosen some kind of 
'large' regional macroeconomic model. Differences have also arisen in the 
results. Some of them have given empirical support to the monetarist view 
of the (regional) business cycle. Others have proved that fiscal variables 
also matter. 
In spite of these differences, there are also common points among all of 
them. We would underline two main ones. First, the money supply is 
considered as being perfectly exogenous to the system. That is, the central 
monetary authorities can exert a perfect control on money supply through 
open market operations. Second, the analysis has tried to isolate periods of 
tight monetary policy and see what the performance of regional economies 
has been by comparison with the national one. 
However we find both hypotheses unsatisfactory. With regard to the 
second one, how could we possibly isolate the effect of monetary policy on 
income from the effect that all the other policies being implemented are 
having (fiscal, industrial, labour, regional, etc.)? That is, how could we 
develop a 'ceteris paribus' analysis? On the other hand, is money really so 
exogenous to the system? And if so, does it mean that financial 
intermediaries only play a neutral role in the transmission of monetary 
changes? That is, aren't financial intermediaries able to constrain (expand) 
lending, up to some extent, regardless of what the central bank does? 
Clearly, all these questions would modify the whole analysis and the 
conclusions of all the papers reviewed so far, and we strongly believe that 
they are very relevant indeed. 
5.2.3 Spatial diffusion of open market operations 
The third group contained in Table 5.1 is made up by those papers which 
have tried to assess the regional impact of monetary policy by looking at the 
'regional lags' which may arise in the process of transmission of open 
market operations from central to peripheral money markets. This is a 
literature which is very much tied up to the US experience of the 1950s and 
1960s regarding the relative effectiveness of open market operations and 
reserve requirement as the FED's instruments of monetary control. 
The debate was over the advantages and disadvantages of using one or 
another instrument. Those in favour of the use of open market operations 
claimed that open market operations were more flexible, easily applied 
and readily tuned. Those against open market operations claimed that 
reserve requirement changes exerted their effect over all components 
(regional FED districts) of the banking system, whereas open market 
operations were transmitted from central to non-central markets more 
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slowly (McPheters 1976: 1009). The debate then went over the empirical side 
in order to test both the existence and length of these regional lags in 
adjusting to monetary changes. 
One of the earlier papers in addressing the issue empirically was that by 
Scott (1955) which tried to estimate the lag in the transmission of open 
market operation from New York to the rest of the country. The period of 
study was 1951:6 to 1953:5 and the analysis consisted of comparing the time-
pattern of free reserves by both FED districts and groups of banks. The 
hypothesis to be tested was whether tight monetary policy was first felt in 
central districts and after some lags in peripheral ones. Free reserves were 
then used as an inverse index of the effectiveness of restrictive monetary 
policy. The results indicated that there were important lags in the 
transmission of open market operations from central markets to the rest 
of the country.7 That is, country reserves seemed to be less sensitive to the 
general decreasing trend followed by central reserve banks. 
However, what Scott did not test was whether this comparison in 
sensitivity in country banks' free reserves was only explained by tight 
monetary policies or, on the contrary, the time pattern of free reserves was 
also influenced by other factors than the tight monetary policy. For 
example, different patterns in free reserves by banks could also be explained 
by both banks' and borrowers' differences in liquidity preference. That is, 
a bank could have a higher free-reserves ratio, either because it has decided 
not to lend or because their customers have decided not to borrow. On the 
contrary, Scott's argument ran as follows: (i) open market operations 
determine banks' reserves; (ii) banks maintain a fixed free reserves ratio; 
(iii) banks transmit tight monetary policy by reducing lending when their 
free-reserves are running out; (iv) those banks whose free reserves do not 
follow the general pattern are supposed to be isolated from tight monetary 
policies. However, our argument above suggests that the latter could also be 
explained by factors other than monetary policy. 
Lawrence's (1963) paper was an attempt to distinguish between those two 
effects on regional banks' reserves: (i) changes due to general credit policies; 
and (ii) changes due to the local economic environment. Lawrence studied 
the US case for the period 1953-1961 and his main conclusions were that 
'banks which serve primarily nonfarm business borrowers and depositors 
experience the greatest decline in reserve positions in periods of monetary 
restraint' (Lawrence 1963: 129-130). 
One general criticism which applies to all these papers is that they all refer 
to the US case and, for this, their conclusions are only applicable to this 
particular institutional setting which clearly differs from the one in most 
other countries. Another criticism would be that what is meant by monetary 
policy (open market operations) is a very narrow concept since central 
banks dispose of many other monetary instruments to control liquidity 
(regulation, moral persuasion, etc.). 
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5.3 The regional fmance literature 
Apart from this literature, which has directly dealt with the issue of the 
regional impact of monetary policy, we will also survey some papers whose 
main aims focused on other regional financial matters. Table 5.2 offers a 
classification of such literature. 
This is certainly a very broad literature and, because of this, we have 
decided to group it in three different categories. However, we are fully aware 
that what has been classified under one particular label may well possibly 
fall in more than one category to the extent that some papers have addressed 
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James (1976), Ostas (1977), Rockoff (1977), 
Hendershott and Kidwell (1978), Aspinwall (1979), 
Keleher (1979), Hutchinson and McKillop (1990), 
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Dreese (1974), Keleher (1977a), Roberts and 
Fishkind (1979), Moore and Hill (1982), 
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Source: Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes (1997: 904). 
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more than a single matter. Nevertheless, we have tried to classify the papers 
according to the main contribution made by each author. 
First there is the literature whose focus is on how monetary multipliers 
are modified when monetary analysis includes interregional fmancial and 
trade flows. Another group is made up of the literature which focused its 
efforts on describing, rather than on explaining, interregional financial 
flows. Far more interesting is the literature which deals with the issue of 
regional financial markets. As far as this question is concerned, we have split 
our survey into two sections. The first one deals with the issue of regional 
interest rate differentials whereas the second one addresses a far more 
relevant literature, e.g. the one that looks at the factors determining regional 
availability of credit. 
Although all these papers share common interests in regional financial 
matters, they clearly differ in their theoretical backgrounds, ranging from 
Neo-Classical explanations of regional differentials in interest rates to the 
New Keynesian literature of credit rationing, or the Post Keynesian 
literature on money and credit. 
5.3.1 Regional monetary multipliers 
The aim of this literature is to show how the standard national monetary 
multiplier model is modified when introducing the regional dimension, that 
is when the effect those interregional economic relationships (goods and 
financial flows) have on regional monetary base are considered. The main 
modification is that, when the monetary multiplier model is applied in a 
regional setting, a new source of base-reserves growth appears in com-
parison to the national case. In a regional setting, apart from open market 
operations and reserve requirement changes, the regional monetary base is 
also able to change due to the existence of real flows between regions which 
generate monetary flows, i.e. interregional exports (imports) either of goods 
and services or financial capital. 
Moore et al. (1985) worked out the regional monetary multiplier which 
took the following expression (Moore et al. 1985: 32): 
l+k m=----------
1 - F,(1 - r)(l - io) + k + t (5.24) 
where k stands for the ratio currency to demand deposits, t is the ratio of 
time deposits to demand deposits, r is the reserve ratio requirement, F, is the 
portion ofloanable funds which remain in the region when spent by regional 
bank borrowers, and i0 is the portion of loanable funds invested outside the 
region. F, and i0 are the two factors which are new in the regional monetary 
multiplier. It is easy to see that the higher F, (the lower io) the larger the 
regional multiplier. In the extreme case of F,= l and io=O, the regional 
multiplier becomes the national one. 
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Even though the monetary multiplier model assumes perfect exogeneity 
of the money supply, it also introduces some interesting points which are 
worth considering from a regional point of view. We would mention two 
main ones. First, the monetary multiplier model allows behavioural 
parameters to have a role in the transmission of monetary changes. 
Behavioural parameters such as banks' and borrowers' liquidity preference 
which could lead regions experiencing higher liquidity preference to have 
the lower multipliers. Secondly, although it has been suggested that the 
monetary multiplier model does not match with the current stage of bank-
ing development in most developed economies,8 perhaps it may well apply 
to some particular regions, particularly those having lower levels of banking 
development. These two considerations might open some room for 
monetary multiplier analysis in the regional level. 
5.3.2 Interregional financial flows 
The literature on interregional financial flows is much more concerned 
with the description and estimation of interregional financial flows rather 
than with its explanation. Perhaps the lack of regional data on financial 
matters is the reason for this emphasis on description rather than 
explanation. 
There have been some attempts to estimate flows of fund between regions 
in different countries. Bowsher et al. (1957) and Lees (1969) have done it 
for the US case; Castells and Sicart (1980) and Banco de Bilbao (1980) for 
Spain; and Short and Nicholas (1981) for the UK regions. There have also 
been some other papers which by means of the use of money flows between 
regions have tried to assess intercity relationships (Lieberson and Schwirian 
1962, Carlino and Lang 1989). 
Nevetherless, an investigation of the methodology employed in most of 
these papers leads to doubts about the usefulness of most of these regional 
estimations. For example, a very common hypothesis which is used when it 
comes to estimating either regional currency, deposits or lending, is to divide 
the national currency according to regional GDP shares and, in the case of 
deposits and credits, according to personal disposable income by regions. 
Of course we are aware of both the difficulties surrounding any regional 
estimation and of the usefulness of having such information. We are not 
saying that most of these estimations are not useful at all. What we are 
suggesting instead is that we have to be aware of the limits of such estima-
tions. For example, to assume the hypothesis mentioned above implies, from 
our point of view, two additional assumptions. First, it is being implicitly 
assumed that monetary flows mirror real ones, that is, that money is mainly 
demanded by the transaction motive. Secondly, it is also being assumed that 
no regional differences exist in terms of, for example, liquidity preference. 
That is, two regions having the same share in GDP will have the same 
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currency, regardless of the differences in liquidity preference which could 
arise between them. 
5.3.3 Regional credi,t markets 
Within this block we have distinguished two groups. The first one deals with 
the issue of interest rate differentials. The other is much more concerned 
with the issue of regional credit markets and the factors determining 
regional credit availability. 
5.3.3.1 Differentials in regional interest rates 
Most of this literature refers to the US case. In fact, all papers except those 
by Hutchinson and McK.illop (1990) and Faini et al. (1993), address the 
issue in the US during the 20th century, some papers even going back up to 
the end of the 19th century (such as Rockoff 1977). This is not surprising 
at all if we take into account the lack of regional financial data (and 
specifically on interest rates) in countries other than the US. 
Within the US empirical literature we would distinguish three different 
approaches to the matter of the interregional differentials in interest rates. 
The first group studied the topic from an 'efficiency market approach', 
that is, trying to see what the relationship between regional and national 
interest rates is like. Keleher's (1979) paper belongs to this category. Keleher 
estimated the following model for both the mortgage (new and existing 
homes) and business loan market (long and short term bank loans by size, 
and revolving credit bank loan by size) in the US. The periods of estimation 
were 1965:1 to 1977:12 for mortgages and 1967:1 to 1976:4 for bank loans. 
ireg = a + fJ ius +µ, (5.25) 
where ireg is regional interest rate, ius is the national interest rate, and µ, is 
the random error. 
Keleher concluded that regional financial markets were integrated 
because {J1 was significant and close to 1, and that interregional differentials 
in interest rates, which were accounted in the model through the constant 
(a), existed because of the regional differences in costs, risks and 
homogeneity of financial assets. 
However, an interesting hypothesis, which was not tested by Keleher, 
would have been to study the behaviour of the constant term (a) over the 
business cycle. Indeed, it would have been interesting to see whether this 
term, which could be seen as the 'regional mark-up' in interest rates applied 
by banks, remained constant over the cycle, or if, on the contrary, it moved 
up and down along with the business cycle. Another interesting hypothesis 
to be tested would be to see whether significant differences in this mark-up 
exist for different agents, e.g. small and large businesses, etc. 
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The second of the groups we have distinguished is made up by those 
papers which have tried to test the sensitivity of interregional financial flows 
to regional differentials in interest rates. Cebula and Zaharoff (1974) tested 
the following model for the US regions for the period 1950-1971 in order 
to check whether regional financial flows were sensitive to differential in 
interest rates. 
D; = a+ fJ(r; - ri) + µ (5.26) 
where D; is the change in volume of total deposits in district i over period, 
r; is the average rate of return on loans in district i, ri is the average rate 
of return on loans in district j, and µ is the random error. The results 
confirmed the insensitivity of D; to (r,rj), although, in the authors' view, 
this does not mean that markets are segmented, but that there are differences 
in risks and costs between regions which would remove any chance of 
making profitable transfers of funds between them. 
The third and largest group of papers looked for reasons to explain 
regional interest differentials. Among the factors outlined we would point 
out the following: 
• factors related to market structure such as concentration ratios, number 
of institutions, ceiling on interest rates, etc.; 
• demand factors such as regional pressure on financial resources; 
• risk factors, both on the demand (probability of delinquent payment) 
and supply (risk of bank failure9); 
• cost factors; 
• distance from central monetary markets. 
In an early paper, Schaaf (1966) explained regional differences in 
mortgage rates in terms of risk, distance and demand pressure. The model 
was estimated for the period 1964-1974, and is shown below. 
r=f(L,M,S) (5.27) 
where r is the mortgage yield, Lis the loan-value ratio (risk measure), Mis 
miles from Boston, and S is the state saving per average annual dwelling 
unit constructed (demand pressure factor). 
Winger (1969) would later criticize the risk measure used by Schaaf 
(1966). According to this author, 'different lenders may not respond alike 
to the same risk options because they may differ in their assets preferences 
or in the regulatory constraints surrounding their operation' (Winger 1969: 
662). He also added that regional differences in risks are a consequence 
of regional growth disparities. 
The point made by Winger on the concept and measurement of risk is 
worth noting because it seems that anything which cannot be explained by 
empirical models is very often 'packed' under the label 'differential risk'. 
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This, in tum, has led to considering regional financial markets (either 
mortgage or loan markets) as if they were perfect, in the sense that they have 
been able to evaluate regional differences in costs and risks when allocating 
resources. However, it will be useful to think about how to measure risk 
and, further, whether risk is similar to uncertainty, and whether the latter 
would also have to be included in the analysis of the regional differentials 
in interest rates and credit rationing. 
Another point made by Winger regarding the 'regulatory constraints' 
which could be affecting lenders' behaviour was also extremely important. 
For example, Ostas (1977) re-estimated Schaaf's (1966) model in order to 
include the effects of 'state usury ceilings' on mortgage market. The model 
was estimated for 1970-1972 and the results showed that 'usury ceilings' 
were the most powerful variable in the model. 10 
The model by Aspinwall (1979) was aimed to test the power of market 
concentration on regional mortgage interest rates and was estimated for 
the first months of 1965. The model included the following variables. 
R =f(F,H, Y,L,B) (5.28) 
where R is the rate of interest, F is the number of mortgage lending 
institutions, H is change in number of households 1950-60, C is a 
concentration measure, Y is the median family income, L is the ratio of 
loan to dwelling price, and B is the log of average number of deposit 
accounts per commercial bank. 
The results confirmed the power of variables related to market structure 
(F and C) and regional income (Y and H) in explaining regional interest 
rates. However, risk variable (L) did not seem to be significant. 
The papers by Hutchinson and McKillop (1990), McKillop and 
Hutchinson (1990), D'Amico et al. (1990) and Faini et al. (1993), are 
among the few which have dealt with the issue of differential in regional 
interest from an empirical side in countries other than the US. Hutchinson 
and MacKillop (1990) and McKillop and Hutchinson (1990) addressed the 
issue for the UK and Northern Ireland cases, whereas the other two papers 
paid attention to the Italian case. 
McKillop and Hutchinson (1990) found some evidence regarding the 
existence of different interest rates applied on loans to SMEs. As regards 
large businesses they concluded that no evidence of such regional differences 
existed and that this fact could be explained by the increased competition 
among banks for this segment of the market. As long as personal financing 
was concerned, and contrary to what theory would have suggested (higher 
interest rates in isolated regions), they concluded that 
the interest rates charged are, with one or two exceptions, either 
approximately equal across these three regions [England and Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland] or highest in England and Wales 
(McKillop and Hutchinson 1990: 29) 
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However, they also pointed out that these comparisons focusing on 
interest rates alone 'omits important aspects of the lending process relating 
to bank charges and collateral requirements' (McKillop and Hutchinson 
1990: 29) because these may vary across regions. It was because of this 
that the authors decided to look at the regional differences in bank charges 
and fees as they make up the 'true cost' of funds. Once these regional 
differences in bank charges and fees were included, some regional 
differences in the 'true cost' were found among the three regions (McKillop 
and Hutchinson 1990: 30-31). It still must be noted that the same authors 
also concluded in another paper that 'there is no evidence of a regional 
constraint nor of an interest rate structure significantly higher [for the 
Northern Ireland financial sector] than that which prevails at the national 
level [UK]' (Hutchinson and McKillop 1990: 430). The evidence would 
therefore seem inconclusive. However, it would be interesting to spell out 
further what is meant by 'significantly' higher, since sometimes regional 
differences in interest rates are explained as simple regional differential 
risks. If this were the case, then what had to be explained is how these risk 
differentials are accounted for and, further, whether banks are able to fully 
measure them or if instead they simply either add some mark-up when they 
simply do not know. 
D'Amico et al. (1990) and Faini et al. (1993) also found some evidence of 
differential in interest rates between the Northern and Southern Italian 
regions. In particular, D'Amico et al. (1990) concluded that differentials 
in interest rates were due to differences in GDP per capita and to the 
particular composition of lenders (by size and sector). Those two variables 
accounted for almost 90 percent of the variability in interregional interest 
rates in Italy for the period 1969-1988. Other variables reflecting risk, 
such as the bad loan to total loans ratio, and concentration, such as the 
Herfindal concentration index, resulted in minor significance. The model 
estimated by them was: 11 
LR =f(COMP,GDP,BL,HERF,DUAG) (5.29) 
where LR is the average lending rate charged by branches located in 
province, COMP is a composition effect which takes into consideration 
borrowers' size and economic sector, GDP is Gross Domestic Product per 
capita in each province, BL is the ratio of bad loans to total loans reported 
by local branches, HERF is the Herfindal index for each province, and 
DUAG is a dummy variable for the province of Agrimento (Sicilia). 
5 .3 .3 .2 Regional credit availability 
Although most of the papers included in this section have a common 
concern, the analysis of the factors which determine regional credit avail-
ability, they clearly differ in the way they have approached the topic itself. 
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In order to organize our presentation we will distinguish, apart from the 
seminal papers by Roberts and Fishkind (1979), Moore and Hill (1982), 
Harrigan and McGregor (1987) and Dow (1987c), which set up the basis for 
the debate, three approaches which have tried to develop the topic from very 
different theoretical backgrounds. These three approaches could be roughly 
identified with the Neo-Classical general equilibrium models, the New 
Keynesian literature on credit rationing and, finally, the Post Keynesian 
literature on regional money and credit. 
PERFECT CAPITAL MARKETS 
The first of the approaches mentioned above, that is, the one which has tried 
to assess the issue through the development of some kind of general 
equilibrium model, is, certainly, the least extended among the scholars. This 
is so because money and financial flows are considered of minor, if any, 
relevance for regional economic growth, as it is assumed that financial 
resources perfectly flow from one to another region in order to fund the best 
investment alternative. The papers by Moore and Nagumey (1989) and, up 
to some point, Hughes (1991, 1992) would fit in this 'general equilibrium' 
category. For example, Moore and Nagurney assume that the interplay 
between the regional supply of funds, which is generally determined by 
a multiplier process, and the regional demand for funds, which is seen 
as mainly depending on interest rates, will create some 'equilibrium state' 
where: 
the supply interest rate at supply markets plus the transaction cost 
between a pair of supply and demand markets cannot exceed the 
demand interest rate at the demand market, if there is a positive 
monetary flow between this pair of supply and demand market 
(Moore and Nagumey 1989: 401) 
Hence, so long as regional credit markets work properly there will exist 
equilibrating interregional financial flows between regions which, in tum, 
makes money of no relevance at the regional level. The only chance for 
money to play a role arises when 'something' exists which makes markets 
work incorrectly. The Neo-Classical view of the process could be summed 
up as follows: let the market work alone and money will be allocated in the 
'best place'. 
CREDIT MARKET SEGMENTATION: EARLY CONTRIBUTIONS 
However, as we earlier suggested, this has not been the way in which most 
research on this topic has developed. Indeed, rather than assuming perfect 
interregional financial flows, most of the research has been concerned with 
the identification of the factors which does not allow markets to work in a 
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'Neo-Classical way'. This was certainly the path followed by those early 
seminal papers cited above. 
Roberts and Fishkind's (1979) paper was inspired by Losch's study of 
spatial fluctuations in interest rates (Losch 1954), and tried to identify the 
factors which could lead to segmentation in regional credit markets. They 
identified three main factors which could explain regional segmentation. 
The first of them was related to the availability of information by regional 
agents. Roberts and Fishkind considered that, as knowledge and inf or-
mation about financial conditions outside the region are only available at 
some costs, these costs could lead to some regional segmentation in credit 
markets so long as they could remove the possibility of profitable financial 
arbitrage between regional and national financial markets. Additionally, 
the more isolated a region is, the higher the costs of obtaining information 
are; isolated regions are the most likely to suffer from segmentation in 
their credit markets. The second factor pointed out by Roberts and Fishkind 
was the existence of non-homogeneous financial assets among regions. 
Non-homogeneity of financial assets makes comparisons between them 
difficult to assess. Hence, the non-homogeneity of financial assets in terms 
of liquidity, maturity or risk, could also be another factor explaining 
segmentation in regional financial markets. Thirdly, they also considered 
that regional differences in liquidity preferences and risk aversion could lead 
to differences in terms of interest sensitivity of both supply and demand for 
assets. The foregoing led the authors to five conclusions (Roberts and 
Fishkind 1979: 20---22): 
• Regional interest rates may be different from the national ones (either 
higher or lower). 
• Regional interest rates vary around national ones between two bands 
which stand for regional differences in costs. 
• The more isolated a region, the wider their bands and, therefore, the 
higher its regional variability in interest rates. The wider bands would be 
explained by the higher transaction costs, lower availability and more 
costly information on financial conditions that the higher isolation 
implies. 
• The more isolated the region, the more inelastic both supply and 
demand for regional assets. With regard to the demand side this 
inelasticity would reflect local borrowers' higher dependency on 
banking funds, both because these are likely to be mostly personal and 
small businesses, and because of their isolation from central financial 
markets. The higher inelasticity of supply could reflect higher banks' 
'perceived risk' or costlier 'risk-assessment' for 'peripheral markets' 
(isolated regions). 
• Regional differences in IS and LM elasticities would lead to different 
regional impacts of monetary policy. 
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Figure 5.1 Roberts and Fishkind's analysis. 
Notes: b1 and b2 are the 
upper and lower bounds 
for regional interest rates 
fluctuations; r1 and I" are 
the regional and national 
Interest rates, respectively 
Apart from their theoretical analysis, Roberts and Fishkind also quoted 
some empirical evidence (Ebner 1976) which supported the hypothesis of 
regional segmentation in financial markets. 12 
Moore and Hill (1982) added a new factor to the three ones pointed out 
by Roberts and Fishkind which could lead to some kind of regional 
segmentation within regional credit markets: the distinction between small 
and large borrowers and lenders. 
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Regional demand higher than regional deposit base 




Figure 5.2 Moore and Hill's analysis. 
Moore and Hill's (1982) analysis considers regional supply of funds as 
determined by a regional bank multiplier process and, therefore, limited for 
the regional deposit base. The demand for funds is considered to operate 
quite independently of the regional supply. They consider that the excess of 
demand could only be met if banks lend more locally or if they get more 
funds from outside the region. However, they noted that this arbitrage 
between local and national markets would be less than perfect because 
some local borrowers and lenders (small business and household sector 
and, possibly, some local banks) do not have access to national markets 
(lack of information). 
The arbitrage between local and national financial markets was also 
developed by Harrigan and McGregor (1987) in a more straightforward 
way, but retaining the main ideas already put forward by both Roberts and 
Fishkind's (1979) and Moore and Hill's (1982) papers. The issue of the 
regional segmentation of credit markets has also been addressed from an 
empirical point of view (Hutchinson and McK.illop 1990, McK.illop and 
Hutchinson 1990, Amos 1992, Bias 1992). 
As suggested earlier, McK.illop and Hutchinson (1990) and Hutchinson 
and McKillop (1990) addressed this matter in the UK case, and found some 
evidence regarding regional differentials in both interest rates and fees 
(McK.illop and Hutchinson 1990: 29-31). But they also addressed another 
issue: whether a credit constraint existed for the Northern Ireland economy 
with respect to the UK case. Their analysis proceeded by comparing the 
assets and liabilities of the Northern Ireland clearing banks and the British 
banks for the years 1977, 1980, 1982, 1985 and 1987. The hypothesis to be 
tested was that Northern Ireland banks had a proportionately lower 
deposit base, higher liquidity and lower bank advances, with respect to the 
British banks. They concluded that there was 'no evidence of an overall 
limit on the regional supply of credit' and, accordingly, that the Northern 
Ireland financial sector was a part of an integrated market in spite of 
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being distant from the central market, and having particular political and 
financial characteristics (Hutchinson and McKillop 1990: 428-430). 
Bias (1992) found some evidence of regional segmentation in US financial 
markets. By means of the estimation of the following equation, Bias tries to 
demonstrate that regional differences in terms of interest rate sensitivity 
exist and, therefore, regional segmentation in financial markets. The model 
was estimated for 12 US states for the period 1967-1986. 
Mi = J(Realfed, Drate, Realbase, Population, ei) 
Pi 
(5.30) 
where Mi/Pi stands for regional13 Ml supply, Realfed for FED's stock of 
treasury securities (open market operations), Drate for discount rate, 
Rea/base is a proxy for regional basic-income (manufacturing and mining 
sectors) and ei is a random error. Population entered as a scale variable to 
retain the regional size, and all variables were deflated. The results showed 
regional differences in terms of both Realfed and Drate, and this was 
interpreted by Bias as proof of regional segmentation in financial markets 
(Bias 1992: 331-332). 
The paper by Dow (1987c) added three new points to Moore and Hill's 
analysis. One point was the interdependent character of demand for and 
supply of credit. Dow suggested that regional monetary base, apart from 
open market operations and interregional financial flows, could also be 
influenced by regional demand for credit. That is: 
- d B = B(Hr, Fr, Cr) (5.31) 
where B stands for regional monetary base, Hr for liabilities of the monetary 
authority (open market operation), Fr is the exogenous component of 
regional balance of payment and C; is the regional demand for credit. This 
point was clearly aimed at introducing the endogenous character of the 
money supply. The second factor she distinguished was the recognition of 
the 'speculative component' in the demand for money and, hence, the role 
played by liquidity preference in the regional credit creation process. The 
introduction of both the endogeneity of money and the liquidity preference 
led to the reversal of the causation acknowledged in Moore and Hill's 
analysis. That is, instead of only considering the possibility that changes 
in regional income could lead to changes in regional deposits and credits, 
as Moore and Hill assumed, Dow also opened the possibility for changes in 
regional liquidity preference (due to greater/lower confidence in regional 
economy) to lead to endogenous changes in regional credit and, therefore, 
changes in regional income, instead of the other way round. 
A third factor added by Dow's (1987c) paper was the role played by the 
institutional financial structure. The question addressed was whether the 
existence of a branch banking system would alter the conclusions reached 
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in her analysis. Indeed, it has been suggested that regions face a mark-up 
horizontal supply of funds because regional bank branches are able to 
lend beyond their regional deposit base. This, in tum, means that credit 
availability is no longer a problem for regions so long as its supply is 
perfectly elastic at some mark-up over the national interest rate. However, 
Dow concluded that, even when a branch banking system exists, we cannot 
assume a regional perfectly elastic supply of funds because, although a low 
regional deposit base would not necessarily mean less regional credit, it 
might mean a higher regional liquidity preference on behalf of the national 
banks and this, in tum, will be the factor which will constrain the regional 
extension of bank lending. Therefore, and despite the endogenous character 
of regional money supply, credit availability still remains as a variable that 
matters for regional analysis. 
THE NEW KEYNESIAN REGIONAL LITERATURE ON CREDIT RATIONING 
The second distinctive approach noted above consists of the recent attempts 
to extend the New Keynesian credit-rationing literature to a regional 
setting (Samolyk 1989, 1991, 1994, Greenwald et al. 1993, Faini et al. 1993). 
Unlike the modifications to Neo-Classical models discussed above, which 
introduce information problems as the regional element, the new 
Keynesians start with an imperfect information model and apply it to 
regions. This literature focuses on how asymmetric and imperfect 
information could lead to low capital mobility and, further, to misallocation 
of financial resources and regional credit-rationing.14 
The New Keynesian literature points out that, because of the existence 
of regional segmentation in credit markets, local banks' wealth, as a deter-
minant factor of banks' ability to extend lending, can become one of the 
factors which explain regional credit-rationing. Indeed, as local banks are 
more likely to have superior information on local investment opportunities 
than outsiders and, therefore, they can monitor them at lower costs, this 
makes local investors more dependent on local financial institutions because 
of the unwillingness of national institutions to lend regionally. 
Building on this analysis, Samolyk (1991, 1994) developed an empirical 
model to test for a relationship between banking conditions and economic 
performance at the state level in the US. The underlying hypothesis was that 
the existence of information costs may lead to credit constraints in some 
financially 'distressed regions', but not in financially 'sound regions'. Three 
models were tested for the period 1983-1990 taking the following form as 
the more general one: 
Yit = BoY;,1-1 + L,B;CREDIT;, 1-1 +µ, (5.32) 
where y stands for 'growth rate of real gross state product minus growth 
rate of real gross national product' and CREDIT includes variables for 
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regional credit conditions such as: (i) real growth rate of loan loss reserves; 
(ii) non-performing loan share; (iii) per capita volume of failed business 
liabilities; (iv) real growth rate of domestic loans; and (v) bank ROA. The 
second specification tested for differences in this relationship for 'poor' and 
'good credit health' states in order to see whether this general relationship 
changed, depending on whether states had a non-performing loans ratio 
which was high or low with respect to the national share. The third model 
was aimed at studying the relationship between low and high income 
growth states. 
Samolyk's conclusions were that 'local-banking sector conditions explain 
more of real income growth in states where bank loan quality has been poor 
than in those whose banking conditions are relatively healthy' (Samolyk 
1994: 259) thus confirming the power of local banks to affect the local 
economy when regional segmentation exists. 
Faini et al. (1993) also tried to build up some relationships between, on 
the one hand, local banks' monopoly power and banking inefficiencies 
and, on the other hand, low economic performance for Southern Italy. 
Particularly, their analysis suggests that the low productivity shown by 
Southern Italy could be explained by inefficiencies of the financial sector, 
and that this latter aspect is related to informational problems in Southern 
Italian credit markets. 
The New Keynesian literature, as summarized in Figure 5.3, suggests that 
asymmetric information explains credit rationing since it inhibits the 
provision of credit by national (outsider) institutions in regional markets 
when local ones fail to do it. This conclusion poses the further question of 
how far branching of national banks in credit-constrained regions would get 
around the problem of asymmetric information. Porteous (1995) concludes 
that the optimal banking structure to address the problem of monitoring 
costs for firms in peripheral regions is a mixed one, with small local banks 
providing credit to small local firms. 
~c-n~ 
Potential consequences: 
- Regional demand more 
dependent on local banks 
- Local banks' inefficiencies 
affect 'real' local economy 










(higher monitoring costs, 
low capital mobility, 
unwlHlngneas to lend) 
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THE POST KEYNESIAN REGIONAL VIEW ON THE CREDIT CREATION PROCESS 
Rather than focusing on why a perfect flow of financial resources among 
regions does not exist, the Post Keynesian literature on regional money and 
credit takes market imperfection as the norm and focuses on the study of 
regional patterns of credit creation, and how these may vary from one 
region to another. In so doing Post Keynesian theory makes use of both 
Chick's stages of banking development and the Keynesian principle of 
liquidity preference. 15 
Although there are some parallels between the New Keynesian and the 
Post Keynesian theories, a closer look reveals significant differences. 
A particular feature of the Post Keynesian theory is that its analysis 
addresses both the supply side and the demand side of the regional credit 
market. New Keynesian literature is mainly concerned with the supply side 
issue of how imperfect information segments regional markets. Regional 
credit rationing could arise then as a result of the unwillingness of non-local 
financial institutions to lend within the region (because of their lack of 
information to assess local project riskiness and profitability). However, 
post Keynesians point out that credit rationing could also be explained by 
demand factors to the extent that the amount of regional credit is the result 
of the interaction between supply and demand, and because both functions 
are interdependent, being affected by changes in liquidity preference. This 
point was already raised in Dow's (1987c) modification of Moore and Hill's 
(1982) analysis. As a consequence, Post Keynesian theory suggests that the 
understanding of the regional credit creation process implies the analysis 
both of the supply and demand side of the market. Hence, regional credit 
rationing is not seen as a unicausal situation explained by regional-
discriminatory behaviour on the part of the financial system (mainly banks) 
which, in tum, leads to an uneven regional distribution of credit, but as 
a multi-causal situation in which all sectors in the region are involved 
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Figure 5.4 Post Keynesian theory on regional credit. 
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behaviour', which we now explore in more detail in terms of the regional 
supply of and demand for credit. 
Regarding the supply side, Post Keynesian theory considers that regional 
credit supply is affected both by regional liquidity preference and the stage 
of bank development. The stage of banking development determines banks' 
ability to extend credit regardless of their deposit base, either regional or 
national, i.e. the degree of endogeneity of money supply. The lower the stage 
of bank development, the more applicable the money multiplier model is. 
This would imply that regions having banking systems in lower stages of 
development would be more constrained by, say, lower saving or deposit 
ratios than others. Thus, local banks at an earlier stage of development than 
national or international banks will find themselves at a competitive 
disadvantage, including a lesser capacity to create credit. However, once the 
banking system reaches higher stages, the foregoing no longer applies. The 
former analysis also implies that, depending on the own stage of banking 
development, the constraints on credit expansion are able to change and 
so the relevant monetary theory also should change. 
Post Keynesian theory allows liquidity preference to affect regional 
suppliers of credit and regional demand for credit. From the banks' point of 
view, liquidity preference influences the willingness to lend within the region 
when regional perceived risk is higher or its assessment is more difficult. 16 
The New Keynesian approach refers to risk assessment as an objective 
process, where in principle full information would allow the generation of 
a risk measure. The Post Keynesian approach rather sees all credit-risk 
assessment as being subject to uncertainty of varying degrees (Dow 1995, 
1998, 2004); that uncertainty is perceived to be greater the more remote the 
borrower from the lender (where remoteness may be spatial, cultural, etc.: 
see Porteous 1995). Banks' liquidity preference may hence be influenced by 
both regional expectations regarding regional income growth, regional 
instability, etc., and by the expected effects of 'monetary conditions' created 
by the central bank. 
Liquidity preference not only affects lenders' behaviour but also exerts 
its effect on savers' behaviour. For example, higher liquidity preference 
encourages savers to adopt more liquid portfolios and that liquidity is more 
likely to be supplied by extra-regional assets. An increase in liquidity 
preference by regional agents in peripheral regions could then lead to an 
outflow of financial resources to central regions which may reduce local 
availability of funds. Whether or not this outflow affects regional credit 
availability depends on: (i) the ability of the banking sector to expand credit 
regardless of its regional deposit base; and (ii) the effect that such regional 
outflows have on banks' own regional liquidity preference. However, what 
is worth noting is that this effect has its origins in non-financial sectors. 
The demand side has to take into account the effect that liquidity pre-
ference could have on the regional demand for credit. For example, lower 
expectations regarding the regional economy (higher liquidity preference) 
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could lower the regional demand for funds to the extent that investors are 
less willing to run into debt. Higher regional expectations could drive up 
regional demand for credit and, to the extent that the banking system shares 
the optimism and is able to extend credit beyond its deposit-base (a factor 
which depends on its stage of development), could also increase the regional 
supply of credit. It is this interdependence between supply of and demand 
for credit which makes it difficult to identify whether any regional 'credit 
gap' exists. Some authors have tried to assess the matter in terms of 
declining long run credit shares by peripheral regions and have found no 
clear evidence of such a trend. Porteous (1995), for example, presents 
some empirical evidence from Australia (1950-84) and Canada (1975-90), 
suggesting that, overall, 'there is little strong evidence of systematic discri-
mination by national banks as seen in long-run credit shares or in the 
extent of rationing' (Porteous 1995: 193). Porteous further concluded that: 
(i) wealthier regions have higher shares of bank credit; (ii) there is no 
evidence of declining shares of credit in peripheral regions; (iii) monetary 
policy does not discriminate against peripheral regions; and (iv) some 
evidence suggests the existence of credit rationing in peripheral regions, 
but this evidence is not conclusive. 
However, Post Keynesian theory does not claim long run decreases in 
regional credit shares by peripheral regions. It rather claims unstable 
patterns in regional credit creation in the sense that credit creation can fuel 
expansions and enhance recessions, generating greater instability.17 Some 
empirical evidence for the Spanish regions can be found in the papers by 
Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998) and Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow (2003). Since 
money is credit-driven, rather than the other way around, the issue is no 
longer limited to looking at whether banks lend more than they borrow 
regionally, as is often suggested. The matter is no longer how a fixed amount 
of credit is divided up among regions, but how credit is created (or not) 
regionally. The focus then is on the interdependent relationships between 
credit, deposits, money supply and income over business cycles. For 
example, credit is expected to increase during economic upturns because of 
higher banks' and borrowers' willingness to lend and borrow, respectively. 
The deposit total depends on whether most of this credit flows outside the 
region in terms of imports and capital outflows. Therefore, a high credit/ 
deposit ratio is expected during expansions in peripheral regions. However, 
what happens in recessions is more difficult to predict. Credit demand and 
supply are expected to be low during downturns because of higher liquidity 
preference on behalf of both investors and lenders. Nevertheless, a regional 
credit gap could still exist to the extent that there is a need to finance 
working capital. At the same time, higher liquidity preference could lead to 
financial outflows if safer and more liquid financial assets are not provided 
within the region. Whether the credit/deposit ratio remains high or low 
with regard to the expansion phase will depend on the significance of each 
of the above mentioned factors (credit demand, credit supply and financial 
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outflows). However, no deterministic relationships are to be expected 
because some of the factors affecting them cannot be deterministically 
measured or foreseen (such as changes in liquidity preference), or can be 
modified by others (such as the institutional setting). 
5.4 The 'new' orthodox literature on the regional impact of 
monetary policy 
The debate over the economic consequences of the EMU has mainly been 
developed on two fronts. The first one started with the analysis of the efforts 
needed in order for members to meet the official criteria to take part in this 
process (the nominal convergence criteria established in the Maastricht 
Treaty), the likely uneven spatial distribution of benefits and costs among 
members of the EMU and its potential consequences for economic growth 
and employment (higher economic policy coordination and the loss of 
monetary and exchange rate national policies). However, once the European 
Union entered the third and final stage of EMU, in January 1999, the 
discussion moved on to another front: the transmission of the single 
monetary policy to different member economies.18 In particular, there is an 
increasing concern for the implications that differences in financial structure 
across countries in the euro area 19 may have for the transmission 
mechanism of the monetary policy in EMU since, for some authors, those 
differences may produce a differential impact of the ECB's monetary policy 
(see for example Kashyap and Stein 1997b, Cecchetti 1999, Bondt 2000). 
In this section we briefly review this later literature, although some 
comments will also be made for the first strand of the above-mentioned 
literature. According to our exposition, the orthodox literature on the 
regional impact of European monetary policy will be classified into three 
broad categories (Table 5.3). 
First, there is a group of studies which are based on the Optimum 
Currency Areas approach. Most of these papers are concerned with the 
asymmetric shocks or asymmetric responses to shocks of member economies 
of a currency union. The Optimum Currency Area literature has also paid 
close attention to the mechanisms that would lead economies to recover 
from an asymmetric shock (wage-price flexibility and labour mobility), or 
the consequences of a common monetary policy when the currency union 
member economies show a low business cycle correlation. The second body 
of literature only assesses differences in responses to monetary policy shocks 
without giving any formal explanation for the diverse responses. Finally, 
there is the literature that tries to offer some potential explanations for the 
differences in responses to monetary policy shocks. The differential effect of 
monetary policy is usually explained by the asymmetric impact of national 
monetary shocks on regions having structural differences with respect to the 
national average (these differences increase the sensitivity of some regions to 
exogenous changes in national interest rates or business cycles). Sometimes, 
Table 5.3 Classification of the new orthodox literature on the regional impact of European monetary policy 
Theoretical framework 
Optimum Currency 
Area (OCA) framework 
Orthodox Monetary 
Theory (small reduced 
form models and alike) 
Orthodox Monetary 
Theory (large macroeconomic 




• Asymmetric shocks 
• Asymmetric responses to shocks 
• Adjustment mechanisms to shocks 
• Business cycles synchronization 
• Regional differences in responses to 
monetary policy shocks 
Explanatory variables 
• Sectoral composition 
• Lack of nominal flexibility (wage and price 
flexibility and labour mobility) 
• Lack of business cycle synchronization 
• No explicit or quantitative explanation is 
provided (but qualitative arguments point 
to economic and financial structure) 
• Regional differences in responses • Sectoral and demand composition (interest-
to monetary policy shocks due to sensitive industries and expenditure) 
heterogeneous economic and financial • Openness (exchange rate effect on net exports) 
structures • Firms' size (bank dependence firms) 
• Banking market structure (concentration, 
external dependence, ownership, legal framework, ... ) 
• Banks' size and health 
• Balance sheet effects 
• Availability of non-bank sources of finance 
Source: Adapted from Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow (2003: 971). 
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the differential impact of monetary policy is explained by the central role 
played by the banking system in some regions, both in the transmission of 
monetary policy and in the provision of credit. This view thus presumes 
some segmentation in financial markets, due to market failure and/or 
asymmetric information, to the extent that borrowers in some regions might 
not have access to a full, substitutable, range of sources of finance. This 
literature draws on New Keynesian monetary theory. In other cases the 
differences in responses to monetary policy shocks are also related to 
differences in economic structure as well as financial factors. 
5.4.1 The economi,c consequences of currency unions: the case 
of the EMU 
The analysis of the economic consequences of the euro has been primarily 
developed within the Optimum Currency Areas (OCA) literature. This 
approach was applied early in the history of European monetary unification 
by Magnifico (1973), building on the pioneering work of Mundell (1961), 
McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). A comprehensive treatment of this 
literature in the context of the European monetary integration can be 
found in De Grauwe (1997). 
This approach assumes that the single monetary policy would have 
asymmetric effects in the presence of structural differences among euro 
countries; the single monetary policy would be more suitable for some 
economies than others. As devaluation is no longer available, any 
asymmetric shock can only be offset by greater economic flexibility, defined 
as wage and price flexibility and mobility of factors of production (the 
emphasis in Europe being on labour mobility, since capital mobility is 
already high). 
This approach has resulted in a large amount of empirical literature that is 
concerned with the asymmetric shocks or asymmetric responses to shocks of 
member economies of a currency union. For example, Krugman (1993) has 
suggested that the EMU would cause a higher vulnerability20 of some 
regions to asymmetric shocks, since economic integration leads to higher 
specialization. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993: 222-223) used structural 
vector auto-regression to identify supply and demand shocks and found 
important differences in responses to supply shocks between the 'core' and 
'periphery' countries, the shocks to the core being both smaller and more 
correlated across neighbouring countries. The same results were found for 
the demand shocks, although the differences between core and periphery 
countries were now less dramatic. The same argument is put forward in 
the studies by Karras (1996) and Kouparitsas (1999). Karras concludes 
that Europe is not an optimum currency area since 'country-specific shocks 
are both large and asymmetric', whereas Kouparitsas points out that 
the EMU will not be a viable currency area for all European countries. 
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The OCA literature has also paid close attention to the adjustment 
mechanisms that would lead economies to recover from an asymmetric 
shock (wage-price flexibility and labour mobility). Empirical evidence 
points to a lower degree of labour mobility in Europe (De Grauwe and 
Vanhaverbeke 1991, Emerson et al. 1992, Eichengreen 1993), and so has 
usually concluded that the EMU is not an optimum currency union since its 
adjustment mechanisms rely more on public transfers than on price 
flexibility and factor mobility (Obstfeld and Peri 1998). 
The consequences of a common monetary policy when the currency union 
member economies present a low business cycle correlation has also been 
a matter of concern within the OCA literature. Employing Optimum 
Currency Area theory, Carlino and DeFina (1996, 1999) identify the 
regional impact of monetary policy with the effect of national monetary 
policy on regional business cycles. Carlino and DeFina's aim is to identify 
the factors that make some regions more sensitive to national business cycles 
than others, which (following a monetarist approach) they consider to be 
caused by monetary shocks. To this end Carlino and DeFina (1996) 
estimated a V AR model to analyze regional responses to business cycles in 
the US during 1958-1992. They concluded that regional sensitivity to 
business cycles was stronger in regions with larger shares of interest-sensitive 
industries and smaller firms. These conclusions were also confirmed for the 
state level in Carlino and DeFina (1999). 
Ramos et al. (1999a) studied the regional impact of single monetary policy 
by looking at the output correlation among some EMU countries, since a 
lower correlation may indicate that a single monetary policy may not fit to 
all. The authors found higher output correlation in the 1980s and this 
evidence was interpreted as indicative of a lower probability for the single 
monetary policy to produce asymmetric shocks (demand shocks). However, 
they also found evidence of higher probability for EMU countries to suffer 
supply shocks in the 1990s. Angeloni and Dedola (1999) have also found 
evidence of a higher cross-country correlation among EMU countries in 
terms of real cycles and inflation. They concluded that these results and the 
convergence in terms of monetary policy rules followed by the main 
Eurosystem central banks would reduce the harmful effects of the Single 
European Monetary Policy. Mihov (2001) has also recently suggested that 
policy-coordination among EMU countries has contributed to a higher 
correlation among business cycles during the 1990s. 
Overall the pre-EMU empirical literature did not deliver a definitive 
answer to the question of whether the EMU would be viable for all 
European countries. In any case, the third and final stage of the EMU 
started in January 1999 and since then there have not been many shocking 
aspects which could be solely attributed to it. There is considerable 
evidence suggesting that Europe is not an optimum currency area. But 
there are also some authors who argue (Suardi 2001) that these differences 
are much lower among those European countries which are part of the 
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euro area (such as Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy and Holland), 
than between euro countries and European non-euro countries (such as 
Sweden and the United Kingdom). In addition, Suardi points out that the 
introduction of the euro has removed the differential effect that monetary 
policy had in the past through exchange rate fluctuations, and has also 
contributed to improved functioning of financial markets, and thus capital 
mobility. Some authors have also suggested that the differential effect of 
the single monetary policy would be reduced in the future as the process of 
economic integration continues and economic policy coordination increases 
(see, among many others, Dornbusch et al. 1998: 52, Ehrmann 1998: 28, 
Arnold 1999: 22, Arnold and Vries 2000: 213, Clausen 2001: 172). However, 
since the third and final stage of EMU did take place in January 1999, the 
most urgent question now seems to be what the regional effects of the 
common monetary policy could be. This issue is addressed in the next 
section. 
5.4.2 Regional differences in the transmission mechanism of 
monetary policy: the case of the EMU 
In the last decade many empirical papers have attempted to study the 
differences in the transmission mechanism of the common monetary policy 
in Europe. In spite of these efforts, the empirical evidence has not provided 
a clear answer to the issue, so the topic remains controversial. This section 
reviews some of these papers with the aim of summarizing what empirical 
work has been able to sort out and to identify the issues which are still far 
from being resolved. We do not mean to offer an exhaustive and complete 
list of empirical papers in this section, but to illustrate the key aspects of 
the issue with our particular selection of literature. 21 
A quick look at the empirical literature reveals, among other things, the 
following interesting aspects. There are a large number of papers whose 
only aim is testing differences among euro countries in their responses to 
monetary policy shocks. The objective of this strand of the literature is to 
find a definitive answer to the issue of whether (or not) differences in the 
responses to monetary policy shocks exist. This strand usually overlooks the 
point that monetary policy might work differently, not only across countries 
or regions, but also alongside business cycles as well as depending on the 
'behavioural responses' of economic agents. Other papers focus on 
providing explanations for the differences in responses to monetary 
policy, but these explanations are almost always related to macroeconomic 
structural differences and very little is said about those (macro and/or 
microeconomic) factors that influence the responses of economic agents.22 
Consequently, it is difficult to identify which part of the asymmetric effects 
is due to structural differences and which part is due to the behaviour of the 
economic agents (Mazzola et al. 2002). This is an important issue since 
structural differences might disappear and this would not necessarily mean 
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that asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy would auto-
matically vanish: there would be still scope for asymmetries arising from 
differences in the behavioural responses of economic agents to monetary 
policy.23 Finally, there is a wide range of econometric methods used in 
empirical testing, none of them free from criticism, and this makes it difficult 
to compare results across different studies (Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998, 
Guiso et al. 1999). 
The remaining part of this section reviews some contributions aimed at 
empirically testing for differences in responses to monetary policy shocks 
in the EMU, including those which explicitly have tried to offer some 
explanations for the differences in responses. Finally, this section concludes 
by summarizing some of the most important issues raised in our survey of 
the literature. 
5.4.2.1 Testing for differences in responses to monetary 
policy shocks 
The empirical literature studying differences in the transmission mechanism 
of monetary policy in Europe could be classified into two different groups: 
large and small econometric models (Dornbusch et al. 1998: 31-36). The 
group of the small econometric models is by far both larger and more 
diverse than the first group. In addition, most empirical papers included in 
the second group employ Vector Autoregression Models (V AR) to study 
differences in responses to monetary policy shocks24 even though these 
models have been subject to some important criticism.25 
One example of a large-scale model is the work conducted by the Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS 1995) to study the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy in some industrialized countries. 26 The 
empirical results of this project showed differences among some EMU 
countries in terms of their responses to monetary policy shocks, with the 
larger countries having stronger responses (Guiso et al. 1999: 58-59). 
The group of small-scale models is more numerous and diverse (from an 
econometric point of view). Most contributions in this group are based on 
reduced-form models and the Vector Autoregresion Models (V AR) is the 
most preferred econometric tool. The countries' responses to monetary 
policy shocks are studied by means of a V AR model, sometimes with a 
common structure for every single country, and sometimes with a different 
structure depending on idiosyncratic aspects which differ from one economy 
to another. This is the case, for example, in Mojon and Peersman (2001) 
and Ehrmann (1998), which allow for different VAR specifications in the 
countries considered. In other cases the countries' response is studied by 
estimating a V AR model for the EMU area as whole, as if the current 
EMU member countries had also been engaged in a currency union before 
it really started in January 1999. The papers by Peersman and Smets 
(2001), Clements et al. (2001) and Peersman (2003) belong to this category. 
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Table 5.4 Some VAR literature on differences in responses to monetary policy 
shocks in EMU 
V AR with same structure 
for every country 
V AR with different 
structure for every 
country 
V AR for the whole 
EMU area 
No (or little) 
cross-country differences 
Gerlach and Smets (1995) 
Barran et al. (1996) 
Kieler and Saarenheimo 
(1998) 
Mojon and Peersman 
(2001) 
















It is worth mentioning that none of the three alternatives is free from 
criticisms.27 Table 5.4 contains some of the contributions made from the 
V AR literature. The papers considered have been classified according to the 
following two criteria. We first consider the structure of the V AR model. 
Then, we look at their conclusions on whether significant cross-country 
differences were found in terms of responses to monetary policy shocks. A 
quick look at the table reveals that the results obtained from V AR models 
are ambiguous and may be 'of only limited relevance for the issue at hand' 
(Guiso et al. 1999: 59). 
5.4.2.2 Explaining differences: fmancial and economic structure 
heterogeneity 
This section considers some of the studies which see the differential 
regional impact of monetary policy as being caused by differences in 
economic and/or financial structure among EMU countries. This is the case 
of Carlino and DeFina's (1998) paper, which provides a ranking of the 
EMU countries according to their likely sensitivity to a monetary policy 
shock. Using the empirical evidence found in earlier US studies (Carlino and 
DeFina 1996), they construct an index to measure the regional effect of 
ECB monetary policy. They use a VAR model to study the long run 
response of US states to changes in interest rates. These responses are then 
regressed on a set of variables (industry mix, firms' size and some banking 
variables) to explain regional differences. Finally, the estimated coefficients 
are used to weight some variables included in the index for the EMU 
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countries. The index only takes into account the differences in terms of 
industry-mix and banks' size, since firms' size was not found significant for 
the US case. According to their results, three different groups of EMU 
countries could be distinguished. First, the group of countries most sensitive 
to monetary policy shocks: Finland, Ireland and Spain; secondly, the group 
of less-sensitive countries: France, Italy and Netherlands; thirdly, a group 
with a response close to the EU average: Austria, Belgium, Portugal, 
Germany and Luxembourg. 
For both Arnold (1999) and Guiso et al. (1999), the regional effect of 
the single European monetary policy is again ascribed to differences 
in economic structure. In particular Arnold (1999) suggests that it is the 
differential share of industrial employment that explains the differential 
effect of ECB monetary policy in 68 EU regions. Guiso et al. (1999) pay 
more attention to microeconomic factors, such as business size, propensity 
to export and location for a survey of business in Italy. 
Following the work by Carlino and Defina (1998), Ramos et al. (1999b) 
focused on the regional incidence of Spanish monetary policy by means of 
the construction of an index that included some of the key variables to 
explain regional sensitivity to changes in interest rates: sector-mix and firm 
size. The results showed a high spatial variability in the index values, and 
therefore seemed to confirm the differential regional incidence of monetary 
policy in Spain during 1985-1992. 
Mihov (2001) also follows the Carlino and Defina (1998) paper to explain 
heterogeneity in responses to monetary policy shocks. They found that the 
effects of monetary policy shocks on output are smoother in Anglo-Saxon 
countries and stronger in Germany. The paper also provides empirical 
evidence on the heterogeneity in responses within (across regions) Germany, 
Italy and France. 
The paper by Kashyap and Stein (1997b) suggests that regional 
differences in financial structure in Europe might become a source of 
(regional) concern for the transmission of the single monetary policy. 
Kashyap and Stein base their analysis on the assumption that banks play 
a key role in the transmission of monetary policy, an assumption which 
clearly contrasts with the 'money view' which is usually assumed in conven-
tional monetary theory. Their arguments rely on empirical evidence about 
the discriminatory effects of monetary policy changes on large and small 
business financing, thus they adopt a 'bank-centric view' in order to take 
into account the importance of bank size in the transmission of monetary 
policy. 28 They argue that larger banks are more likely to overcome periods 
of tight money, so that small banks lending is more sensitive to monetary 
policy changes. Their theoretical conclusions are that the effects of 
monetary policy are not uniform if there are regional differences in the 
following variables: (a) the incidence of bank-dependent firms; and (b) bank 
size and soundness (strong vs weak banking system). After analyzing 
differences among EMU countries in terms of firm size and the availability 
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of non-bank sources of finance (as proxies for bank-dependence), and the 
size distribution of banks (as a proxy for bank soundness), they conclude 
that a single monetary policy will affect more strongly those countries with 
weaker banks, smaller firms and banks, and less availability of non-bank 
sources of finance. 
Cecchetti (1999) comes to the same conclusion as Kashyap and Stein, 
namely that differences in financial structure, such as size, concentration, 
banks' health, and the availability of non-bank sources of finance, may 
produce asymmetries in the transmission of monetary policy in Europe. 
Contrary to the official view of the European Commission, he argues that 
further steps in the process of monetary integration will not necessarily lead 
to the removal of such differences in financial structure in Europe unless 
there is an equalization in terms of legal structures protecting shareholders' 
and creditors' rights in all EU countries. He concluded that differences in 
financial structure in Europe will make some national economies more 
sensitive than others to changes in interest rates.29 
Dornbusch et al. (1998) also find that financial structure plays a relevant 
role in the explanation of the differences in the responses to monetary 
policy shocks, since the effects of monetary policy are systematically weaker 
in countries with market-centre financial systems (Dornbusch et al. 1998: 43). 
However, the authors also conclude that 'differences are not dramatic' 
(Dornbusch et al. 1998: 40) and that 'this process is sure to evolve in part 
as a result of the financial industry restructuring that is already under 
way and that is accentuated by the common money' (Dornbusch et al. 
1998: 52). 
Finally, Bondt (2000) provides evidence of the existence of cross-country 
variations in financial structure in six European countries (Germany, 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Belgium and the Netherlands). In 
particular, by using a variety of econometric techniques, he found evidence 
on the existence of both a bank lending and balance sheet channel for 
Germany and Italy and, to a lesser extent, in France, Belgium and the 
Netherlands (Bondt 2000: 135). He finally concludes that differences in 
financial structure 'may hamper the implementation of a common European 
monetary policy' since they might modify the transmission channel of 
monetary policy in every euro country (Bondt 2000: 129). 
5.4.2.3 Some concluding remarks on available empirical evidence 
Most available surveys of the empirical literature dealing with asymmetries 
in the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy in Europe conclude 
that the empirical evidence is not conclusive at all: the results vary not only 
across countries but also across studies. Few conclusions, robust or not, 
can therefore be extracted from the available empirical literature (Guiso 
et al. 1998: 61, Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998: 12, Elbourne and Haan 
2004: 12-15), and some authors even suggest that, given the complexity 
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of the task, the econometric analysis 'will never be able to resolve this issue' 
(Kieler and Saarenheimo 1998: 32). 
However, there does seem to be a consensus on the following statements. 
Firstly, country-specific models tend to produce substantial differences in 
the responses to monetary policy shocks, but it is unclear whether such 
differences are due to the country-specific nature of the models themselves 
or to other factors. Secondly, using the same empirical methodology for all 
countries (for example, a common structure in a V AR model) produces 
much less cross-country variation in the results. Thirdly, many authors 
suggest that pre-EMU empirical results are not useful at all for 
extrapolating post-EMU results since this has implied a change in the 
model of the economy (the so-called 'Lucas critique'). And finally, the usual 
explanation for the differences in responses to monetary shocks relies on 
macroeconomic differences (economic and financial structure), and very 
little attention has been paid to the determinants of economic agent 
responses, which for sure influence the macroeconomic outcomes but are 
always open to change in a non-deterministic way. Since it is expected that 
further economic and monetary integration, as well as economic policy 
coordination will reduce structural differences among EMU countries, 
many authors expect the different responses to common monetary policy 
shocks to be narrow in the near future (Dornbusch et al. 1998: 52, Ehrmann 
1998: 28, Arnold 1999: 22, Guiso et al. 1999, Arnold and Vries 2000: 213, 
Clausen 2001: 172, Peersman 2003: 12). 
5.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has surveyed the literature dealing with the regional impact of 
monetary policy from an empirical point of view. In so doing we have tried 
to show that most empirical approaches have been, to a large extent, simple 
'regional extensions' of the discussion regarding how monetary policy 
affects economic activity. 
Most of the analysis regarding the potential regional effect of monetary 
policy has been developed within the standard open version of the IS-LM 
model since this framework is supposed to suit regions: they are very small 
open economies which do not dispose of monetary tools. Consequently, 
most empirical work has focused on identifying regional structural 
differences in terms of IS and LM slopes, or the factors which may lead 
to some segmentation in regional credit markets. In fact, these two 
approaches along with the other contributions which have considered 
money as being the cause of regional business cycles have attracted most 
empirical effort. 
The 'old' literature on the regional impact of monetary policy has been 
recently complemented with some contributions which have flourished 
because of the third stage of EMU. These new contributions are mainly 
concerned with the consequences which might stem from the existence of 
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significant differences in the transmission mechanism of the European 
Central Bank monetary policy to the member economies of the euro area. 
One of the conclusions to be drawn from the survey literature is that most 
empirical work assumes the real vs monetary duality, so monetary policy is 
seen as neutral for real purposes. Therefore, monetary policy can only cause 
regional effects either when some market failure (lack of information, 
segmentation, money illusion, etc.) or structural differences make the 
transmission mechanism differ from one region to another. Nevertheless, 
this duality is not acknowledged in those contributions made from a Post 
Keynesian perspective, which were surveyed in the section dealing with 
regional credit markets. 
6 Some empirical evidence* 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter gathers some diverse empirical evidence which we think might 
be useful to illustrate the regional dimension of national monetary policies. 
However, the evidence provided in this chapter should be interpreted with 
caution because our empirical approach only addresses some of the 
theoretical issues raised in the previous chapters of the book. Consequently, 
our suggestion would be to interpret the empirical evidence within the 
theoretical framework put forward in Chapters 3 and 4. 
The chapter will primarily pay attention to the European Monetary 
Union, since it has obviously created an increasing concern over the 
potential regional consequences of the single monetary policy. The chapter 
also offers some empirical evidence for Spain which we think helps to 
understand the prospects of the euro area. 
The analysis of the regional economic consequences of monetary policies 
is addressed from two different perspectives. The first one tries to assess 
whether the European Central Bank (ECB) has effectively succeeded in 
achieving its primary goal of price stability since it started to control 
monetary policy for the euro area in year 1999. The second perspective is 
concerned with the issue of regional monetary asymmetries within currency 
unions. Instead of looking at the euro area, the chapter concentrates on 
studying regional monetary policy asymmetries in Spain for two reasons. 
First, because the empirical literature which addresses this topic at the 
euro area level is extensive and has already been surveyed in Chapter 5 
(Section 5.4). Secondly, because we think the Spanish experience might 
provide useful insights for understanding the regional consequences of the 
single monetary policy (actually the Spanish regions already belonged to 
a currency union before the third stage of the European Monetary Union 
started in year 1999). 
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 6.2 first outlines 
the ECB's monetary framework with the aim of identifying the key 
role that inflation plays in the ECB's monetary strategy and then studies 
the theoretical factors that might explain regional inflation differentials 
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and inflation persistence within a currency union. It finally analyzes regional 
inflation differentials in two long-established currency unions (Spain and 
the United States) and compares these results with the EMU experience. 
The purpose of this section is to show that price stability does not always 
result from the centralization of monetary policy. Section 6.3 approaches 
the regional effects of national monetary policies by studying regional 
asymmetries in monetary policy shocks. To some extent this 
section reproduces some of the empirical approaches surveyed in Chapter 
5 (Section 5.4) for the Spanish regions but emphasizes the role of finan-
cial structure in monetary transmission from a regional point of view. The 
empirical evidence provided in this section suggests that Spanish mone-
tary policy has had a differential effect among Spanish regions and, 
secondly, that regional differences in both financial and economic 
structure are responsible for such a differential effect. Section 6.4 provides 
some empirical evidence for the cyclical pattern of regional credit avail-
ability in Spain. The aim of this section is to illustrate the influence that 
monetary policy might have played in the regional patterns of credit 
availability in Spain. Finally, the chapter offers some conclusions. 
6.2 Inflation and monetary policy in currency unions 
It is well known that the primary goal of the ECB's monetary policy is to 
achieve price stability. Empirical evidence shows that during the 1980s and 
1990s there was a rapid and strong convergence in terms of price differential 
among the euro countries, particularly in those countries with higher 
inflation rates in the past. Nevertheless, convergence in inflation rates has 
stopped since the mid 1990s and this fact has raised fears that the single 
monetary policy is not adequate for a number of countries (Bjorksten and 
Syrjanen 2000). This latter possibility was not a major concern during the 
early years of the single monetary policy since the average rate of inflation 
was low and its dispersion among the EMU countries was expected to be 
quickly removed by the introduction of the single currency.1 However, this 
does not seem to be the case anymore, and even the ECB now acknowledges 
that inflation differentials across regions are a natural feature of the mone-
tary union and that monetary policy cannot influence them (ECB 2004: 53). 
In fact, the persistence in inflation differentials within the EMU area 
was one of the arguments considered by the ECB to explain why it has 
officially refused to bring inflation below its 2 percent objective and finally 
adopted the new target of an 'inflation rate below, but close to, 2% over 
the medium term' in the year 2003 (ECB 2003a).2 
The perpetuation of the inflation differentials within the euro area raises 
some interesting issues. Firstly, the persistence of inflation differentials 
within the euro area might mean that inflation is not always and everywhere 
a monetary phenomenon, so the single monetary policy would not be 
efficient in fighting inflation within the euro area.3 Secondly, since the 
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ECB sets the official interest rate according to the average inflation rate 
of the euro area, the persistence of such price differentials would mean 
that 'one size does not fit all', and this might have important economic 
consequences, particularly for the euro countries with structurally lower 
inflation rates (ECB 2004: 54). For this reason the ECB has pointed out 
that 'it is necessary for monetary policy to consider the size, persistence 
and determinants of inflation differentials in assessing area-wide inflation 
dynamics' (ECB 2003b: 6). 
This section is concerned with the existence of persistent inflation dif-
ferentials within a currency union. Firstly, it reviews the monetary strategy 
of the ECB in order to identify the key role assigned to the inflation 
target in it. Secondly, it offers some explanations for inflation differentials 
across regions of a currency union to arise and persist over time. Thirdly, 
it studies empirically regional inflation differentials in two long-stablished 
currency unions (Spain and the United States) and confronts these results 
with the EMU experience. 
6.2.1 The ECB monetary strategy and the role of inflation 
The ECB's monetary strategy was formally defined by its Governing 
Council in October, 1998, and consists of a 'framework and the procedures 
that the central bank uses to translate relevant information into monetary 
policy decisions' (Issing et al. 2001: 2). Contrary to simple monetary policy 
rules, such as the so-called Taylor's rule (Taylor 1993), 'the ECB's mone-
tary strategy is presented as an information-processing framework', and as 
such, 'it cannot be expressed in a simple mathematical function' (Issing et al. 
2001: 4-5). 
It has been pointed out that the ECB cannot follow a fixed ( or known) 
rule because of the uncertainties that surround the European Monetary 
Union experiment. At the time when the ECB's monetary policy 'architec-
ture' was designed, in 1998, there was uncertainty about the institutional 
change that the introduction of the single currency would mean.4 But 
even after the launching of the euro and the introduction of the single 
monetary policy uncertainty still remains. Uncertainty about the response 
given by economic agents (parameter uncertainty) and the nature of the 
'true' economic model (model uncertainty) of the euro area (lssing et al. 
2001: 100) are considered to be crucial for the implementation of the 
monetary policy. 
Even though 'model uncertainty' is claimed, the ECB does have an 
implicit economic model in its monetary framework. 5 This model takes 
into account the existence of a high correlation between money and inflation 
and assumes that money causes inflation in the long run. However, the ECB 
also acknowledges that the correlation between money and prices vanishes 
in the short run. Monetary policy has real effects because of the existence 
of imperfect information, competition or economic rigidities, either real or 
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financial (see Issing et al. 2001, particularly Chapter 1). These assumptions 
are present in the 'two pillars' of the ECB's monetary policy.6 According 
to the principle that money causes inflation in the long run, the first pillar 
monitors monetary aggregates and the ECB has a specific reference value 
for the rate of growth of the M3 in the long run.7 On the contrary, the 
second pillar focuses on short term price developments. The ECB monitors 
a wide range of economic and financial indicators to carry out this task. 
The prominent role assigned to monetary aggregates in the first pillar 
has led some authors to question the ECB's monetary strategy (see Begg 
et al. 1999, Svensson 1999, Gross et al. 2000). These critics point out 
that the existence of two pillars does not provide a clear explanation of the 
ECB's strategy and that financial innovation reduces the reliability of the 
first pillar. However, there are some authors who defend the strategy 
by pointing out that 'the two pillars symbolize the still insufficient knowl-
edge concerning the functions of the macro-economy and the characteristics 
of the transmission process' (Issing et al. 2001: 108) and that the use of 
a simple rule would not allow the central bank to take into account 
'all potential sources of information' which is relevant for monetary policy 
decisions (Issing et al. 2001). 
Although most central banks deny following a deterministic monetary 
policy rule, there exists a large and growing collection of empirical 
studies8 showing that simple monetary rules, such as the one proposed 
by Taylor (1993), are capable of reproducing central banks' monetary 
policy decisions on interest rates. Regarding the euro area, Taylor 
(1999) recently concluded that 'the simple benchmark rule, such as the 
one I proposed in 1992, with some adjustment in the response coefficients, 
would be worth considering as a guideline for the ECB'. Gerlach and 
Schnabel (1999) also found that 'average interest rates for the EMU 
countries in 1990-98, with the exception of the exchange market turmoil 
in 1992-93, moved very closely with the average output gap and inflation 
as suggested by the Taylor rule'. More evidence in this regard can be 
also found in the papers by Alesina et al. (2001 ), von Hagen and Bruckner 
(2002), Breuss (2002) and Gali (2003), among many others. 
These empirical results are not surprising since the Taylor rule assumes 
that central banks set the official interest rate according to the deviation 
of both inflation and output from their targets (Taylor 1993). Analytically, 
the rule can be expressed as follows: 
i, = r +ft+ <P1hr, - ft)+ <PxXt (6.1) 
where i1 is a money market interest rate under the control of the monetary 
authority, r is the equilibrium or natural real interest rate, ft is the infla-
tion target, rr, is the current rate of inflation and x1 = y1 - J1 is the 
output gap, being y, and y", the current and potential output, respectively. 
The parameters <Pn and <Px indicate the response of monetary authority 
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against deviations of the inflation rate from its target and variations in 
the output gap. 
In this regard, it is worth remembering that 'the primary objective of the 
ESCB is to maintain price stability' .9 But the EU treaty also points out that 
'without prejudice of the objective of price stability the ESCB shall support 
the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing 
to the achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in 
Article 2' .10 It is not surprising, therefore, that the ECB takes into account 
not only the inflation rate, but also a variable reflecting the economic pulse 
of the area, such as the output gap, when setting the official interest 
rates for the euro area. Figure 6.1 confirms this fact by showing a high 
correlation between the market interest rate and the inflation rate for the 
euro area as well as the interest rate and the output gap.11 The second 
correlation is much higher (0. 77) than the first one (0.44). 
The same information is shown in Figure 6.2, where the money market 
interest rate and the benchmark interest rate performed by the Taylor 
rule are depicted. 12 Figure 6.2 shows that the Taylor rule matches 
reasonably well with the money market interest rate, particularly up to 
2001. It is evident, therefore, that both inflation and output gap play an 
important role in the determination of the interest rates in the euro area. 
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Source: International Monetary Fund and own calculations. 
may vary from one country to another. Temporal or small variations 
would not be a concern. However, if the regional variations in inflation 
rates were both sizeable and permanent, then the ECB would not really 
be implementing a one size interest rate policy for the euro area. How 
important are the inflation differentials within the euro area? Are they 
also persistent? To what extent is the EMU different to other established 
currency areas? These issues will be addressed in the remaining part of 
this section. 
6.2.2 Inflation differentials and persistence in currency unions: 
some theoretical explanations 
The identification of the factors explaining the evolution of regional 
inflation differentials in Europe has been a topic of major concern in recent 
years. In fact, the existence of inflation differentials within the EMU 
area was considered to be a crucial element in the recent evaluation of 
the performance of the single monetary policy (see ECB 2003a). 
Factors explaining regional inflation differentials in a currency union 
may be better understood if they were grouped according to their temporal 
dimension. According to this categorization, we will distinguish, on the 
one hand, those factors influencing inflation differentials in the short run 
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and, on the other hand, those acting in the medium to long term. Three 
arguments are usually provided in order to explain inflation differentials 
within a currency union in the short run. The first one concerns the different 
impact that the single monetary policy may have on inflation when regional 
differences in terms of the monetary transmission mechanism exist. 13 
The second one assumes that regional divergences in terms of output 
gaps might cause higher inflationary pressures in those economies with 
advanced business cycles.14 The third argument sustains that inflation 
differentials within a currency union arise because of the regional differences 
in terms of openness. For example, differences in national oil dependency 
might spur inflation differential when oil prices go up. Another example 
is that the inflation rate in the most open economies will be more dependent 
on the evolution of nominal exchanges rates, therefore the depreciation 
of nominal exchange rates could increase inflation differentials among the 
members of a currency union. 
There are also factors which explain regional inflation differentials in 
the medium to long run. One factor is the price level differences which might 
exist between the regions of a currency union. If price levels differ 
across countries in the currency union, the expected convergence of prices 
to a common level could give rise to differences in inflation rates in the 
transition period, since the countries with lower price levels would experi-
ence higher inflation rates than those with higher price levels at the 
initial stage. The convergence in price levels in the euro countries has been 
studied, among others, by Hendrikx and Chapple (2002), Honohan and 
Lane (2003), Rogers (2002), Rogers et al. (2002), ECB (2003b) and Kent 
(2003). Their empirical results tend to confirm the relevance of price level 
convergence on the path of inflation differentials among European countries 
in the last years. However, as argued in Rogers et al. (2002), other forces 
explain most of the current cross-country differences in the euro area 
inflation. 
Another potential explanation for the inflation differentials within a 
currency union can be found in the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, 15 
whereby countries with lower productivity in the traded sector experi-
ence more rapid productivity growth on the path of convergence. The 
adjustment process leads to a higher rate of wage inflation in the economy 
as a whole, and hence a positive inflation differential. 16 The relevance 
of the Balassa-Samuelson effect has also been confirmed by Alberola and 
Tyrvainen (1998), Canzoneri et al. (1999), De Grauwe and Skuldeny (2000), 
although the empirical evidence provided in these papers does not rule 
out the possibility for other factors to affect inflation differentials within 
the euro area. 17 
Whereas the determinants of inflation differentials in currency unions 
have been a common topic for research in recent years, inflation persistence 
has received far less attention. This might be explained by the fact that 
persistence in inflation rates was expected to be removed in the medium 
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term, either by the implementation of the single monetary policy or by 
cross-border arbitrage among different markets. A single monetary policy 
avoids the existence of several national monetary policies that target dif-
ferent inflation objectives. At the same time, a single currency enhances 
price transparency, reducing the scope for persistent differences in the 
pricing policy followed by firms. 
Two reasons have been suggested to explain why inflation differentials 
persistence may be more important within a currency union than among 
independent countries. One possibility is that the setting of a single nominal 
interest rate for the euro area would mean different real interest rates for 
those member countries with higher inflation rates. If the inflation rates 
increase during upturns because of higher demand pressure, the resulting 
lower real interest rate might amplify the business cycle and, therefore, 
inflation. The second explanation is partly derived from the first one: 
a higher inflation rate and a lower real interest rate in a booming region 
may increase both nominal and real housing prices which, in tum, may 
stimulate consumption through balance sheet effects. 18 
A controversial question with regard to the persistence of inflation dif-
ferentials within a currency union is the role that the real exchange rate 
might play in the adjustment process. It is commonly assumed that a 
booming regional economy is expected to experience a real appreciation 
in its exchange rate because of the changes in relative prices between 
the domestic market and the rest of the union. If firms cannot segment 
markets, the reduction in the external demand (derived from the real 
appreciation) will mitigate the economic boom, and therefore contributes 
to the adjustment process (Arnold and Kool 2002). However, recent 
contributions in the field of international economics suggest that inter-
national price discrimination (pricing-to-market policies) reduce the 
scope for the expenditure-switching effect to work (see Obstfeld 2002). 
Bergin (2003) proposes a pricing-to-market model for a monetary union 19 
and concludes that inflation differentials can appear in a monetary union 
and persist a long time, even in tradeable products, due to the 
market power of firms that engage in price discrimination among different 
markets. 
Although we have focused on differences in the degree of persistence of 
inflation differentials within the regions of a monetary union and across 
independent countries, there are also several reasons why the persistence 
of inflation differentials can vary across currency unions. A first argu-
ment points to the existence of different degrees of economic policy 
centralization. For example, a higher degree of budgetary centralization can 
ameliorate demand pressures in different regions of the monetary union. 
Another argument highlights the role of nominal rigidities in the goods and 
labour markets. Let us assume two currency unions. In one currency union 
we observe a better coordination between firms and workers, thus nominal 
price and wage rigidities are similar across its regions. In the other currency 
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union the coordination is lower. Less-persistent inflation differentials are 
expected to be observed in this scenario as the coordination between firms 
and workers increases. 
So far we have surveyed some of the arguments put forward to explain the 
existence of inflation differentials within a currency union, along with those 
suggested to explain their degree of persistence. The next section explores 
these questions from an empirical point of view in order to answer a set of 
questions. We employ a dataset of EMU countries, before and after forming 
the currency union and among different regions of two long-established 
currency unions: the United States and Spain. 
6.2.3 Inflation di,fferentials and persistence in currency unions: some 
empirical e•idence 
This section studies the regional inflation differentials and their persistence 
between the euro countries, the Spanish regions and some regions in the 
United States. Since some analysts have suggested that it is still too soon to 
evaluate whether the ECB has succeeded in achieving the price stability goal 
(the single European monetary policy started in year 1999), the comparison 
with the results achieved in some other longer-established currency unions, 
such as Spain or the United States, might offer some clues in this regard. 
Inflation data for the European Union was collected from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) database 'Internacional Financial 
Statistics'. Spanish regional data for the 17 Autonomous Communities were 
extracted from the Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (INE), while the data 
for the 14 USA Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSA) was taken from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). All data are monthly, except for 11 MSA 
where bimonthly data are available, and extend from January 1980 to 
December 2002. 
The trend of inflation rates among the EMU countries shows a 
convergence pattern since the beginning of the 1980s. The high-inflation 
economies have achieved outstanding results in terms of the reduction in 
inflation rates, particularly from the mid 1990s. This success is to a large 
extent explained by the political determination of some countries to meet 
the Maastricht criteria. Figure 6.3 shows the maximum and minimum 
inflation rates among the EMU countries, and also the standard deviation 
for the whole area. The observed reduction both in the maximum rate 
and in the standard deviation reveals the underlying convergence process 
in terms of inflation rates in the euro area. 
The trend shown in Figure 6.3 could lead some authors to expect that 
inflation differentials would definitively disappear with the establishment 
of the single currency. However, a closer look at the inflation trends in some 
countries does not seem to support this assumption. In particular, there 
is a group of countries, such as Portugal or Spain, where the inflation 
rate has persistently remained well above the euro area rate (see Figure 6.4). 
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Figure 6.5 Standard deviation (unweighted) of inflation rates in EMU countries, the 
Spanish regions and some US regions. 
Source: International Monetary Fund and own calculations. 
Conversely, there is another group of countries (France or Germany) which 
has persistently experienced lower inflation rates. It is interesting to note 
that inflation rates were quite close among these countries in 1997 and 1998, 
coinciding with the evaluation of the Maastricht criteria, but they started 
to diverge when the third stage of the EMU took place. 
The above-mentioned trends in inflation rates have raised some con-
cerns for European policymakers. Some authors have pointed out that 
the differences observed for the euro area can also be found in other 
long-established monetary unions, such as the United States, Germany or 
Spain. Figures 6.5 and 6.6 are included to study this possibility, and present 
standard deviation and the absolute spread in inflation rates for the euro 
area countries, the Spanish regions and some regions in the United States. 
The time period considered extends from 1994 to 2003, thus we focus on 
a recent period where nominal stability has been a political priority. 
There are three features worth mentioning in both cases. A first trend 
confirms the existence of convergence in inflation rates among the euro 
economies which stops at the beginning of 2000 and rises slightly afterwards. 
This result is consistent with the important role played by the fulfilment 
of the Maastricht criteria and the monetary unification in the reduction 
of inflation differentials. However, differences in inflation rates have 
not totally disappeared with the implementation of the single European 
monetary policy. As can be seen in Figures 6.5 and 6.6, significant inflation 
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Figure 6.6 Absolute spread in inflation rates in EMU countries, the Spanish regions 
and some US regions. 
Source: International Monetary Fund and own calculations. 
dispersion is present in all the currency unions considered in our analysis. 
However, some relevant differences exist when comparing the three 
currency unions. In particular, the inflation dispersion for the euro area 
and the United States is almost twice as much as the value for the Spanish 
regions. The higher dispersion for the inflation rates in the EMU area 
and the United States could be explained by the lower degree of economic 
policy centralization achieved in terms of fiscal, labour and product 
market policies and also by the higher geographical distance in compar-
ison to the Spanish regional case (see ECB 2003b). The close simi-
larity between the euro area and the United States after the introduction 
of the euro put into question the relevance of some exclusive explana-
tion to the observed inflation differentials within the euro area, among 
them the differences in terms of price and productivity levels. The most 
interesting conclusion, which can be derived from Figures 6.5 and 6.6, 
is that inflation differentials are not a specific problem of euro area 
members, since the size of inflation differentials observed at present in the 
euro area is not so different from the ones observed in the United States. 
The empirical evidence reveals that inflation differentials are not an 
exclusive feature of the euro area, since they also exist in the other two 
case studies. However, this description does not necessarily apply for the 
persistence in inflation. It would thus be interesting to determine whether 
(and why) persistence in inflation among the euro countries is higher than 
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in the other two currency unions, as well as to study its potential 
consequences for the implementation of the single monetary policy. In 
order to study inflation persistence, we will proceed as follows. First, the 
degree of persistence of inflation differentials will be compared among the 
regions belonging to a monetary union and the euro area countries before 
the beginning of stage three of EMU. Second, we will test for the existence 
of different degrees of persistence across currency unions. Data for the euro 
area countries, the Spanish regions and some regions of the United States 
during the period 1999-2003 will be used.20 
In order to address the first issue, we have employed a set of unit root and 
stationary tests. To understand the mechanics of these tests, consider the 
following simple autoregressive process of order one AR(l) for the inflation 
rates differentials: 
(6.2) 
where (Jt - JC"'e") is the inflation differential for country i with respect to the 
reference area considered, a and p are the parameters to be estimated and 
e1 is assumed to be white noise. If Ip I:::: 1, the inflation differential is 
a non-stationary process and therefore no convergence is expected to take 
place. On the contrary, if Ip I < 1, the inflation differential is a stationary 
series and convergence is expected to take place. The value of p also 
determines the speed of the convergence process. 
The unit root test studies the null hypothesis H0 : p = 1 against the 
one-sided alternative H1: p < 1. We employ different unit root tests 
proposed in the literature, such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(Dickey and Fuller 1979), the Phillips-Perron test (Phillips and Perron 
1988), the Dickey-Fuller test with GLS detrending (Elliot et al. 1996) and 
the Elliot, Rothemberg and Stock optimal point test (Elliot et al. 1996). 
Stationary tests are used to test the alternative null hypothesis H0: p < 1. 
We have also applied the KPSS test proposed by Kwiatkowski et al. (1992). 
This combination of different tests allows us to obtain a more robust 
conclusion about the convergence ( or lack of convergence) of inflation 
differentials in the long run. 
We compare the stationary properties of inflation differentials among 
some European countries, the Spanish regions and some regions of the 
United States before the start of the EMU. Data availability limits the 
time period considered from January 1980 to December 1998. The aim 
of this comparison is to find some clues to answer the question of whether 
inflation differentials are more persistent among countries with independent 
monetary policies than among regions within a currency union. 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 sum up the results of applying the stationary and unit 
root tests to the inflation differential series for the euro area countries and 
the regions in Spain and some regions in the United States. With regard 
Table 6.1 Unit root and stationary tests of inflation differentials in euro area 
countries (1980:01-1998:12) 
Unit root tests Stationary test Conclusion 
ADF pp DF-GLS ERS KPSS 
Austria NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Belgium * * NO NO ** Inconclusive 
Finland * ** NO NO NO Inconclusive 
France NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Germany NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Greece NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Italy NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Luxembourg * * NO NO * Inconclusive 
Netherlands NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Portugal NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Spain NO NO NO NO ** Non-stationary 
Notes: One and two asterisks represent statistical significance at a 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
Table 6.2 Unit root and stationary tests of inflation differentials in the Spanish and 
the United States regions (1980:01-1998:12) 
Unit root tests Stationary test Conclusion 
ADF pp DF-GLS ERS KPSS 
Spanish regions 
Andalucia ** ** NO ** * Inconclusive 
Aragon ** ** NO * NO Stationary 
Asturias * ** ** NO NO Stationary 
Baleares * ** NO ** NO Stationary 
Canarias * * ** ** NO Stationary 
Cantabria ** ** NO ** NO Stationary 
Castilla y Le6n * ** * ** NO Stationary 
Castilla La Mancha NO ** NO NO NO Inconclusive 
Catalwia NO ** * * NO Stationary 
Com. Valenciana ** ** NO NO NO Inconclusive 
Extremadura ** ** * ** NO Stationary 
Galicia * ** NO ** NO Stationary 
Madrid ** ** ** NO NO Stationary 
Murcia NO ** NO ** NO Inconclusive 
Navarra ** ** ** ** ** Inconclusive 
Pais Vasco NO * NO NO NO Inconclusive 
La Rioja ** ** NO NO NO Inconclusive 
United States regions 
New York * ** NO NO NO Inconclusive 
Chicago ** ** NO * NO Stationary 
Los Angeles NO ** NO NO * Inconclusive 
Notes: One and two asterisks represent statistical significance at a 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. 
128 Some empirical evidence 
to persistence in inflation, the results confirm the existence of a higher 
persistence in inflation differentials among the current euro area countries. 
Table 6.1 suggests that the non-stationary behaviour of inflation differ-
entials cannot be rejected in most cases (in eight countries out of the 11 
considered). In the remainder of cases, the evidence is mixed; that is, we 
cannot clearly determine the nature of the data. 
The degree of persistence of the different series was also calculated from 
the ADF test obtained, using for this purpose the half-life of the adjustment 
process for each country. The half-life statistic depends on the value of p 
and its analytical expression is as follows: HL = (In 0.5/ln p). The expression 
gives us a measure of the time that a series needs to return to its equilibrium 
once it is affected by a shock. As we have a different estimated p value 
for each of the series, we will take its pooled value as representative for 
the whole group so we can obtain p values for each of the two groups 
considered: the European countries and the regions in Spain and in the 
United States. The differences between the estimated values are very impor-
tant. Hence, whereas for the European countries the half-life is approx-
imately 22 months, for the Spanish and the United States regions it is only 
4.5 months. 
Although these results are interesting, the study of persistent inflation 
differentials across currency unions may provide more useful insights in 
this issue. Accordingly, Table 6.3 summarizes some measures within the 
euro area countries, the Spanish regions and some regions of the United 
States for the period 1999-2003. Although monthly data are available, 
the limited sampling of the data does not recommend applying unit root 
tests in order to determine the stationary properties of inflation differen-
tials, so alternative statistics were used to assess the degree of persistence. 
On the one hand, we calculate the autoregressive coefficient of different 
orders (first, second and forth) for the inflation differentials among the 
regions and the currency area as a whole. On the other hand, and following 
Batini (2002), Kozicki and Tinsley (2002) and Kieler (2003), the persistence 
of inflation differentials was measured as the sum of coefficients from an 
estimated autoregressive model of inflation differential, considering two 
alternative autoregressive orders (sixth and twelfth). 
The European inflation rates seem to diverge more persistently than in 
Spain and in the United States for all the measures calculated.21 Con-
sequently, persistence in inflation differentials seems to be an intrinsic 
feature of the euro area economies. 
A possible explanation for the higher persistence in inflation differentials 
in the European Monetary Union is that nominal rigidities might be 
more similar among the Spanish and the United States regions than among 
the euro countries. This argument could be supported by the evidence 
in other works. For example, Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2002) suggest 
that there are important differences in the degree of price stickiness in 
the five major countries of the euro area. In particular, they point out that 
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Table 6.3 Persistence in inflation differentials among the EMU countries, the 
Spanish regions and some regions in the United States: 1999-2003 
AR(]) AR(2) AR(4) 
EMU Average 0.812 0.725 0.543 
Maximum 0.941 0.919 0.946 
Minimum 0.712 0.561 0.309 
United States Average 0.756 0.552 0.416 
Maximum 0.911 0.807 0.647 
Minimum 0.549 0.149 0.050 
Spain Average 0.763 0.607 0.380 
Maximum 0.937 0.890 0.781 
Minimum 0.570 0.250 -0.333 
Sum of coefficients from AR of order 
Sixth Twelfth 
EMU Average 0.856 0.717 
Maximum 0.974 0.951 
Minimum 0.738 0.497 
United States Average 0.752 0.297 
Maximum 0.974 0.926 
Minimum 0.405 -0.754 
Spain Average 0.734 0.523 
Maximum 0.935 0.956 
Minimum 0.359 -0.106 
for Germany, the Netherlands and France, the degree of price stickiness 
seems to be lower than that observed in both Italy and Spain. Along the 
same line, Nickell (2003) suggests that labour market institutions diverge 
across the European economies, which could produce differentiated patterns 
in the rigidities of the labour markets. 
6.3 The regional effects of monetary policy shocks in Spain 
An increasing concern exists over the implications that the differences 
in financial structure among the euro countries might have for the ECB 
monetary policy. These concerns are based on empirical evidence reveal-
ing current substantial differences among the fmancial structures of the 
European Monetary Union countries (see Danthine et al. 1999, De Bandt 
and Davis 1999, Schmidt 1999, Bondt 2000, Maclennan et al. 2000, Padoa-
Schioppa 2000, Kleinieier and Sander 2001, Cabral et al. 2002), even though 
they have shared a common monetary policy since 1999. Consequently, it is 
crucial to determine whether those differences in fmancial structure may 
affect the way the single European monetary policy works; and in the 
affirmative case, to understand how these differences affect the member 
countries of the euro area. 
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Even though some authors suggest that differences in financial struc-
ture may produce asymmetries in the transmission mechanism of the 
single monetary policy (Kashyap and Stein 1997b, Cecchetti 1999, Bondt 
2000), many others expect these asymmetries to disappear in the long run 
since the process of increased economic integration and economic policy 
coordination will end by eroding such differences in financial structure 
(Dornbusch et al. 1998: 52, Ehrmann 1998: 28, Arnold 1999: 22, Arnold 
and Vries 2000: 213, Clausen 2001: 172). 
This section aims at contributing to this current debate by studying 
the regional effects of Spanish monetary policy during the 1990s. It specif-
ically concentrates on determining whether regional differences in financial 
structure in Spain help explain the differential effects of national monetary 
shocks during 1988-1998. 
The empirical approach followed in this section is carried out in 
three different steps. The first step aims at identifying the exogenous 
monetary shocks22 by means of the estimation of a Vector Autoregression 
model (V AR) and a reaction function of the central bank (the Bank of 
Spain). We are aware that this is a very controversial question, both from 
a theoretical23 and an empirical point of view.24 Nevertheless, we have 
chosen to follow this orthodox approach to produce empirical results which 
are comparable with the current empirical literature on the real effects 
of monetary policy (Christiano et al. 1999). A second aim is to offer 
some alternative explanations for the results obtained. Once the 'exogenous 
monetary shock' is identified, the second step consists of regressing the 
exogenous shock against the industrial production index growth for 
every region in Spain. This step allows us to identify differences in the 
regional responses to monetary shocks. Finally, in the third step the regional 
responses to monetary shocks are explained according to the explanatory 
variables included in a cross-section regression. The empirical results 
presented in this section point out that the Spanish regions responded 
differently to the national monetary policy shocks during the period 
1988-1998 and, secondly, that some regional fmancial variables seemed to 
have played a crucial role in the explanation of these differences in regional 
responses. Consequently, one potential implication that could be drawn 
from our results is that if differences in fmancial structure among the 
Spanish regions existed under a single monetary policy and a uniform regu-
latory framework for a long time, it is not unreasonable to assert that 
current differences among financial structures of the euro countries will not 
easily vanish in the near future and could contribute to a non-homogenous 
impact of the single monetary policy of the ECB. 
6.3.1 The identification of the exogenous monetary shocks 
Following the recent orthodox empirical literature on monetary policy 
(Christiano et al. 1999), the identification of the exogenous monetary shocks 
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is estimated both from a V AR model and a reaction function of the central 
bank. 
The V AR model was estimated for a period which extends from January 
1988 to December 1998 and its structure is shown below: 
[x,] [A(L) 0 ][Xt-l] [a o][ef] 
Y, = C(L) D(L) Y,-1 + c d e[ (6.3) 
where Y, is a vector of endogenous variables for the Spanish economy 
which includes the Industrial Production Index, the Consumer Price Index, 
a short-term interest rate in Germany, the monetary aggregate M3, the 
long-term return for public debt, the 3-month interest rate for the non-
transferable deposits and the Peseta-Deutsche Mark exchange rate. X1 is 
a vector of exogenous variables which includes a constant term, a trend 
and a world commodity price index. All variables are monthly, expressed 
in levels (except for the interest rates) and in logarithmic form. The data 
were extracted from the Bank of Spain. The monetary policy shocks were 
identified through a recursive Choleski decomposition with the variables 
ordered as above and with a 2-month lag structure. The identifying assump-
tions are that unanticipated monetary policy shocks do not have a contem-
poraneous impact on output (proxied by the Industrial Production Index) 
and prices. 
The monetary policy shocks were also estimated through the estima-
tion of a reaction function, following the contributions made by Clarida 
et al. (1998, 2000), Taylor (1999), Batini and Haldane (1999), Angeloni 
and Dedola (1999), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000) and Nelson (2000). We 
assumed that the Bank of Spain sets the official interest rates according to 
the deviation of both inflation and output from their targets. In particular, 
the reaction function proposed is shown below: 
(6.4) 
The proposed reaction function can be interpreted as a linear Taylor rule 
with interest rate smoothing, represented by the parameter p, X represents 
a vector of variables which influence the central bank's decisions on inter-
est rates, such as the exchange rate or the foreign interest rate, x is the 
output gap, rr is the deviation of inflation from its target and i is 
the money market interest rate under the control of the monetary authority. 
The parameters /J and y indicate, respectively, the response of monetary 
authority to deviations in inflation from its target and variations in the 
output gap. This expression was estimated by the Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) method.25 
Figure 6. 7 shows the effects of the cumulated shock estimated both 
from the VAR model (shock-VAR) and the reaction function (shock-FR), 
as well as the evolution of a short-term interest rate. An interesting obser-
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Figure 6.7 Monetary shocks and short-term interest rates in Spain. 
Source: Own estimates. 
vation is that the estimated shocks show a close correlation with the 
short-term interest rates, at least until the mid 1990s. 
6.3.2 Differences in regional responses to monetary policy shocks 
The next step in our empirical exercise was to identify differences in 
the regional responses to national exogenous monetary shocks. To this end 
the following expression was estimated for the Spanish regions: 
12 
ipii, t = <Xi + L /3i · ipii, t-j + Yi · shock,-1 + 'Ii, 1 
j=l 
(6.5) 
where ipi is the Industrial Production Index growth for every Spanish 
region and shock is the national monetary shock estimated in the previous 
section. The estimates for the regional responses to monetary shock (y) 
are shown in Table 6.4, where the 17 Spanish regions are classified according 
to their responsiveness to national monetary shocks. 
It is worth noting that in all cases the response to national monetary 
shocks is negative, and that the classification (ranking) of the different 
regions does not change depending on the shock which is used (shock-VAR 
or shock-FR). Three groups seem to emerge from Table 6.4. The first group 
includes regions which seem to be less sensitive to monetary shocks 
(Castilla-La Mancha, Baleares, Extremadura, Andalucia and Murcia). 
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Table 6.4 Regional responses to monetary shocks 
Shock-FR Shock-VAR 
Castilla la Mancha -0.0240 Murcia -0.0007 
Baleares -0.0523 Baleares -0.0040 
Extremadura -0.0748 Extremadura -0.0172 
Andalucia -0.0941 Andalucia -0.0285 
Murcia -0.1135 Castilla La Mancha -0.0390 
Canarias -0.1231 Galicia -0.0763 
Madrid -0.1671 Aragon -0.0813 
Galicia -0.2074 ** Asturias -0.0953 
Asturias -0.2281 ** Valencia -0.1015 
Cantabria -0.2434 ** Madrid -0.1131 
Aragon -0.2601 ** Navarra -0.1251 
Cataluiia -0.2609 ** Castilla y Leon -0.1293 
Valencia -0.2623 ** Cataluiia -0.1308 
Navarra -0.2968 ** Cantabria -0.1428 
Castilla y Leon -0.3332 * Canarias -0.1553 
Pais Vasco -0.3345 ** Pais Vasco -0.1691 
La Rioja -0.4347 ** La Rioja -0.3956 ** 
Wald test=24.7941 (0.0735) Wald test= 17.2552=(0.3693) 
*and•• denote 1 and 5% significance, respectively. 
A second group is most sensitive to monetary shocks (La Rioja and Pais 
Vasco). Finally, the third group (Castilla-Leon, Navarra, Valencia and 
Catalufia) is less sensitive to monetary shocks than the second one. Overall, 
the results seem to confirm the existence of important differences across the 
Spanish regions in terms of their responses to national monetary shocks. 
This result is also confirmed by the Wald test on the shock-FR. The value of 
the test for the shock-VAR does not allow us to reject the null hypothesis of 
parameter equality. However, when the test is carried out for the groups the 
null hypothesis is also rejected for the shock-VAR. 
6.3.3 Some potential explanations for the regional differences in 
responses to monetary policy shocks 
Several cross-section regressions were carried out in order to explain 
differences in regional responses to national monetary shocks. In particular, 
five different models were estimated (Table 6.5), both for the VAR (shock-
V AR) and the reaction function (shock-FR) shocks. 
The five equations share a common structure: a constant term (CTE), 
the ratio 'investment/regional Gross Domestic Product' (INVEST), the ratio 
'(exports+ imports)/regional Gross Domestic Product' (OPEN) and the 
percentage of small businesses, which was proxied by the share of business 
branches with up to six employees (SME). The estimates show the expec-
ted signs. The regional 'investment' variable (INVEST) shows a positive 
Table 6.5 Cross section regressions to explain regional responses to monetary policy shocks 
Model no. l Model no. 2 Model no. 3 Model no. 4 Model no. 5 
FR VAR FR VAR FR VAR FR VAR FR VAR 
CTE 6.1648 2.5678 6.1784 2.646 4.7714 0.294 6.6511 2.9267 5.1753 0.6346 
(3.98) (1.32) (3.69) (1.26) (3.06) (0.18) (4.47) (1.46) (3.82) (0.39) 
INVEST 0.7823 -0.0953 0.7874 -0.0659 1.1178 0.4522 0.9515 0.0297 1.3494 0.6475 
(1.42) (-0.14) (1.32) (-0.09) (2.13) (0.79) (1.8) (0.04) (2.92) (1.17) 
OPEN -0.3842 -0.1986 -0.3845 -0.2002 -0.3259 -0.1035 -0.483 -0.2715 -0.433 -0.1938 
(-4.05) (-1.67) (-3.86) (-1.60) (-3.61) (-1.05) (-4.44) (-1.85) (-4.74) (-1.77) 
SME -7.065 -2.7219 -7.0867 -2.8467 -5.504 -0.1745 -6.9853 -2.6631 -5.2394 0.0486 
(-3.91) (-1.20) (-3.53) (-1.13) (-3.04) (-0.09) (-4.11) (-1.16) (-3.37) (0.03) 
DEPR3 -0.2384 -0.2702 -0.2359 -0.2561 -0.1611 -0.1442 -0.272 -0.295 -0.1912 -0.1696 
(-1.68) (-1.52) (-1.41) (-1.22) (-1.21) (-1.00) (-2.01) (-1.62) (-1.66) (-1.22) 
REG-BANKS - - 0.0057 0.0329 
(0.03) (0.16) 
PUB-ASSETS - -1.7626 -2.8764 - -1.9581 -3.0412 
(-1.96) (-2.93) (-2.53) (-3.23) 
INEFF - - - - -1.2427 -0.9171 -1.427 -1.2034 
R2 
(-1.59) (-0.87) (-2.22) (-1.56) 
0.735 0.3546 0.735 0.3559 0.8038 0.6371 0.7847 0.3964 0.8685 0.7081 
R2 Adjusted 0.6466 0.1395 0.6145 0.0631 0.7146 0.4722 0.6869 0.1221 0.7896 0.5329 
Log likelihood 24.6 20.72 24.6 20.73 26.63 21.68 26.37 21.29 30.92 27.47 
Durbin-Watson 2.48 2.32 2.48 2.31 2.71 2.56 2.75 2.53 2.62 2.07 
Some empirical evidence 135 
correlation with the regional response to monetary shocks. Since estimated 
monetary shocks were both negative (Table 6.5), the positive sign for 
INVEST means that, the larger the regional investment effort, the lower the 
contraction in the regional production index after a monetary shock. The 
use of the variable OPEN is to reflect the region's exposure to exchange 
rate fluctuations: the more open a region is to trade, the larger the effect of 
the exchange rate appreciation on economic activity after a monetary 
contraction. Consequently, the expected sign for OPEN is negative, which 
is confirmed by our results. The variable SME also shows a negative cor-
relation with the regional response. The sign for SME is compatible with the 
conventional credit channel literature explanation, which maintains that 
small-sized businesses face higher credit constraints because of their higher 
dependence on bank-credit financing. Consequently, those regions with 
larger shares of small businesses must experience a higher reduction in credit 
availability after a monetary shock. The reduction in credit might have 
important consequences for regional economic activity (particularly for 
bank-dependent firms). 
A fourth variable is included in Model 1: market share in the regional 
market for deposits of the top three banking institutions (DEPR3). 
This variable was included as a proxy for 'concentration' in the regional 
market. The estimates show a negative sign for DEPR3: the higher the 
concentration in the market for deposits, the larger the regional response 
(in terms of a contraction in the industrial production) to national monetary 
shocks. One potential explanation for such a link could be that, in a context 
of higher market concentration, financial institutions might pass on any 
increase in costs to their customers (borrowers). Consequently, a rise in 
national interest rates (due to a monetary shock) might have a higher effect 
on the credit market (in terms of raising the cost or reducing the availability) 
in those regions with a higher banking concentration (higher market power). 
Model 2 also includes the variable REG-BANKS, which is a proxy 
for the relevance of regional-based financial institutions in the region. 
The estimates show a positive sign for this variable. This result could be 
interpreted as if the regional-based financial institution tends to diminish 
or absorb the negative impact of monetary policy on regional activity. 
However, it should also be noted that the estimated value for this variable 
is not significant from a statistical point of view. Since 'regional banks' 
tend to concentrate their lending within the region boundaries, and lending 
is usually by far their most important business, they might have incentives 
to avoid excessive short term cyclical turns in their customers' solvency 
and profitability (by pushing up interest rates in a period of tight monetary 
policy), and focus instead on long term (not cyclical) profitability and 
lending relationships. This potential explanation can be reinforced by the 
fact that, as some authors maintain, 'local banks usually exploit better the 
soft information which is generated in lending relationships' (Williams 
2003). This interpretation is in line with those authors who suggest that 'the 
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segmentation of the European banking system could realize higher growth 
rates in European regions through information asymmetries', particularly 
because there is also evidence suggesting that such banks are highly cost 
efficient (Williams and Gardener 2003: 327). 
Model 3 includes the variable PUB-ASSETS, which is defined as the share 
of public sector debt investments in total assets. To some extent this vari-
able reflects the investment behaviour of the financial institutions and 
the estimates show a negative and significant sign. We interpret this result 
as follows: the 'conservative' portfolio decisions of financial institutions 
during episodes of tight monetary policy might reinforce the restrictive 
effect on economic activity since banks might protect themselves from 
risk by buying more public debt. 
Model 4 includes the inefficient ratio (INEFF), which is measured 
as the proportion of 'Gross income' absorbed by 'Operating expenses'. 
Our empirical results reveal a negative sign for this variable, meaning 
that the higher the bank inefficiency, the larger the contraction in the 
regional industrial production. Finally, Model 5 only includes the variables 
which were significant in previous models, and the results seem to confirm 
the ones obtained before. 
6.4 Regional credit availability and the role of monetary 
policy: some empirical evidence for Spain 
The aim of this section is to provide some empirical evidence for the cyclical 
pattern of regional credit availability in Spain. Following the analysis 
developed by Dow (1998) and the theoretical framework put forward in 
Chapter 4, Section 6.4.1 will first review some of the theoretical arguments 
to explain why some regions may exhibit higher instability in credit 
availability along business cycles, namely the regional differences in terms of 
stages of banking development and liquidity preference of financial agents 
(including the banks). It will also pay attention to the influence that 
monetary policy might have on financial agents' behaviour (liquidity 
preference) and, consequently, on the regional patterns of credit availability 
(see Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow 2003, Dow 2004b). Section 6.4.2 
then provides some empirical evidence of credit market instability for the 
Spanish regions. 
6.4.1 Sources of instability in the regional credit expansion process 
The Post Keynesian explanation for credit expansion instability derives 
from theory concerning changes in liquidity preference over the business 
cycle. This framework has been explicitly applied to a regional setting 
by Dow (1998) and some empirical evidence for the Spanish regions can be 
found in Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998) and Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow (2003). 
From a regional perspective, the hypothesis is that changes in banks' 
liquidity preference lead to 'excessive' optimism with respect to credit 
Table 6.6 Summary of empirical results for non-financial variables 








The larger the investment, the 
smaller the contraction in the 
regional industrial production 
index after a monetary shock 
(exports + imports)/regional GDP 
Negative 
The more open a region is to trade, 
the larger the contraction in the 
regional industrial production index 
after a monetary shock 
Exchange rate channel: The monetary 
shock produces an exchange rate 
appreciation that reduces regional 
competitiveness 
SME 
% of business branches with up to six 
employees 
Negative 
The larger the share of small business, 
the larger the contraction in the regional 
industrial production index after a 
monetary shock 
Credit channel: The monetary shock 
reduces credit availability for small-
sized business 
Table 6.7 Summary of empirical results for financial variables 
Variable DEPR3 REG-BANKS 
Definition Market share of top-three 'Proxy' for the relevance of 
banking institutions in the region-based financial 
regional market for deposits institution 
Sign Negative Positive (but not significant) 
Statistical The higher the concentration The higher the share of the 




larger the contraction in the institutions, the lower the 
regional industrial production negative impact of monetary 
after a monetary shock policy on regional activity 
In a context of higher market Local financial institution may 
concentration (market power), counterbalance the negative 
financial institution can pass impact for their own interests 
on to demand any worsening and because they 'exploit better 
of monetary conditions the soft information which is 
generated in lending 
relationships' (Williams 2003) 
PUB-ASSETS 
Share of public sector 
debt investments in 
total assets of banks 
Negative 
The larger the share of 
public sector debt 
investments in total assets, 
the larger the negative 
impact of monetary policy 
on regional activity 
The 'conservative' portfolio 
decisions of financial institution 
during episodes of tight 
monetary policy might reinforce 
the restrictive effect on economic 
activity since banks might 
protect from risk by buying 
more public debt ( defensive 






The larger the 
inefficiency ratio, 
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creation in peripheral economies in upturns, and 'excessive' pessimism in 
downturns. In upturns, competing banks are prepared to hold less liquid 
portfolios as they strive to extend their market share in peripheral econo-
mies. Their expectations regarding risk and return are influenced by the 
general state of optimism, but are based on more limited knowledge than 
their expectations with respect to the more developed economies. At the same 
time, lower liquidity preference among borrowers in peripheral economies 
in upturns creates additional demand for credit to finance expenditure; 
however peripheral economies are characterized by a relatively high liqui-
dity preference over the entire cycle, because of past experience of what 
tends to happen in downturns. When confidence in peripheral economies 
falters there is scope for sharp retractions of credit availability, particu-
larly given the weak knowledge base of banks with respect to the periphery. 
The banks' liquidity preference rises in general as the national economy 
declines, but it is the credit to peripheral economies which tends to be at the 
margin where credit contraction bites hardest. The end result is greater 
instability in credit growth in peripheral economies. 
Credit instability then is not only explained by structural differences 
but by changes in financial behaviour which might well be influenced 
by monetary policy. This alternative explanation (which gives room also 
to liquidity preference) is what leads us to suggest that a comprehensive 
understanding of the regional effects of a single monetary policy should 
take into account the behavioural effects mentioned in Chapter 4 (Section 
4.3), and not just structural differences among regions. 
6.4.2 Empirical evidence on regional credi.t instability in Spain 
The following expression was estimated for the 17 Spanish regions with the 
aim of testing credit instability alongside business cycles: 
cred;,t = a; + f3Yi,t + 0DtYi,t + v;,t (6.6) 
where cred;,1 is the rate of growth of credit for the region i in year t, a is 
an individual fixed effect, y is the regional real Gross Domestic Product 
and D is a dummy variable which takes on value 1 for the recession period 
(1991-1993) and 0 for the rest. The 17 regions were classified into two 
groups according to their relative levels of per capita income. The first 
sample includes the wealthier regions26 in the year 1986, whereas the second 
group is made up of those with lower levels.27 We used annual data for 
the period 1986-2001 and panel data techniques for the estimates. 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 show the estimated results for different specifica-
tions of equation (6.6) for both samples using the Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SURE) method.28 It is worth noting that the inclusion of the 
dummy variable for the recession period increases the sensitivity of credit 
to regional income for the poorer regions. Two regions (Extremadura 
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Table 6.8 Estimates for the low-income regions 
Coefficient t-statistic P value 
SURE method 
a I0,241 9,533 0.000 
/3 l,0ll 6,691 0.000 
SURE Fixed effects 
/3 0,933 5,885 0.000 
SURE Fixed effects with dummy 
/3 0,912 4,676 0.000 
0 -0,050 -0,155 0.877 
SURE Fixed effects with dummy and excluding Extremadura and 





Source: Dow and Rodriguez-Fuentes (2003: 976). 
Table 6.9 Estimates for the wealthier regions 
Coefficient t-statistic 
SURE Fixed effects 
a 9,641 13,960 
/3 0,867 5,807 
SURE Fixed effects 
/3 0,792 5,453 
SURE Fixed effects with dummy 
/3 0,709 3,961 









SURE Fixed effects with dummy and excluding Baleares 
/3 0,702 3,714 0.000 
0 0,818 2,082 0.049 










and Castilla La Mancha) were excluded during the recession period due 
to their anomalous behaviour.29 The results in this case seem to reinforce 
our hypothesis of higher instability of credit in lower-income regions than 
in higher-income regions. 
The results show that for every 1 % of growth in regional GDP (y) 
the rate of growth of credit for the poorer regions is 1.188%, much higher 
than for the wealthier regions (0.702%). It is significant that for the 
Some empirical evidence 141 
period of slower growth (1991-1993), the responsiveness of credit to income 
change during recessions is less for the lower-income regions, at 0.426%, 
compared to 1.520% for the more advanced regions. The results show 
that during expansionary periods the rate of growth of credit for the 
low-income regions is 1.69 times the rate for the wealthier, whereas for 
the period of slower growth it is only 0.28. We believe that these results 
support the Post Keynesian theory that claims a more unstable pattern 
for credit expansion alongside business cycles in low-income regions, and 
are also consistent with those obtained in earlier studies of Spanish 
regions (Rodriguez-Fuentes 1998). 
6.5 Conclusions 
This chapter has offered some empirical evidence which we think illustrates 
how monetary policy might produce different effects across regions or 
countries. The evidence provided in the chapter mainly refers to Europe, 
since the third stage of the EMU has raised fears that the single monetary 
policy will have asymmetric effects across the euro area countries. The 
chapter also presented some evidence for Spain in this regard, because we 
consider that the Spanish experience might provide useful insights 
for understanding the regional consequences of the single monetary policy. 
The empirical results reported in Section 6.2 suggest that the single 
monetary policy has been quite inefficient in reducing inflation differentials 
among the euro member economies. In fact, our empirical evidence shows 
that from year 2000 on inflation has remained above its 2 percent objective 
and that inflation differentials among the euro area countries have not been 
removed despite monetary unification. In addition, persistence in inflation 
differentials in Europe seems to be much stronger than that observed in 
other long-established currency unions (Spain and the United States). The 
persistence of inflation differentials among the euro area countries not only 
questions the assumption that inflation in Europe is exclusively a monetary 
phenomenon, but also that the European Central Bank is implementing a 
'one size' interest rate policy for the euro area. These two aspects might have 
important consequences for the macroeconomic performance of some 
regions/countries in the euro area. 
The empirical evidence included in Section 6.3 showed that the Spanish 
regions responded differently to the monetary shocks during 1988-1998. 
Our empirical evidence also suggested that regional differences both in 
financial and economic structure were responsible for such differences 
in responses. Consequently, if differences in financial structure among the 
Spanish regions were not fully abolished, even under a unique monetary 
policy and regulatory framework for a long time, we concluded that 
current differences in financial structure of the euro area might well last 
much longer than expected and so contribute to a non-homogeneous impact 
of the single monetary policy. 
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Finally, Section 6.4 provided evidence on the existence of a more unstable 
pattern for credit availability in some regions in Spain. In particular, 
the results showed a much higher instability for the credit growth in the 
lower-income regions in Spain along business cycles, this result being 
compatible with the Post Keynesian theory that emphasizes the role of 
uncertainty, liquidity preference and financial structure in the determination 
of the regional credit markets, as well as the influence that monetary policy 
decisions might have on all these variables. 
7 Conclusions 
This book has presented a theoretical framework to study the regional 
effects of monetary policy. With this framework we aim to make a useful 
contribution to the current debate over the regional implications of the 
European Central Bank monetary policy. 
The analysis of the real effects of monetary policy has usually been 
conducted from the transmission mechanism perspective. Our review of this 
literature in Chapter 2 showed that many discrepancies exist between 
different schools of economic thought with regard to the specification of 
the transmission mechanism. In addition, our review also suggested that 
most of these differences were more of degree than of kind as the idea 
of a mechanism that links real and monetary forces is commonly shared 
by all the participants in the debate. In fact, all the contributions reviewed 
in this chapter share the assumption that monetary policy is neutral unless 
there are some distortions in the economy (that of course are always 
removed in the long run). These distortions usually take the form of 
temporary nominal rigidities (wage and price stickiness) or imperfect (or 
asymmetric) information. But, without such distortions, monetary policy 
is always neutral since money is only the oil which lubricates the machine 
by acting as a medium of exchange. However, the oil is not considered to 
be an integral part of the machine itself. 
In contrast, our analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the elaboration 
of a theoretical framework which explored the ways through which money 
and monetary policy may affect regions. Our framework emphasizes 
the role that the banking system and the liquidity preference of eco-
nomic agents (including banks) play in the transmission of central banks' 
monetary policy decisions to regions within a country, or countries within a 
currency union. 
As shown in Chapter 3, our theoretical framework is based on the 
assumption that, as the financial system develops (stage of banking 
development), the increase in liquidity depends more on banks' and 
borrowers' liquidity preference than on the central bank's direct interven-
tions. Thus money supply becomes increasingly endogenous to the eco-
nomic system. However, the concept of endogenous money in Chapter 3 
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does not imply that monetary policy does not influence the liquidity of the 
economic system, nor that the money supply is always horizontal. Instead, 
we suggested that central banks can always influence the liquidity of the 
system, but it is only influence, since monetary policy is only one of many 
factors which are involved in the process of liquidity creation. Our analysis 
also showed that, under certain conditions, money supply may become 
inelastic even though money is endogenous; for example, in an environment 
of high liquidity preference among borrowers and lenders. Furthermore, 
it was suggested that the money supply is likely to be more elastic during 
expansions rather than during downturns. That is, the pattern of credit 
expansion follows a cyclical pattern, as do changes in liquidity preference. 
Consequently, the notion of endogenous money in Chapter 3 does not 
mean that money is not important, as some orthodox and non-orthodox 
economists could argue. Instead, the endogenous money approach only 
removes the causal role attributed to money by orthodox economists, but 
not necessarily its power to affect real variables nor to affect the whole 
process of credit creation (Dow 1993a: 26). 
As far as the analysis of the effects of monetary policy on economic 
activity is concerned, we pointed out that the debate over whether 
'money matters vs doesn't matter' only makes sense when (i) there is a 
sharp distinction between the real and monetary sides of the economy and 
(ii) money is perfectly exogenous to the system. It is only when these two 
conditions are met that it is possible to analyze what happens to the real 
side when we introduce an exogenous change in the money supply. Only 
by assuming that economic activity depends on real factors such as labour, 
physical capital, etc. and monetary flows simply mirror real ones, can 
it be assured that money and monetary policy are neutral with respect 
to output and employment. Otherwise, the issue regarding whether 
money is neutral would not make any sense, just as it would not make 
sense to consider whether labour or physical capital were neutral. If such 
a clear distinction between real and monetary sides of the economy are 
not drawn, then efforts should be put into studying when and how rather 
than whether monetary policy is neutral or not. Whether monetary policy 
is neutral or not could only be addressed from a theoretical standpoint 
which, by assuming money to be exogenous to the economic process, tries 
to determine the long run effect of an exogenous increase in the money 
supply. However, if money were not exogenous then this matter would 
not be relevant, and the issue to analyze would rather be how exogenous 
monetary interventions in financial markets affect the liquidity of the 
system and thereby economic activity. 
Our framework also suggested that, when money is endogenous, the 
analysis of the effects of monetary policy must be context-dependent since 
the final effect of any monetary change will depend on the final use given 
to the new money which is supplied. This is what Chick (1973: 132) has 
labelled as the second half of the monetary transaction. In this sense, 
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an endogenous money supply perspective would mean that the time and 
location where 'the helicopter' throws the money is of crucial importance 
when analyzing its effects. This led us to distinguish two dimensions when 
analyzing the effects of monetary policy on economic activity: a structural 
dimension and a behavioural dimension. The first is concerned with the 
effects of exogenous monetary changes on different economic variables 
(the structural effect). The second dimension is related to the effect that such 
changes may have on agents' behaviour (the behavioural effect). 
The more developed the financial system is, the more relevant this second 
factor will be. 
Chapter 4 presented a theoretical framework to explore the ways through 
which monetary policy can affect regions. One of the peculiarities of the 
analysis presented in this chapter is that it explicitly considers the regional 
differences in terms of banking structures and liquidity preference of finan-
cial agents (including banks). These two variables allowed us to consider 
a new way through which monetary policy can affect regions differently: 
the behavioural effect. In particular, our analysis suggested that monetary 
policy can affect regional credit availability through its influence on banks' 
and borrowers' liquidity preference and that regional differences in bank-
ing development and liquidity preference may produce higher instability 
in credit availability in the less-developed regions. This argument clearly 
contrasts with the belief that peripheral regions face a long run decrease 
in their credit shares because banks tend to lend in these markets less 
than they borrow, whereas the contrary applies to more-developed regions. 
On the contrary, our analysis suggested that cyclical changes in the liquid-
ity preference of economic agents, which might be influenced by monetary 
policy, are likely to produce unstable patterns of credit availability for some 
particular regions. 
This argument has important implications for empirical work. Whereas 
most empirical work concentrates on studying the structural differences 
which might cause different regional responses to national monetary 
policy shocks, our theoretical framework suggests focusing on the factors 
which determine regional credit availability. Consequently, empirical 
research cannot be limited to the study of regional differences in response 
to exogenous monetary shocks, nor how a given amount of credit is distri-
buted among regions by the banking system. These might be the right 
issues to address when money is exogenous (the banking multiplier applies 
because of a low level of banking development), but not when the supply 
of credit increasingly depends on banks' and borrowers' financial deci-
sions (reflecting a high level of banking development). One of the many 
consequences of the framework presented in this book is that the proper 
analysis of the regional impact of monetary policy should explicitly take 
into account the spatial differences in terms of banking development and 
liquidity preference, as well as the influence that monetary policy may 
have on such variables (the behavioural effect), and not only the structural 
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differences that might produce regional asymmetric responses to exogenous 
monetary policy shocks (the structural effect). 
Nevertheless, our survey of regional finance literature (Chapter 5) 
revealed that most contributions attribute the regional effects of monetary 
policy to either the existence of a market failure (lack of information, 
segmentation, money illusion, etc.) or to structural differences which make 
the transmission mechanism differ from one region to another. This is true 
both for the early contributions in this field (Beare 1976) and for the more 
recent contributions concerned with the implications that the cross-country 
differences in financial and economic structure in EMU may have for the 
transmission mechanism of the ECB monetary policy (see Kashyap and 
Stein 1997b, Cecchetti 1999, Bondt 2000). Consequently, most empirical 
works have focused on studying what we have called the structural effect 
of monetary policy, where the asymmetric impact of monetary policy 
is usually explained by differences in economic and/or financial structure 
that increase the sensitivity of some regions to exogenous monetary shocks. 
It should be noted that the literature concerning monetary transmission 
in EMU omits an important point: that the real effects of monetary 
policy also depend on the 'behavioural responses' of economic agents, 
and not only on the existence of temporary nominal rigidities or asymmetric 
information. The analysis developed in this book was aimed to highlight 
this point: that monetary policy can have real regional effects both for 
the differences in economic structure and for the differences in responses 
of economic agents. We think this argument is important because the cur-
rent structural differences in Europe might disappear sometime in the 
future, but this would not necessarily mean that asymmetries in the trans-
mission of monetary policy would automatically vanish: there would still 
be scope for asymmetries arising from differences in the behavioural 
responses of economic agents to monetary policy. 
Chapter 6 presented some partial empirical evidence which we think 
illustrates why monetary policy matters for regions. Three different (but 
related) results were reported in this chapter. First, for the EMU area, our 
results suggest that the single monetary policy has been quite inefficient 
in reducing inflation differentials among the euro member economies. 
In fact, our evidence shows that from the year 2000 on inflation has stayed 
above its 2 percent objective and that inflation differentials among the 
euro area countries have not been removed despite monetary unification. 
In addition, persistence in inflation differentials in Europe seems to be 
much stronger than that observed in other long-established currency unions 
(Spain and the United States). The persistence of inflation differentials 
among the euro area countries not only questions the assumption that in-
flation in Europe is exclusively a monetary phenomenon, but also that the 
European Central Bank is implementing a 'one-size' interest rate policy for 
the euro area. These two aspects might have important consequences for 
the macroeconomic performance of some regions/countries in the euro area. 
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The second result regards the Spanish experience. The empirical evidence 
included in Chapter 6 showed that the Spanish regions responded differently 
to the monetary shocks during 1988-1998. Our empirical evidence also 
suggested that regional differences both in financial and economic structure 
were responsible for such differences in responses. Consequently, if 
differences in financial structure among the Spanish regions were not fully 
abolished, despite having had a unique monetary policy and regulatory 
framework for a long time, we concluded that current differences in 
financial structure of the euro area might well last for longer than expected 
and so contribute to a non-homogeneous impact of the single monetary 
policy. 
Finally, Chapter 6 also reported evidence of a more unstable pattern 
for credit availability in some regions in Spain. In particular, the results 
showed a much higher instability for credit growth in the lower-income 
regions in Spain along business cycles. This result is compatible with the 
Post Keynesian theory that emphasizes the role of uncertainty, liquid-
ity preference and financial structure in the determination of the regional 
credit markets, as well as the influence that monetary policy decisions might 
have on all these variables. 
Notes 
1 Introduction 
1 See the book by Angeloni et al. (2003), which gathers the results of a multi-year 
collaborative project conducted by the ECB and other Eurosystem central banks. 
2 See the empirical evidence provided in Chapter 6 and in other published works 
(Rodriguez-Fuentes 1998, Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow 2003). 
3 Richardson (1973) has also offered some interesting clues as to why regional 
scientists have usually neglected any role for money and financial variables. 
One reason is that they have borrowed too freely from neoclassical growth 
theory the assumptions of free and costless movement of labour and capital 
among regions, full and costless availability of information, etc. These as-
sumptions leave no role for money at the regional level. He also mentions that 
both the open character of regional economies and the absence of regional 
monetary tools leave regional economies without any monetary identity 
(Richardson 1973: 9-14). 
4 Global monetarism points out the low effectiveness of monetary and exchange 
rate policies in small open economies. The underlying argument is that 
exogenous and expansive monetary shocks will lead to imbalances in the 
external sector due to the highly open character of these economies (see, for 
example, Ally 1975, Khatkhate and Short 1980, Corbo and Ossa 1982, Caram 
1985, 1993, Worrel 1991). However, some authors have also recognized some 
effectiveness for certain policies such as selective credit controls (Khatkhate 
and Villanueva 1978, Crusol 1986, Blejer 1988). Rodriguez-Fuentes (2004) 
offers a survey of this literature and explores the possibilities for monetary policy 
in small island economies. 
5 In these kinds of models national monetary policy affects regions through its 
incidence on national business cycles, which determine regional exports growth. 
6 This is evident for example in the paper by Beare (1976), which can be regarded 
as a regional application of Andersen and Jordan's (1968) paper. The same could 
be said for Mathur and Stein (1980) and Garrison and Kort (1983). 
7 One exception in this regard seems to be the paper by Chatelain et al. (2002). 
2 A dichotomized view of the economic process: the trammission channels of 
monetary policy 
1 Leeuw and Gramlich (1969), Spencer (1974), Tobin (1978), Laidler 
(1978), Romer and Romer (1990), Blanchard (1990), Miles and Wilcox (1991), 
Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993b), Cecchetti (1995), 
Mishkin (1995, 1996 and 2001) and Randa (2000) deal specifically with 
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this issue. However, either intentionally or not, most literature on the effects 
of monetary policy on economy also includes references to such a concept. 
2 The long list of contributions in this regard should start with the influential 
paper by Friedman and Meiselman (1963), where the authors tested the 
relationship between money and aggregate expenditure for the US economy, 
and could go on with, among others, the contributions by Andersen and 
Jordan (1968), Meiselman and Simpson (1971), Keran (1970a, 1970b, 1970c), 
Sims (1972), Carlson (1978), Dewald and Marchon (1978), Hafer (1982), 
Batten and Hafer (1983), Batten and Thornton (1983), Chowdhurry et al. (1986), 
Kretzmer (1992), Becketti and Morris (1992) and Rasche (1993). However, 
these 'monetarist' results have also been questioned and challenged by many 
others: Poole and Kornblith (1973), Waud (1974), Lombra and Torto (1974), 
Williams et al. (1976), Friedman (1977), Vrooman (1979), Feige and 
Pearce (1979), Seaks and Allen (1980), Cooley and Leroy (1985), Darrat 
(1986), Spencer (1989), Chowdhurry (1986a, 1986b) and Friedman and Kuttner 
(1992). 
3 It is said that money may affect output within the short term when price 
increases precede cost increases. The former is likely to happen when some 
costs are fixed, at least within the short term (for example, wages). In turn, this 
'price-cost gap' would allow some producers to make profits by increasing 
their production and so employment. However, this situation cannot last for 
long since cost, both financial - interest rates and labour - wage indexation will 
finally rise. 
4 Johnson has considered these two points, i.e. the fact that inflation is an 
important question and that monetarism has provided both its explanation 
and a policy to deal with it, among the factors which would help to explain 
the relative success of the monetarist counter-revolution. He put it as follows: 
'New ideas win a public and a professional hearing, not on their scientific merits, 
but on whether or not they promise a solution to important problems ... the 
monetarist counter-revolution has ultimately been successful because it 
has encountered a policy problem - inflation ... for which ... [it] has both a 
theory and a policy solution.' (Johnson 1971: 12). 
5 Friedman symbolized the theoretical demand function for money for an 
individual wealth holder in the way shown in equation 2.6, and considered 
that, with some minor adjustments in some variables, the business demand for 
money could be obtained and therefore, by aggregation, the total demand for 
money (Friedman 1970: 202-206). 
6 Although Friedman has given a specific rate of monetary growth to follow (4 or 
5 per cent according to his empirical estimates), he has also pointed out 
many times that 'a steady and known rate of increase in the quantity of money 
is more important than the precise numerical value of the rate of increase.' 
(Friedman 1970: 48). See also Friedman, opus cit., pp. 108-109 and 184-187. 
7 For a formal exposition on how to arrive at such expressions see, for example, 
Branson (1985), Chapter 5. 
8 This is the transmission in the closed version, i.e. the model which neglects 
the existence of the external sector for the economy. The open version of the 
mechanism will be considered later on. 
9 See, among others, Tobin (1947, 1956, 1958), Latane (1954), Friedman (1959), 
Bronfenbrenner and Mayer (1960), Meltzer (1963), Brunner and Meltzer 
(1964), Courchene and Shapiro (1964), Laidler (1966, 1977), Laidler and 
Parkin (1970), Goldfeld (1973) and Judd and Scadding (1982). 
10 See, for example, Akthar and Harris (1987), Chouraqui et al. (1988, 1989), 
Mauskopf (1990) and Mosser (1992). 
150 Notes 
11 The existence of such a difference could only be explained by transaction costs, 
differential risks and low substitutability among national and international 
financial assets. 
12 Unless some effective sterilization policy is being run by the national monetary 
authorities. 
13 This does not necessarily mean that national rates are equal to international ones 
since some mark-up may allow for differential country risks, imperfect asset 
substitution, transaction costs or whatever. This would imply that international 
differences in interest rates would move in the same direction. 
14 This would happen when there is a lack of information (imperfect information) 
which misleads agents in their expectation formation process. 
15 See among others Mishkin (1982), Boschen and Grossman (1982), Fitzgerald 
and Pollio (1983) and Driscoll et al. (1983). 
16 They also agree in their belief that 'macroeconomics should be grounded 
in microeconomic principles, and that understanding macroeconomic behavior 
requires the construction of a (simple) general equilibrium model' (Greenwald 
and Stiglitz 1993b: 23-24). This is also claimed by the proponents of the 
New Neoclassical Synthesis, as it will be shown in the next section. 
17 See, among others, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Bernanke (1983, 1993), 
Gertler (1988), Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995), Romer and Romer (1990), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a), Gertler 
and Gilchrist (1993b), Kashyap et al. (1993) and Kashyap and Stein (1997a). 
18 Bernanke and Blinder (1988) take into account this assumption and introduce 
both money and credit into the standard IS-LM model with the aim to give 
a role to the bank-lending channel. 
19 See, for example, Bernanke and Blinder (1992), Gertler and Gilchrist (1993b) and 
Kashyap et al. (1993). 
20 Meyer has suggested that even though 'money plays no explicit role in today's 
consensus model', the influence of monetarism is beneath its surface, partic-
ularly regarding the issues of what monetary policy can and cannot do, and the 
key role played by central banks to achieve price stability (Meyer 2001: 3). 
21 According to Meyer (2001: 2), the consensus macro model is represented by 
the three following dynamic equations: 
Yf = aYf_1 + bE,(Yf+1) - c[R, - E,(P1+1)] + x, (a) 
Pt = d(Yf) + W1P1-1 + w2E1(P1+1) + Zt (b) 
R, = r" + E,(P1+1) + f Yf + K(P1-1 - p') (c) 
where yg is the output gap, R is the nominal interest rate, r* is the equilibrium 
interest rate, p is inflation, p 1 is the inflation target, x and z are stochastic 
shocks, and w1 +w2 =1. 
22 See Romer (2000) for further details in this respect. 
23 For example, the monetary policy rule employed in the Clarida et al. (1999: 1696) 
paper is a forward-looking version of the simple Taylor rule (Taylor 1993) with 
interest rate smoothing. 
24 Further details can be found in Clarida et al. (1999: 1665-1667) and Meyer 
(2001: 3). 
25 The average mark-up is defined as the ratio of the average firm's price to marginal 
cost of production (Goodfriend and King 1998: 26). 
3 Beyond transmission mechanisms 
One exception to this exogenous money view is the Real Business Cycle theory 
(Kydland and Prescott 1982, 1990, Long and Plosser 1983), which considers 
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that money mirrors real output changes and that these changes are caused by 
real shocks (mainly technological ones) that have nothing to do with monetary 
policy (King and Plossser 1984). 
2 On this point, see Davidson (1978a, 1992, 1994), Chick (1984), Kregel (1984-85) 
and Arestis (1992). 
3 For example, Moore sees the money supply as horizontal in interest rate 
because banks will always meet any demand for credit. He argues his position 
saying that 'banks are price setters and quantity takers in both their retail 
loan and their deposit markets' (Moore 1988b: 381). However, this position, 
which has been labelled as horizontalist, is not universally shared by all post 
Keynesians. See, for example, Wray (1990), Dow (1993a, 1996b) and Chick and 
Dow (2002). 
4 Dow (1995) offers a review and a categorization of the concept of uncertainty 
whereas Dow (1998, 2004a) explores its consequences for credit availability and 
monetary policy, respectively. 
5 See Shackle (1955), particularly Chapters I-IX. 
6 The papers by Wray (1992a) and Desai (1998) deal with the distinction between 
endogenous and exogenous. See also Dow (1993a), Chapter 3, for the 
implications of an endogenous money approach. 
7 For an account on Keynes' own view on endogeneity and further developments 
of this concept made by post Keynesian, see Dow (1996a). See also Foster (1986) 
for Keynes' view on endogenous and exogenous money. 
8 Chick (2005) offers an interesting analysis of the 'story of the struggle for, and 
loss of, the concept of endogenous money'. Her analysis suggests that the 
concept of endogenous money was one time widely accepted but 'was lost 
in favour of the money-base theory through very subtle changes of emphasis 
and language. Partly through excessive formalization of the multiplier and 
partly through reinterpreting cash reserves from a limitation on banks to an 
instrument of control, the multiplier came to support the monetarist project' 
(Chick 2005: 63). 
9 This price rigidity is also explained by the existence of long term contracts in 
the labour market. See, for example, Fischer (1977). 
10 Feige and McGee (1977) and Feige and Pearce (1979) have studied the causal 
relationship between reserves and money supply, and money and income. 
respectively. Neither found clear evidence suggesting that the FED can control 
reserves nor money causes income. Some further evidence on the 'reverse 
causation argument' can be found in Lombra and Torto (1973) and Wray (1990: 
Chapter 7). The general argument is that it is impossible to clearly distinguish 
between the influence of the money stock on economic activity from the 
influence of economic activity on the money stock. It is impossible then to clearly 
'identify' money demand and supply ('identification problem'). 
11 Although this point will be taken again below, we must point out here the matter 
regarding whether the supply of money is fully determined by the demand for 
credit remains controversial. 
12 Wray provides some empirical evidence of the ways through which the banking 
system frees from reserve constraints (Yvray 1990: Chapter 7). 
13 Some authors have interpreted Moore's model as an IS-LM model with a 
horizontal money supply. However, and as Wray has rightly pointed out, 'the 
primary difference between Moore's position and that of an IS-LM model with 
and interest rate target [horizontal money supply] lies in the mechanism through 
which money enters the economy. In the IS-LM models, the central bank 
supplies more reserves and . . . banks find they can make more loans ... 
In Moore's model, money demand rises because economic agents desire to 
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increase spending [and] ... banks passively respond by issuing more money and 
then try to obtain reserves to meet legal requirements' (Yvray 1992a: 1155). 
14 Goodhart (1989c). 
15 An example of this implicit separation is seen in the design of the European 
Monetary Union. 
16 See Duca (1993) and Clair and Tucker (1993) for an account of these arguments. 
17 Interbank lending, discount window and lender of last resort facilities, access to 
external financial markets, increased banking competition, financial innova-
tion, etc., would be among the factors which would explain this process. 
18 Chick and Dow (2002) also mention that the 'central bank's influence is not 
simply a matter of determining the interest rate. Rather, monetary policy 
generally consists of a combination of quantity effects and price effects, none 
of which is deterministic. The scope for the central bank to get these effects to 
bite is limited by the state of expectations, by the institutional arrangements 
through which interest rate effects are transmitted, and by the capacity of 
the banks to rearrange portfolios in order to avoid quantity effects' (Chick and 
Dow 2002: 605). 
19 Reference removed. 
20 Credit demand for speculative activities (speculative demand) is likely to be 
less interest elastic as these activities may have attached higher returns, 
because of their risky nature, within shorter periods of time. As regards personal 
demand, this could also show low interest elasticity since personal borrowing 
decisions are likely to be determined by personal income expectations 
(wages, employment, etc.) rather than by its cost (interest rates). The former 
is reinforced by the fact that personal borrowing is sometimes aimed to 
provide households with goods of first need (low price elasticity, such as 
housing, etc.). 
21 This factor may depend on borrower's size since larger firms usually have access 
to other financial sources than bank credit. 
22 Moore (1988a) being the leading author. 
23 See Cottrell (1994) for a survey. 
24 J.C.R. Dow and Saville (1990: 23-27) have also made a similar point to this. 
They have distinguished two points in bank intermediation. The first one is a 
'potential equilibrium point' whereas the second one would be the 'operative 
equilibrium point', both of which would move forward in a growing economy. 
The potential equilibrium point is defined as the 'desired lending' by final lenders 
and borrowers, being the operative equilibrium point that banks themselves 
find profitable. 
25 See Minsky (1982), especially Chapters 5-7. 
26 J.C.R. Dow and Saville (1990: 55) argue that 'although banks are many and 
separate, collectively the banking system behaves in some respects as a block .... 
The conformity in behaviour probably reflects not oligopoly but other reasons, 
... Banks are in the business of maturity transformation ... Short-term funding 
will become harder to obtain if doubt develops about the quality of bank loans; 
. . . Thus, it is essential to each bank to maintain market confidence in its 
management, and this in general will require following lending policies similar to 
those other banks'. 
27 The papers by Moore (1989a), Niggle (1989b), Ash and Bell (1991) and Arestis 
and Howells (1994) have dealt with some of the redistributional effects of high 
levels of interest rates. 
28 However, one wonders how money could possibly matter within a model 
which explicitly assumes real variables (real income) to depend only on real 
factors (physical capital and labour). If by definition we take money away 
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from the real sector, how could it matter for real purposes? How could labour 
force matter if we consider that output does not depend on labour? 
29 This is what Chick has labelled as the other half of monetary change (Chick 
1992: 159-160). 
30 By monetary conditions we do not only mean interest rates, but also expectations 
on future interest rates, economic growth and any other variable (information) 
which may affect borrowers' and lenders' behaviour. 
4 The regional effects of monetary policy: a theoretical framework 
1 See, for example, the contributions by Mathur and Stein (1980, 1982, 1983) and 
Garrison and Kort (1983). The papers by Mathur and Stein suggest that the use 
of reduced-form models was rather misleading since their results were biased. 
Garrison and Kort (1983) tried instead to support empirically the view that a 
strong and reliable relationship between regional income and fiscal variables also 
existed at the regional level. 
2 For a review on the differential effects of monetary policy on different 
components of aggregate demand see, among others, Friedman (1989, 1990a), 
Fisher and Sheppard (1972, 1974), Meiselman and Simpsom (1971), Chouraqui 
et al. (1988, 1989), Akthar and Harris (1987), Mauskopf (1990) and Mosser 
(1992). 
3 On this particular point see Jones (1985), and Carlino, Cody and Voith (1990). 
Some remarks on the Spanish case have been made by Martinez and Pedrefio 
(1990), Pedrefio and Pardo (1990), Pedrefio (1992), and Martinez (1994). See also 
Hung (1992-93) for a study of the impact of the exchange rate appreciation on 
aggregate profits of exporting and import-competing firms in the US. 
4 This is precisely the New Keynesian argument of credit rationing applied to a 
regional credit market. 
5 For example, Doyle (1992) has made this the case for the regional impact of the 
EMU in Europe. See also Doyle (1988, 1991). 
6 As we have seen, this is almost the same argument that current followers of the 
Optimum Currency Area theory now employ to explain the asymmetries that a 
one-size interest rate policy may have in Europe. 
7 See, for example, Marelli (1985) and Folmer and Nijkamp (1985). 
8 It is generally agreed that higher long term interest rates have a stronger effect on 
some economic sectors and some types of expenditure, particularly investment, 
than others, and that it is unlikely that those sectors and investments are to be 
evenly distributed within a national economic space. It is also generally agreed 
that a strong appreciation of the exchange rate will affect open regions more than 
closed ones. Furthermore, even among the 'open regions group', exchange rate 
changes would have different regional effects as long as there were differences 
in the price elasticity of demand for exports. 
9 For instance, it is argued that if no intervention exists and information is made 
available to all agents, financial markets would allocate funds in the 'best place'. 
10 See Chick (2000) for a discussion of the distinctions between these approaches. 
11 On this point, see Chapter 3, particularly Section 3.4 and also Chapter 5, 
particularly Section 5.3, where the Post Keynesian theory of regional finance 
is reviewed. 
12 See Chapter 3, particularly Section 3.2. 
13 This was found to be the case for Scotland in Dow (1992d). 
14 Rodriguez-Fuentes (1998) and Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow (2003) have 
provided some empirical evidence for the Spanish regions in this regard. 
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15 See Section 3.1 in Chapter 5. 
16 It is known that small firms are more bank dependent than larger ones. This 
bank dependence has been explained by factors such as: (i) the existence of higher 
administrative costs, which could make it unprofitable to borrow small amounts 
in capital markets, (ii) the existence of thinner markets for financial assets 
supplied by small firms (low marketability); (iii) lack of (standard) information 
from small business; (iv) owner-managers unwilling to open 'family businesses' 
to outsiders (investors in capital markets); (v) lower collateral to be offered by 
small business, and (vi) greater difficulties attached to the credit risk assessment 
process (due to lack of information). All these factors would explain why small 
businesses are highly vulnerable to credit rationing. 
17 One point to consider here would be the effect that financial regulation may have 
on different regional banks, or, alternatively, the existence of regional differences 
in financial regulation. Evanoff and Israilevich (1991) studied this latter effect 
for a sample of large US banks, and found evidence of 'adverse effect' of 
regulation by banks of one particular region in comparison to the rest. However, 
they also concluded that these banks seemed to be in a better position to bear the 
burden of regulation, this being explained by 'apparent adjustments' in their 
production technology (Evanoff and lsrailevich 1991: 51-52). 
18 At a higher price of course, but it would always supply the quantity needed. 
19 Rousseas (1986), especially Chapters 4 and 5. 
20 See Dow and Saville (1990), and particularly Chapters 3, 4, 8 and 9 as they 
offer an account of a central banks' power to influence both market interest 
rates and commercial banks' behaviour, respectively. 
21 See the stages of banking development by Chick (1986, 1988). 
22 Amado also mentions this particular problem when interpreting the ratio loans 
to deposits to study the role of the financial system in regional economic 
development in Brazil (Amado 1997: 141-147). 
23 By means of offering information on sources of finance available to them, costs, 
etc. 
24 This is the traditional new Keynesian 'adverse selection' effect. 
25 The papers by Moore (1989a), Niggle (1989b), Ash and Bell (1991) and Arestis 
and Howells (1994) have addressed the consequences of monetary policy for 
personal income. 
26 However, and even in the case that a regional monetary policy could be put in 
practice, most researchers also acknowledge that this would not be desirable 
because, after considering the advantages and disadvantages attached to this, 
it would be of little help. In fact, the running of a regional monetary policy would 
mean either the introduction of exchange controls or a regional currency. These, 
in turn, may entail some disadvantages. For example, exchange controls (higher 
transaction costs) could affect regional trade relationships. A regional currency 
would open the possibility for exchange rate management and, hence, some kind 
of balance of payment management. However, it is also acknowledged that the 
effectiveness of such policy would be of minor importance due to the adverse 
effects it could have on trade relations and because of the small and very open 
character of such economies. The papers by Tait (1977) and Robertson (1985) 
offer an analysis of these possibilities for the Scottish case. An analysis of 
the relative ineffectiveness of exchange rate policy in small open (island) 
economies can be found in Ally (1975), Khatkhate and Short (1980), Corbo 
and Ossa (1982), Crusol (1986), Worrell (1991) and Rodriguez-Fuentes (2004). 
27 By looking at interest rates? The higher the interest rates the tighter the mon-
etary policy is? By looking at the growth of monetary aggregates? The lower 
the growth the tighter the monetary policy? Clearly all these criteria only fit in 
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a world of perfect exogenous money, i.e. in a world where central banks can 
unilaterally decide whether to reduce monetary growth or not, for example. 
However, once we assume monetary growth to depend also on banks' behaviour 
the former argument is not so clear. Therefore, a low monetary growth 
could be also explained by either high banks' or borrowers' liquidity prefer-
ence, since monetary growth now depends on whether borrowers decide to 
borrow and banks decide to meet all these demands as well, and not only on 
the central bank's (unilateral) decision of supplying more liquidity. Could central 
banks force banks to lend? Could commercial banks force borrowers to bor-
row? Couldn't banks first decide to lend if it is profitable to them and, 
afterwards, look for the reserves needed, either in national or international 
financial markets, or claiming them in the discount window? And, finally, 
could central banks really neglect such liquidity when banks really need it? 
Aren't central banks responsible for looking after the stability of the financial 
system? 
28 Whether banks partially or totally meet this increase in demand for credit will 
depend on (i) their ability to satisfy such increase in credit demand and (ii) their 
willingness to supply such credit. The former factor depends on their capacity to 
extend credit beyond their deposit-base and on central bank interventions 
since they can make it more difficult, or not. The second factor will depend on 
whether banks share the same optimism, which leads borrowers to increase 
their demand, i.e. their regional liquidity preference. 
5 Monetary policy, fmancial flows and credit markets: a survey of the 
regional literature 
1 The 'experimentation' pointed out by Beare was prompted by some multi-
collinearity problems (Beare 1976: 60, footnote 5). 
2 Early models developed by, among others, Czamanski (1969) and Glickman 
(1977) would be included in this group, and clearly contrast with those other 
Neo-Classical models of regional growth which explicitly have denied any role 
for monetary variables to play in the explanation of regional economic growth. 
An example of the latter can be found in Borts (1968). 
3 However, there are also some papers which explicitly do not fall in either of the 
categories as they do not explicitly show the implicit model followed. This is the 
case of Chase Econometric Associates (1981). 
4 The indicator of the degree of 'monetary tightness' was M2 (money stock plus 
net time deposits) rate of growth. 
5 Although YMFG, Y AGR and YMIN are considered as the export regional 
sector (the basic sector), the authors chose YMFG as the only one which was 
directly affected by national monetary and fiscal variables. They assume both 
YAGR and YMIN were expected to respond to other external stimulus, such as 
movements in world food prices in the case of Y AGR. 
6 Miller defines these variables as 'the differences between cash items in process of 
collection and deferred availability cash items on the individual Reserve Bank 
balance sheets'. Since Federal Reserve Banks credit members banks for checks 
not collected yet, this may mean that 'regions having larger volume of checks 
flowing in from other areas will be the regions that have larger proportional 
increases in their net source base due to any increase in the national float item' 
(R.J. Miller 1978: 12-13). 
7 However, there have also been contributions which have arrived at the 
conclusion that such lags do not exist. See, for example, Bryan (1967). Some 
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others have also argued that even if they existed, lags would be reduced by 
improvements introduced in the workings of the monetary markets during 
the 1960s and 1970s. However, McPheters (1976) found no significant change 
between the periods 194~1960 and 1961-1969. 
8 We are referring here to the Chick's model of stages of banking development 
(Chick 1986). See also Chick and Dow (1988), and Chick (1993a) for two 
applications to a regional setting. 
9 Rockoff (1977) attributed the high interest rates existing in some US regions 
during 1870--1914 to their higher rates of bank failures. 
10 Another difference with Schaafs findings was that 'distance' was not significant 
any more. 
11 As reported in Faini et al. (1993: 209). 
12 The empirical evidence provided by Ebner (1976) showed that some regional 
differences existed in terms of the sensitivity of savings to changes in national 
interest rates. The model to test the hypothesis was (as reported in Roberts 
and Fishkind 1979: 22-24): 
SLA = Po+ P1 SA2L + P2 RTBL + P3 TIME 
where SLA is deposits/state personal income, SA2L is SLA lagged one period, 
RTBL is the 3 month treasury bill rate and TIME a time trend variable. 
13 This was estimated as: 
national money supply . 
M; = . 1 de nd de . x state demand deposits natzona ma posits 
14 On this point see, among others, the papers by Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Gertler 
(1988), Bernanke and Blinder (1988, 1992), Bernanke and Gertler (1989), 
Bernanke (1993), Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993a) and Gertler and Gilchrist 
(1993b). A survey of this literature can be found in Cosci (1993) and Mattesini 
(1993). 
15 See Chick and Dow (1988) and Dow (1987a, 1988) for a theoretical account. 
Dow (1987b) applies that theory to an open economy whereas Dow (1990, 
1992d) and Chick (1993a) offer a case study for Canada, Scotland and the 
European Union, respectively. More recent contributions have applied that 
framework to study the regional patterns of credit availability in Spain 
(Rodriguez-Fuentes 1998, Rodriguez-Fuentes and Dow 2003). 
16 This is the New Keynesian imperfect-information argument. 
17 See Dow (1993a), Chapter 3, especially pp. 38-40. Minsky's (1982) Chapter 5 
offers a comprehensive account of the relationship between lending expansion 
(contraction) and business cycles. 
18 See the collection of papers included in Angeloni et al. (2003). 
19 These differences are documented in De Bandt and Davis (1999), Danthine et al. 
(1999), Schmidt (1999), Bondt (2000), Maclennan et al. (2000), Padoa-Schioppa 
(2000), Kleimeier and Sander (2001) and Cabral et al. (2002). 
20 To some extent this pessimistic view was challenged in Emerson et al. (1992: 212-
234), where an optimistic evaluation of the effects of the European Monetary 
Union for the less-favoured regions in the EU is provided. 
21 Several surveys of this literature can be found in Britton and Whitley (1997), 
Dornbusch et al. (1998), Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998), Guiso et al. (1999) and 
Mojon and Peersman (2001). Angeloni et al. (2003) gathers a collection of papers 
on this issue. 
22 One exception in this regard seems to be the paper by Chatelain et al. (2002). 
23 The relevance of the behavioural responses will be emphasized in the next 
chapter. 
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24 Christiano et al. (1999) offer a survey of the literature that employs VAR to 
study the transmission of monetary policy shocks. 
25 See Rudebusch (1998). Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) and Guiso et al. (1999: 
5~1) expand further on how this criticism may affect the results and 
conclusions obtained in the empirical literature for the EMU. 
26 Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998: 8-9) report other examples of large-scale 
macroeconomic multi-country models, such as the US Federal Reserve's 
MCM model, the IMF's Multimod standard simulations. 
27 Apart from the above mentioned works by Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998) and 
Guiso et al. (1999), see Peersman and Smets (2001), van Els et al. (2002) and 
Peersman (2003). 
28 See Bernanke (1993) for an account of the bank lending view, and Greenwald 
et al. (1993) for its regional implications. Gertler and Gilchrist (1991) and 
Kashyap et al. (1993) analyze the implications for firms' financing. 
29 However, Elbourne and Haan (2004: 21) provide some empirical evidence that 
shows that 'the result and conclusion of Cecchetti (1999) is not robust across 
model specifications'. 
6 Some empirical evidence 
* The empirical evidence provided in this chapter is the result of my joint research 
with other colleagues. In particular, Sections 6.2 and 6.3 are co-authored 
with David Padron and Antonio Olivera, while section 6.4 is co-authored with 
Sheila Dow. 
1 The single currency was expected to remove market segmentation, enhance 
market competition and therefore make the law of one price work in the medium 
term. 
2 The purpose of this change is 'to maintain a sufficient safety margin to guard 
against the risks of deflation' (ECB 2003a: 79). However, if inflation is a 
monetary phenomenon, as the ECB seems to believe when justifying the first 
pillar of its monetary policy scheme, there should not be room for defla-
tion because the central bank could always produce inflation by increasing the 
money supply. If the central bank has the tools to avoid excess money, it should 
also be able to avoid the reverse situation. If this is not the case, then what's 
the point in keeping an eye on the rate of growth of the M3 in the long run 
( the first pillar)? 
3 Of course, the ECB could always reply that inflation is a monetary phenomenon 
only in the long run, so it is still too soon to say anything about monetary 
policy effectiveness in Europe (actually, the single monetary policy has been 
working only since 1999). However, there is empirical evidence showing that 
the correlation between money and inflation is weak for the low inflation 
countries, and that 'country specific factors have a significant influence on 
the strength of such relationship' (De Grauwe and Polan 2001). King 
(2002) provides evidence on the strong correlation between monetary growth 
and inflation in the long run, although in the short run this correlation 
is less evident. In addition, he points out that 'correlation, of course, is not 
causation'. 
4 That institutional change had straightforward and substantial implications 
for the continuity and availability of reliable statistical information which would 
be crucial for the decision-making process at the ECB, for example. 
5 A comprehensive analysis of the implications of model uncertainty for monetary 
policy transmission can be found in Dow (2004a). 
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6 For a fuller description see Issing et al. (2001), Chapter 7. 
7 The reference value was set in terms of an annual rate of growth of 4.5 percent 
for the entire euro area. Interestingly, this value was worked out by using 
the quantity theory of money, assuming a 2 percent rate of growth for prices, a 
2-2.5 percent rate of growth for GDP and a declining trend in the income-money 
velocity of circulation (ECB 1999). 
8 See, for example, Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), Taylor (1999), Clarida et al. 
(1998, 2000), Nelson (2000), Batini and Haldane (1999) and Angeloni and Dedola 
(1999). 
9 Article 105 of the EU Treaty. 
10 Article 2 states that: 'The Community shall have as its task ... to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of eco-
nomic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the envi-
ronment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a high level 
of employment and social protection, the raising of the standard of living 
and quality of life, and economic social cohesion and solidarity among 
Member States'. 
11 We employed the industrial production index as an output variable and the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter as the method to extract the potential output. Output gap 
is measured as the 12 month average, intending to provide a smooth indicator of 
this variable. 
12 In relation to expression (6.9), Taylor (1993) assumed the following values for 
the different parameters in the rule: r =fr= 2, <p,,= 1.5 and <p,,=0.5. 
13 These factors can be of a real or financial nature. For a recent survey of this issue 
in the European Monetary Union, see Angeloni et al. (2002). 
14 An explanation of the inflationary Spanish experience based on these factors 
can be found in Ledo et al. (2002). 
15 See Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). 
16 Wage inflation is proportional to productivity growth in the traded sector. 
However, in the non-traded sector prices have to rise because productivity 
is assumed to grow slower than wage inflation. 
17 Olivera (2003) provides evidence for Spain. 
18 The recent developments of the housing markets both in Spain and Ireland could 
support this explanation. 
19 An aspect that must be mentioned is the relevance of the analytical approach 
employed to introduce the pricing-to-market behaviour in the model. As 
Bergin (2003) states, the models that generate pricing to market by assuming 
that goods prices are sticky in the currency of the importer are unable to 
explain pricing to market in the context of a monetary union. However, models 
that use translog preferences (as the one proposed by Bergin, 2003) rely neither 
on multiple currencies nor sticky prices. For this reason, they can generate 
pricing to market in currency unions. These models have the advantage of 
remaining closer to the initial development of pricing to market in the 
microeconomic literature. 
20 We employed the Harmonised Consumer Price Index (HCPI) data from 
Eurostat for the euro area countries, which is available from 1990 on. 
21 We used three MSA for the United States; that is, the three MSA for which 
monthly data were available. 
22 For drawing comparison, we stick here to the 'common practice' in current 
empirical work where the term monetary policy is understood as unanticipated 
(or non-systematic) monetary policy shocks (Christiano et al. 1999). However, it 
is important to take into account that this approach does not consider the 
systematic part of the monetary policy (Romer and Romer 1989 and Taylor 
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1995), which in reality can be at least as important as the 'monetary surprises'. 
McCallum has pointed out that 'the systematic component of monetary policy 
actions is at least as important as the study of the unsystematic component, 
also known as policy shocks' (McCallum 2001: 12). He concludes that, in 
studying the monetary policy transmission process, 'more emphasis should be 
given to the systematic portion of the policy behaviour and correspondingly 
less to random shocks - basically because shocks account for a very small 
fraction of policy instrument variability' (McCallum 2001: 38). 
23 Although necessary for the empirical purposes of this section, we are aware that 
the very idea of identifying (or isolating) the so-called exogenous monetary 
shocks is misleading because it implicitly draws a sometimes arbitrary distinction 
between endogenous (real variables that respond to exogenous monetary 
interventions) and exogenous variables (monetary shocks which are aimed to 
affect real variables) which might impose hidden assumptions on the way 
monetary policy works in reality. 
24 It should be noted that the use of V AR models to identify exogenous monetary 
shocks is not free from criticism (see Rudebusch 1998). 
25 For further details on the estimation procedure see Rodriguez-Fuentes et al. 
(2004b). 
26 Aragon, Baleares, Cataluiia, Comunidad Valenciana, Madrid, Navarra, Pais 
Vasco and La Rioja. 
27 Andalucia, Asturias, Canarias, Cantabria, Castilla La Mancha, Castilla Leon, 
Extremadura, Galicia y Murcia. 
28 We use SURE instead of OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) due to the existence of 
high correlation in the variable cred. However, the estimates using OLS method 
offer similar results. 
29 We follow here the results reported by Raymond (1990, 1993). 
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